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3 The 'Labor Question'

STEVE FRASER

I

WHEN Franklin Roosevelt first appeared on the national stage of American public life, as a youthful assistant secretary of the navy, many of his contemporaries considered the 'labor question' the primal problem confronting the Western world. Even in the United States, where socialist and labor politics had barely scratched out a beachhead, the 'labor question' nonetheless assumed this ontological status. Thus, on the eve of World War I, Louis Brandeis noted, "The labor question is and for a long time must be the paramount economic question in this country."[1] But even that was an understatement. Everyone from Woodrow Wilson to Big Bill Haywood acknowledged that the 'labor question' was not merely the supreme economic question but the constitutive moral, political, and social dilemma of the new industrial order.

From Versailles, President Wilson cabled Congress:

> The question which stands at the front of all others amidst the present great awakening is the question of labor . . . how are the men and women who do the daily labor of the world to obtain progressive improvement in the conditions of their labor, to be made happier, and to be served better by the communities and the industries which their labor sustains and advances?[2]

For a president facing a world undone by war and revolution, the 'labor question' was fraught with danger. For others, like progressive ideologue Frederick Howe, it contained an exalting revelation:

> My own class did not want such a world [a world of equality—SF]. And there was but one other class—the workers . . . Labor would not serve privilege . . . By necessity labor would serve freedom, democracy, equal opportunity for all . . . The place for the liberal was in labor's ranks . . . My political enthusiasm was now for a party of primary producers.[3]

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Momentarily, the editors of the *New Republic* were swept away:

> We have already passed to a new era, the transition to a state in which labor will be the predominating element. The character of the future democracy is largely at the mercy of the recognized leaders of organized labor.[4]

For some, answering the 'labor question' thus promised not only to permanently alter the relationship between Labor and Capital, but in so doing to eliminate the immorality of exploitation, the social inequality and antagonism fostered by great aggregations of wealth, the threat to democratic politics represented by overbearing corporate power and pelf, and even the causes of global and imperialist war.

Along with FDR, a whole political generation matured during this "golden age" of the 'labor question'—men and women later principally responsible for the great reforms and realignments of the second New Deal: Felix Frankfurter and his band of political lawyers, including Ben Cohen, James Landis, Tom Corcoran, Alger Hiss, and future CIO chief counsel Lee Pressman; future cabinet members Frances Perkins, Harold Ickes, and Henry Wallace; senatorial New Dealers Robert Wagner and Robert LaFollette, Jr.; CIO founders John L. Lewis, Sidney Hillman, Clinton Golden, and Len DeCaux; social engineering reformers Harlow Person, Jett Lauck, and Morris Cooke; and future NLRB chairmen Edwin Smith, William Leiserson, and Harry Millis. Yet within the new political and industrial order they helped create, the 'labor question' no longer resonated with its accustomed power. By the time of Roosevelt's death in 1945, it had been eclipsed not only as the animating problem of national politics, not only as the unsolved central dilemma of the social order, but even as the "paramount economic question in this country."

Paradoxically, however, just as the 'labor question' receded like some faint echo from the distant political past, the new labor movement rose in a crescendo of industrial and political power. Indeed, if the new Democratic party crystallizing around the reform agenda of the second New Deal was not a mass labor party, it was nonetheless a party very much resting on the labor movement, on the insurgent CIO particularly. Somehow the political chemistry of the New Deal worked a double transformation: the ascendancy of labor and the eclipse of the 'labor question'.

This metamorphosis was clearly marked by (1) the dying away of the antimonopoly movement and its venerated ideology of productive labor as the core of oppositional politics; (2) the gradual repudiation of all third- or labor-party pretensions by the CIO leadership; (3) the legalization and federalization of industrial unionism and its

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subordination to the rule of administrative law under the Wagner Act; (4) metaphors of social integration, such as "security," "consumption," "interest," that supplanted metaphors of pariahdom like "rights" and "power"; (5) the replacement of the "workers control" of 1919 by "full employment" in 1946 as the animating issue of the postwar period; and (6) a global New Deal, not socialism, that circumscribed the far horizon of labor's vision.

By the end of World War II, the overriding issue in domestic affairs (arguably even in the realm of international politics) had become the American Standard of Living. The ASL was, in a sense, the favored answer to the 'labor question', draining it of its moral preeminence, its political threat, and its elemental social significance. The struggle over power and property, which had supplied the friction and frisson of politics since at least the Gilded Age, was superseded by the universal quest for more—goulash capitalism. Mass politics replaced class politics. Labor ceased to be a great question or even a mass movement containing within it the seeds of a wholly new future. As an institutionalized interest group it had become part of the answer, contributing to and drawing its just deserts from the cornucopia of American mass production and consumption.

Yet a question yawns. How was it that "Labor" came to be both fundamentally more important yet fundamentally less threatening to the American polity, to its newly created administrative state and its new ruling coalition?

An answer converges from two directions: (1) transformations in the macrodynamics of national politics culminating in the crystallization of a new political elite whose prescriptions for economic reform and recovery mated well with the social psychology and organizational imperatives of the new labor movement; (2) profound, if largely invisible, revolutions in the micropolitics of production and consumption, in the very anthropological framework of working-class life out of which the 'labor question' originally arose.

* * *

When, in the era of World War I, workers all over the world raised the cry for workers' control, they did so from the standpoint of a skilled elite (both industrial and pre-industrial) whose whole way of life was threatened with extinction, or at least marginalization, by the new forces of Fordism and Taylorism. But artisanal and industrial craftsmen were not the only ones to challenge the prevailing system of authority at work. 'Industrial democracy', a rubric as evocative and imprecise as "workers' control" but considerably more respectable, commanded equally widespread attention. The war and postwar

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period turned out to be the occasion for a plethora of experiments in redesigning the architecture of power at the workplace and even beyond the workplace. Works councils, shop delegates, profit sharing, corporate parliaments, all inspired visions, some would say delusions, of social partnership, of a new democratic dispensation where once the martial imperatives of coercive hierarchy commanded obedience.

The *New Republic*, aware that democracy was being subjected to "tests of unprecedented severity throughout the world," concluded that democracy's future "depends . . . upon the capacity of employers and workers to harmonize democratic ideals of freedom with the voluntary self-discipline essential to efficient production."[5] Industrial democrats like Felix Frankfurter were at pains to point out the need for independent vehicles of working-class representation. A community of progressive jurists and liberal-minded industrial engineers, along with circles of politically active businessmen, sought ways of restoring some sense of democratic participation to the otherwise stultifying regime of mass production, a regime that could no longer take for granted the submissiveness of its subjects. Ludlow and Lawrence before the war, Seattle and Pittsburgh after it, marked the longitude and latitude of a new geopolitics of class where armed confrontations, immigrant risings, municipal general strikes, and mass industrial unionism menaced the terrain. Equally unsettling, if less visible, was the disintegration of the traditional system of patrimonial authority of departmental foremen in mass production industries like auto where the costs of instability were becoming exorbitant, especially among the growing class of semiskilled workers. Somewhere, it was hoped, amid all the contending blueprints for industrial democracy, was a well-designed escape from "the bitterness of class war and the horrors that have paralyzed Russia."[6]

Notwithstanding the thousand and one subtle nuances of meaning, 'industrial democracy' was an idea whose time had come—or so it seemed. Yet so much was expected by so many from this proposed marriage of industry and democracy that no one could with confidence predict the health or longevity of the offspring, or, for that matter, whether a marriage subject to so many crosscutting desires might not fall apart without issue. Thus, industrial democracy might conceivably evolve as a new system of domination, that snare and delusion warned of by the Wobblies and cynically plotted by more hard-boiled industrialists. For those radical and skilled denizens of the modern factory, however, carriers of a democratic and egalitarian tradition already generations old, industrial democracy plausibly promised an end to hierarchy, centralized authority, and the degrading fragmentation of skills; it seemed, in a phrase, a new vehicle of

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liberation. For a heterogeneous milieu of personnel managers, social workers, efficiency experts, labor relations professionals, and social science academics; for socialists whose watchword was progress and progressives whose shibboleth was social partnership; for reformers loyal to the hoary tenets of antimonopoly politics and reformers like Frankfurter and Brandeis who deployed the populist rhetoric of antimonopoly to express an entirely new industrial dispensation; and for a small circle of socially conscious trade unionists, industrial democracy suggested a social compromise, the 'British way', a new system of integration for a society so explosively fractious it sometimes seemed, in the superheated atmosphere of war and revolution, on the verge of disintegration.

II

The Taylor Society, the institutional home of scientific management, had drifted steadily to the left during and after the war. Until Taylor's death in 1915, the American "science of management" was very much management's science. It was elitist and totalitarian in spirit, evincing a kind of nineteenth-century Stakhanovism whose Benthamite utilitarian psychology lacked any sense of the need for cultural transformation arising out of the destruction of craft and peasant cultures.

After Taylor's death the Society's formal conception of the industrial polity became increasingly syndicalist, envisioning the democratic integration of functional groups in a rationalized production system. Industrial relations mediators like William Leiserson, personnel managers like Meyer Jacobstein, scientific management consultants like Harlow Person, all of whom would play conspicuous roles in the labor politics of the New Deal, knew that the era of the "Prussian method" needed to end. Industrial authority should rest on the consent of the governed, so to speak, not merely because that was only fitting in a society so saturated in the maxims of liberalism, but because those precious psychic and social energies unleashed by the process of autonomous, self-imposed discipline were simply not reachable through the imperious command of others.

Their outlook tended to converge with that of certain progressive trade unionists—Sidney Hillman particularly, who was lionized by progressives everywhere as the architect of a 'new unionism'. Within the men's clothing industry Hillman helped fashion a new system of labor relations that embraced scientific management on condition that it be accompanied and accomplished by mechanisms of democratic—that is, union—control. Hillman, in collaboration with leading

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members of the Taylor Society, especially Cooke, Otto Beyer, and Harlow Person, as well as Frankfurter and economist Leo Wolman, sought both to introduce the rule of law on the shop floor—a constitutional order for labor-management relations—and install scientifically determined standards of production, formulated and agreed to by all parties. What really made the 'new unionism' new, and so appealing, however, was Hillman's distinctive genius for translating the axioms of industrial democracy into the lingua franca of dozens of shop-floor ethno-cultures.[7]

Up until this time, the new science of personnel management was deployed almost exclusively among the English-speaking skilled craftsmen. The immigrant unskilled were left to the less subtle ministrations of the "Prussian method." People like Leiserson and Cooke were convinced that the 'new unionism' of the ACW opened up an incomparably more felicitous avenue of acculturation and socialization by inviting the participation of the new immigrant working class in a controlled system of trade union and industrial decision making. They rejected both the facile belief in some natural harmony between Labor and Capital as well as the fatalism that conflict between them was inevitable and irreconcilable. This new techno-managerial and social science milieu saw in the formal procedures of industrial democracy a way "to obtain the consent of employees to their continued participation in the further development of the capitalist mode." What was required, then, was not only a major reform in the organizational mechanics and jurisprudence of industrial labor relations, but a root-and-branch transformation in the social and psychological dynamics of the workplace.[8]

Cooke not only encouraged the growth of particular trade unions, but proposed the creation of national unions to facilitate planning in the economy at large. Moreover, Cooke's version of economic planning—in contradistinction to the artificial scarcities achieved or at least hoped for by trade associations and oligopolies in older industrial sectors—assumed that "in itself any increase in the production of essential commodities is a desirable social end." Consequently, in the twenties the Taylor Society became the crossroads for a set of newer, mass-consumption-oriented industries—mass merchandisers like Filenes and Macy's; urban real estate developers like the Greenfield interests in Philadelphia; newer investment banks that underwrote the mass consumer sector like Lehman Brothers and Goldman, Sachs; mass-consumer-oriented banks with diversified investments in real estate, fire insurance, furniture, lumber, the movies, agricultural finance, and various consumer services like Bank of America and the Bowery Savings Bank; industries like clothing, housing construction

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and supplies, dry goods, office equipment and supplies, appliances; capital goods suppliers to mass market producers; a wide variety of producer service organizations including management consultants and foundations—all associated with the exponential growth in the size and depth of the urban mass market.[9]

Cooke's 1928 presidential address to the Taylor Society anticipated the next decade's agenda of industrial reform: "The interests of society—including those of the workers—suggest some measure of collective bargaining. . . . Effective collective bargaining implies the organization of the workers on a basis extensive enough—say nation-wide—as to make this bargaining power effective." Inevitably, he argued, in an economic world of complex interdependence, one populated with "national trade organizations; national and even international standards and sales syndicates; the vertical and horizontal integration of widely different industries, inter-industry research organizations; and in 'combinations' of one sort and another," adversarial industrial relations must "gradually give way" and labor organizations would be given "that functional status in the industrial process which is now denied." It was essential, from the standpoint of effective management, Cooke maintained, "to look upon some organization of the workers, such as labor unions, as a deep social need."

In this "new day of scientific management, high wages and standards of living, mass production, quick changes, cooperation, mechanical improvement," it was necessary to have strong labor organizations "ready to grapple with any group of employers guilty either of cupidity or industrial illiteracy." A mass-consumption economy and culture, Cooke noted, was recasting the immemorial struggle between the haves and the have-nots. It was no longer a matter of "the full dinner pail," but "the full garage"; now gasoline rather than bread and perhaps later a "share in the world's highest culture" were at stake. Cooke was equally alert to the dangers of "craft sectarianism and job separatism" that plagued the AFL, making it averse to any kind of organizational experimentation. The organized labor movement was compelled to adjust or perish.[10]

As a premonition of the main organizational, economic, and political objectives of the new labor movement one could scarcely ask for more—or from someone better positioned to simultaneously assess the internal dynamics of labor and industry. One can say more. A decade before Flint and the Memorial Day Massacre, a Great Depression away from the general strikes of Minneapolis and San Francisco, several AFL conventions prior to John L. Lewis's celebrated assault on William Hutcheson, the CIO already existed. It existed, that is, strictly as a managerial-political formation. On the eve of the

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depression it had a strategy—national industrial unionism; a social perspective—functional integration within a finely reticulated, interdependent economy of complex, large-scale bureaucratic organizations; a political economy—planned, expanded production and state-sanctioned redistribution of income in the interests of security and consumption; a general staff—not only Hillman and Lewis but their key economic and social engineering advisers including Cooke, Jett Lauck, Harlow Person, and Leiserson; a cadre school—Brookwood—where such key future CIO operatives as Kathryn Pollack Ellickson, John Brophy, Eli Oliver, David Saposs, and dozens of anonymous trade union militants, who would go on to become the organizers of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, and the like either taught or studied; and an ideology—industrial democracy, the Marxism of the professional middle class, wise to the class antinomies of industrial society but sanguine enough to believe in their pacific supersession by science and abundance.[11]

Most fundamentally, the CIO already existed as an embryonic strategic alliance, its incipient leadership already integrated, via the left wing of the scientific management movement, into the political circles around Frankfurter and Brandeis. These circles included such potentially potent influentials as Senators Norris, Wagner, and LaFollette; lawyer activists outside the labor movement including Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen, and those already or soon to be invited inside the family of labor, including Lee Pressman, Max Lowenthal, Nathan Witt; and progressive social and political activists such as Frances Perkins and Harold Ickes. Those political relationships also entailed ties to institutional networks of businessmen, labor-minded social scientists, and unorthodox economists gathered around the Twentieth Century Fund and Russell Sage Foundation, or, like Waddill Catchings and William T. Foster, associated with consumer-oriented investment houses. While something far less coherent than a shadow government, it was nonetheless a new political elite whose legislative and administrative innovations during the second New Deal would decisively shape the political and economic ecology within which the CIO would discover its niche.

III

Yet what made all the political scheming and social dreaming so agonizingly imprecise was that no one had any really firm idea of just what the message of industrial democracy meant—at ground level—first of all to those politically alert circles of industrial artisans; sec-

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ond, to the newest and fastest growing species of industrial labor, the semiskilled machine tender; last, to the massed, silent armies of the new immigrant working class. Indeed, especially in the last case, no one could even be sure the message had penetrated their ranks at all.

From the standpoint of the craft militant, the advent of bureaucratic-hierarchical management atop a system of mass, semiskilled production represented a root-and-branch expropriation of his social existence and identity. Partisans of workers' control movements, certainly the most uncompromising of industrial democrats, resisted both before and after the war the inexorable processes of de-skilling and the evisceration of what has been called the "culture of control." Ushered in by scientific management, with its chronometry, its impersonally determined and externally imposed piece rates, bonus systems, and job ladders, its ingenious designs for serial production to be undertaken by a whole new class of semiskilled operatives, this new industrial order promised the social extermination of a whole social species. In this beleaguered world, the 'labor question' remained what it had always been since the heyday of the social gospel in the Gilded Age and earlier—not only or even primarily a class question, but a moral one, a matter of autonomous manhood, of redemptive brotherhood and communal rebirth.[12]

All of this had very little to do with the toils and troubles of those old-world peasants suffering the irremediable process of marginalization. For Italian, Polish, and southeast European casual laborers and unskilled factory operatives, who poured in and out of the country in extraordinary numbers until the war ended transatlantic travel, the ideology of productive labor and the program of workers' control exerted little appeal. In the heart of Pennsylvania steel country, eastern European immigrants remained old-country "worker-farmers," tending and in part subsisting on their small garden plots. Arriving from decomposing peasant societies, they were already familiar with mobile, migratory agricultural and urban wage labor and the cash economy. But the experience was so recent and unsettling that the desire for survival, security, and above all for landholding remained potent. Wages in the New World were hoarded in the hope of reproducing the valued landed social structure of the Old. Socially, these cultures in transit remained profoundly deferential.[13]

Indeed, for the most recently arrived unskilled, who lacked political perspective or experience with voluntary, non-kinship-based organizational life—without a vision of the industrial world put together differently—resistance to industrial society was only outwardly similar to that of their more skilled and assimilated co-workers. Their strikes—Lawrence before the war, the steel strike immediately after

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it—more closely resembled episodic communal rebellions—peasant jacqueries or the rising of the fascio in Sicily—than they did acts rooted in the immediate experience of work itself. These prospective "citizens of industry," even as they became naturalized citizens in the 1920s, were concerned less with the procedural formalities of industrial due process, and more with securing the ancient attachments of kin and community corroded by the factory and the market. For them the moral codes of industrial democracy—the spiritual hygiene of disciplined work, economic group and individual self-interest, the iniquity of ascribed values—were at first less than compelling.[14]

In the end, however, the power of industrial rationalization proved ineluctable. The worlds of the impassive peasant and craft militant were undermined utterly, especially during and after the war as the regime of mass production extended its reach across the industrial landscape. The gap between them closed, or rather was filled by a new generation of workers, bound neither to the communal republicanism of the skilled elite nor to the patriarchal traditionalism of the Old World.

During the two decades preceding the depression the very category of common labor and its ganglike structure became far less common. Attention was reoriented to the individual's performance. A new species of semiskilled machine tender emerged, whose work demanded a new repertoire of talents—judgment, observation, control, and measurement, as opposed to the undifferentiated routines of the unskilled. The electrification of production, observed Cooke and Philip Murray, created a new emphasis on "sustained attention; correct perception, quick reaction"; on nervous poise and intelligent coordination. By its very nature such work was subject to more systematic and finely tuned external control and monitoring, at which scientific management excelled; it also elicited new habits at and away from work. Together with the alchemic powers of the mass market and mass culture, whose impact on the desires and behavior of the second-generation immigrant was already conspicuous by the 1920s, it helped fashion the new labor force. And it was precisely this new species, the heterogeneous and more individuated precipitate of various traditional ethno-occupational milieux—often the urbanized sons of immigrants and urbanized blacks as well as "native" Protestant workers—who, precisely because they had lost their anchorages in the closed cultural world of kin, craft, community, and culture, became the natural constituency of industrial democracy and the CIO.[15]

The rise of the semiskilled worker, organically connected to the processes of mass production, did not of course entail the instanta-

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neous obliteration of the industrial and urban crafts. Tool and die makers, die setters, and factory maintenance mechanics, for example, persisted and resisted the ravages of the depressed economy. In the auto and electrical industries, tool and die makers and machinists especially comprised the indispensable cadre of the new industrial unions, the UAW and the UE. If semiskilled operators comprised the CIO's mass constituency, it was a certain kind of skilled worker, experienced politically as well as in trade union matters, who supplied the movement's élan and organizational genius.[16]

But skilled workers comprised a milieu heterogeneous in background. They included both production and nonproduction workers. Some were quite secular and even anticlerical; others were attracted by liberal currents of Catholic social thought then deeply dividing the church.

Often in the United States for several generations, or immigrants from the British isles, skilled workers frequently were experienced trade unionists, and not infrequently acquainted with some version of radical labor or nationalist politics—the Pan-Slavic revolutionary nationalism of the Serbs and Croats, for example, or the syndicalism of Italian artisans or the belligerent atheism of Lithuanian or Bohemian "free thinkers." And yet their motivations were often at the same time deeply conservative. The depression, and the accompanying downgrading of skilled jobs (both with respect to pay and job content), presented a mortal threat to their social status, about which they were acutely conscious: "We were just part of the common mass, you might say. And that's what got us really thinking a lot about unionism," remembered an early UE activist. The locus of UAW support was often in body plants where de-skilling was intense among metal finishers and welders who were often responsible for the waves of quickie strikes and shop-floor struggles for control that followed the Flint sit-down. For such people the CIO, at least in part and particularly in its emphasis on meticulously defined seniority provisions, was a protective device with which to defend hard-won social position.[17]

While the machinists and tool and die makers of the UAW and UE invariably comprised the militant and radical democratic cadre of the CIO, other industrial craftsmen, especially among urban tradesmen and non-production-line workers, were more tradition-bound, less deracinated. Their status-consciousness was embedded in patterns of neighborhood, ethnic, and familial solidarity. For them, shop-floor politics were an extension of the politics of civil society. In even the most cosmopolitan and industrialized urban centers—the "Back of the Yards" neighborhood of Chicago, for example, or in the more

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isolated, self-absorbed ethnic worlds of Pennsylvania steel towns with their own saloons, groceries, butchers, bankers, newspapers, and clothing stores—small-scale, self-contained ethnic social economies reproduced in relative isolation social hierarchies in which craftsmen enjoyed an honored position even if employed by the corporate world outside the ethnic community. Members of the Steelworkers Independent Union, for instance, men of skill and self-conscious dignity, were also opposed to the centralizing tendencies of industrial unionism and were bound up in the exclusionary fraternal world of the Knights of Pythias. In Flint, a self-conscious labor aristocracy dating from the carriage- and wagon-making era maintained close relations with the local business elite and was separated by a wide gulf of material possessions, social status, and security from the emerging migratory milieu of southeastern Europeans and Appalachians.[18]

The influence of these skilled traditionalists on shop-floor politics extended far beyond their own circle, precisely because of their social and cultural hegemony within the circumscribed universe of working-class neighborhood and ethnic life. Within the factory, first-generation unskilled immigrants—for whom work was an unadulterated curse from which they withdrew into the worlds of the tavern and fraternal lodge and the family's religious and secular rituals—were tied by customary relations of deference to their skilled, more worldly brethren. The very sociotechnical structure of industrial work gangs reinforced traditional deferential relations because of the nearly absolute power exercised by skilled gang leaders over the nature, duration, and pace of work, which imparted an intimidating vulnerability to the work experience of these immigrants. A network of authority thus linked the top and the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and generated in certain respects a deeply conservative community with an abiding respect for the institutions of private property, if not capitalism. After all, most Slavic and Italian peasant immigrants hailed from areas of marginal, small-scale, not latifundist agriculture, where the sense of property rights remained strong. For many, the fatalism, restricted mobility, patriarchy, and moral and educational parochialism of the old-world village were reinforced by the exigencies of industrial and urban life.[19]

For a long time, these hierarchical and organic relationships had defined the internal political dynamics of many AFL unions. The CIO insurgency immediately threatened the customary power and prestige of these shop-floor elites. New occupational groupings of semiskilled machine tenders were themselves often ambitious, eager to perform a variety of jobs and advance up the job ladder. Ambitiousness about work—they "wanted better jobs, cleaner, mechanized, with

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some skills"—extended into the realm of consumption. Such ambitions were threatened by the depression. Especially as the wage differential between skilled, often German and Irish, tradesmen and the semiskilled narrowed, the former sensed a threat to established patterns of power and status, a mortal threat to the prerogatives of a craft-based and ethnically homogeneous elite self-conscious about its purported racial and cultural superiority.[20]

Meanwhile, the newer, historically more fluid sector of the shop floor—the semiskilled—was more ethnically dissociated, less enmeshed within networks of kin and community. For second-generation Italians, for example, the structures of patriarchal authority were already decomposing through exposure to schools and work outside the family and community. And, if anything, southern Italians tended to be more village oriented and less mobile than many Slovaks, Rumanians for example, among whom nationalism had some time ago supplanted more parochial attachments. Among various Slavic populations the courtship and marriage patterns of the second generation became noticeably less rigid and endogamous. Neighborhood ethnic parishes were gradually "Americanized" as old-country feasts, distinct village liturgies, local patron saints, and processionals were replaced by a more austere and devotional sacramental orthodoxy. The workplace became a site of resentment as the universalist criteria of merit and individual performance clashed with the real structures of racial-ethnic authority: "We didn't want to live like Hunkies anymore . . . treated like trash." Quintessentially urban, with a functional and instrumental but not existential relationship to their work, far more integrated as consumers into the mass market and more influenced by the media of mass culture than their parents, this new species of worker came closer to resembling Marx's "proletariat"—rootless, dispossessed, functionally interchangeable—than anything yet seen in America.[21]

Precisely because they were often alienated from the extended family, excluded from the charmed circle of craft, and instead integrated into the public worlds of work and citizenship more by bureaucratic than by primordial ties, they were receptive to the message of industrial unionism. However, the CIO might have remained little more than a general staff and officers corps without the electrifying electoral victory of 1936, which unleashed a mass movement of unprecedented militance and tactical boldness.

IV

The mass political mobilization of the thirties, enlisting legions of new voters from among the new immigrant working class (both in its

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first and second generations) and shaking the Democratic party to its foundations, should be considered ontologically prior to the mass labor struggles of the period. Even the great strikes of 1933–34—Minneapolis, San Francisco, Toledo, the textile general strike—and the near general strikes in auto and steel, even the waves of union organization that crested and receded under the frail wings of the Blue Eagle, were themselves politically inspired—inspired particularly by the NRA's clause 7a, which Lewis compared with the Emancipation Proclamation. Strikes and union organizing were in effect attempts to implement purported presidential policy.[22]

Labor—its leadership as well as its rank and file—looked to Washington, sensing that its fate hinged on the outcome of great struggles between contending elites for control of the new government and its administrative machinery. By mid-1935, when the Supreme Court's *Schecter* decision outlawed the NRA, the outlook was grim. The AFL's timidity demoralized thousands initially excited by 7a, while the political paralysis that plagued the anodyne recovery administration crippled whatever real potential it may have once possessed to improve labor standards and encourage unionization. But if *Schecter* seemed a declaration of war from the Right, it also served to mobilize the "keynesian" left, those mass-consumption-oriented political and business circles on the left wing of the New Deal. Simultaneously, populist and third-party movements proliferated, pressuring a temporizing president to abandon efforts at mollifying the hysterical business and political old guard. Between mid-1935, beginning with Roosevelt's reluctant endorsement of the Wagner Act, through the great landslide of 1936—that is, before the emergence of the CIO as a mass organization—all the legislative essentials of the "second New Deal"—the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the second banking act, the public utility holding company act, the wealth tax act—were installed. It was that triumph, one that penetrated key administrative agencies and executive departments as well as vital congressional committees, which helped transform the CIO from a strategic blueprint into a mass movement.

The relationship between the "second New Deal" and the 'new unionism' was organic. Above all, the "welfare state" was expressly designed by its chief architects to encourage and stimulate mass consumption: state intervention in the labor market, along with the state's credit policy, urban renewal, and so on, were tactical devices for achieving that larger strategic purpose.

Frances Perkins put it well as early as 1933: "As a Nation, we are recognizing that programs long thought of as merely labor welfare, such as shorter hours, higher wages, and a voice in the terms and

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conditions of work, are really essential economic factors for recovery, and for the technique of industrial management in a mass production age."[23] Similarly, the Wagner Act was expressly designed, by the senator, his chief economic adviser Leon Keyserling, and Isador Lubin, a close associate of Hillman's, as a device with which to both civilize and stabilize the politics of production and as part of a more general economic recovery program premised on expanded mass consumption.[24]

Alexander Sachs, an economist once associated with Lehman Brothers, not only shared this sympathy with industrial unionism, but expressed well the broader struggle over the structure of the political economy of which it was a part. In a memorandum to General Johnson, critical of some of the corporatist-inspired thinking that would culminate in the NRA, he cited as causes of the depression "policies which had the effect of sterilizing wealth and credit resources" as well as a lack of flexibility and initiative on the part of large corporations "sicklied o'er by the pale case of laissez-faire and liquidity complexes." The federal government, he argued, ought to sponsor public works and credit for housing and consumer durables. He feared instead that what was to become the NRA would, like the German cartel system, have the effect of "congealing the inflated capital values of the speculative era."[25]

The "speculative era" had long been the bête noire of the circle of lawyer-politicians gathered around Frankfurter and Brandeis. People like Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, James Landis, and others, had never been wide-eyed worshipers of the free market. Beginning with Brandeis, they had all represented large corporations and investment houses—although invariably ones outside the orbit of the Morgan and Kuhn Loeb interests. Brandeis and Frankfurter, as architects of industrial democracy, maintained working relations with the Taylor Society and mounted their critique of overbearing corporate power in part from the standpoint of its strangulating inefficiencies. They shared a much more sophisticated view about the relationship between technology and economic concentration, while retaining a wise skepticism about the morals and motives of old-style corporate managements. For them, federal coercion was an unavoidable part of an assault, expressed ultimately in securities and banking and utilities legislation, on an older, entrenched bloc of infrastructural and primary goods industries and their financial allies in the investment banking community—circles committed to the open shop and opposed to the redistributive implications of a mass-consumption economy. This "securities bloc" was responsible in their eyes for the economic arteriosclerosis referred to by Sachs.[26]

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The CIO strategists, including not only Hillman but Jett Lauck, Lewis's principal adviser on broad matters of political economy, shared this view about the relationships between industrial unionism and the restructuring of the political economy. Having played a significant role in the drafting of the NRA's labor provisions, Lauck's advice to Lewis during the fateful years of the middle thirties emphasized the need for government intervention and regulation to expand production, redistribute income, and expand mass purchasing power and government credit. And in 1934 he broached the idea of the UMW leaving the AFL to start a new labor federation.[27]

From Lauck's point of view, the politics of production were but one element in a social and political chemistry of greater complexity: the emergence of modern centralized industrial unions rooted in mass production, informed by modern managerial strategy, developing within the context of mass culture and consumption, and linked to a reform government in the national arena, was the framework within which the more intimate battles of the factory floor and union hall would take place. If the CIO helped fabricate a "new man"—existentially mobile, more oriented to consumption than production, familiar with the impersonal rights and responsibilities of industrial due process—then this new social identity was inconceivable apart from a political elite in command of the state, committed to a program of enlarged government spending, financial reform, and redistributive taxation, presiding over a reconstituted coalition in the realm of mass politics.

The CIO's debt to Roosevelt was thus from the very beginning greater than the president's obligations to the CIO—and the new labor leadership knew it. The CIO of course staunchly supported all the administration's labor and welfare initiatives, and often from a distinctly keynesian point of view. Its loyalty to Roosevelt was practically unconditional. It even included the administration's most bitterly contested attempts at court-packing and executive reorganization designed to strengthen the youthful agencies of the administrative state against enemies in Congress and the judiciary. When Lewis and Hillman created Labor's Non-Partisan League to politically mobilize industrial workers on behalf of Roosevelt's reelection in 1936, they did so in full consultation with, if not at the behest of, the administration's chief political operatives, including Farley, Berle, and Frankfurter. There was a real spiritual compatibility as well. At this, the zenith of the New Deal's reform zeal, the language of labor and the language of executive power were indistinguishable; the Non-Partisan League excoriated the "manipulators of other people's money and the exploiters of other people's labor" and proclaimed a "battle

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of the masses against the classes, of the people against the economic royalists."[28]

This concordance of views and interests permeated the proliferating agencies of the new administrative state. The Labor Department under Perkins was of course sympathetic. She was largely responsible for Hillman's initial elevation to a position of national political prominence under the NRA. Senator LaFollette, a longtime proponent of collective bargaining and keynesian reform of the political economy, used his subcommittee on civil liberties to actively aid CIO organizing drives. The subcommittee's chief counsel, John Abt, was close to the CP and would subsequently become Hillman's personal legal counsel. Subcommittee personnel conferred regularly with CIO cadre on the timing and content of testimony designed to expose the tyrannical and violent practices of the country's leading industrial corporations, especially in the steel industry. Job-hopping between the civil liberties committee, the NLRB, and the SWOC was common.[29]

Above all, the NLRB embodied this marriage of New Deal and new labor movement. It was conceived and administered to promote industrial unionism and at the national level was populated by sympathizers like Edwin Smith, Saposs, Nathan Witt, and others. The board's jurisdictional rulings openly favored the CIO and infuriated the AFL. Most galling and threatening to the preeminence of the AFL's skilled elite was the board's definition of the ideal bargaining unit as the largest practicable one. No wonder that AFL sachem Frey bitterly remarked to board chairman Madden early in 1937 that "there is an impression growing every day that your agents are definitely CIO."[30]

From the fall of 1936 through the summer of 1937 the industrial insurgency from below—beginning with the Flint sit-down and spreading irresistibly from sector to sector and city to city—moved in synchrony with the reform impulse from above. By mid-1937 the state agencies responsible for human capital and infrastructural development, for planning and for regulating the flow of public and private credit, were run by this newly empowered keynesian elite: the Labor Department under Perkins and the Interior Department under Ickes; the NLRB, and the agencies of relief and public works under Hopkins; the National Resources Planning Board run by Beardsley Ruml and Frederick Delano; the REA under Cooke and John Carmody; the various housing and mortgage finance agencies; and of course the Federal Reserve under the keynesian tutelage of Marriner Eccles. Together they comprised the "welfare state." And it was this "state" that the CIO-LNPL leadership exalted.

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V

But other regions of the executive branch, not to mention substantial portions of the Congress, state legislatures, and municipal governments remained hostile to this new public policy perspective and program. Moreover, the mass-consumption–industrial-unionism strategy had yet to win a following among a great mass of entrepreneurs and wide sections of the middle class. Thus, the state itself became a locus of activity for contending elites, for the suddenly articulate armies of the shop floor, for the organizational dynamics of electoral politics and the brute force of the marketplace. It was a dangerously centerless system, tending toward dispersion. Any shift in the fortunes of the new regime would immediately reverberate within the CIO.

As the reaction against the Roosevelt administration set in, more or less coincident with the deep recession of 1937–38, it was apparent that the rise of the New Deal and the CIO were generating powerful countercurrents within the working class. The fratricidal civil war that erupted within the infant UAW between the Homer Martin faction and those tenuously allied groups led by cadre from the Socialist and Communist parties was symptomatic. The Martin group was diverse. There were Appalachian migrants raised on fundamentalist religion and racism who, once in Detroit, were sometimes recruited into the ranks of the Black Legion and Ku Klux Klan and evinced a deep, almost racial-religious, antipathy to the Polish Catholics of the city's industry. There was as well a heavy admixture of Coughlinite urban, Irish and German Catholics, largely mechanics, carpenters, electricians, and plumbers, first organized in 1934 with Father Coughlin's help through the Automotive Industrial Workers Association, centered in Chrysler's Dodge Division. They were elitist and attracted by the corporate authoritarianism of the Little Flower's priest.[31]

Martin's following evinced a deep antipathy toward the more secular, cosmopolitan, racially mixed, and often anticlerical if not irreligious, milieu under the radical leaderships of the socialist Reuther brothers and Adolph Germer or the Communist caucus led by George Addes and Wyndam Mortimer. Martin played on such anxieties in speeches and radio addresses that accused the CIO leadership of being tied "directly to Moscow."[32]

As the case of Homer Martin also suggests, the anthropological fault line not only divided the CIO from the AFL but ran straight through the CIO itself. In the eyes of old-stock German, Irish, and

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other skilled workers—tradesmen as well as nonproduction factory craftsmen—often tied to traditional urban Democratic party machines, the threatening rise of the semiskilled workers within the political hierarchy of production was closely associated with the ascendancy of the new immigrant within the New Deal Democratic party. At the same time, other more cosmopolitan circles of skilled production workers—secular and sometimes politically radical—tended to push the mass movement of the semiskilled to the left. These social anxieties created fissures within all the main CIO unions and erected definite boundaries beyond which the CIO leadership dared not venture politically. The congressional uproar over the wave of sit-down strikes helped focus a pervasive atmosphere of anti-Communist, anti-CIO sentiment that was most pronounced in, but not confined to, the traditional old-stock Catholic skilled milieu. It infected as well the younger, second-generation Catholic semiskilled production workers. Frequently, CIO organizers appealed to liberal Catholics like Father Francis Haas to use their influence among local priests in St. Louis, in the auto centers of Michigan, and elsewhere to counteract anti-Communist–CIO propaganda.[33]

Susceptibility to the politics of anticommunism was, then, a function of a deeper estrangement from the rational-materialist posture of the CIO leadership and its allies in the left wing of the Democratic party. The CIO effort to integrate blacks into its industrial and political coalition—its active campaigns for equal rights on and off the job—further exacerbated these tensions. The child labor provisions of the CIO-supported Fair Labor Standards Act incited the opposition of the Catholic Church, always sensitive to state intrusions into family life and parochial school education, and further estranged sections of the Catholic working class.[34]

The CP and its most conspicuous CIO cadre and sympathizers thus became the lightning rod for animosities that had little to do with the party's loyalties to the Soviet Union. Ironically, then, anticommunism as a mass movement was profoundly anticapitalist insofar as it rebelled against the corporate, bureaucratic, centralizing, and statist tendencies of the modern industrial order. With equal irony "communism" in America only counted in the arithmetic of national and local politics to the degree it articulated the central assumptions and aspirations of the CIO and the New Deal.

This rainbow of social and cultural anxieties severely limited the political influence and perspective of the CIO. Noteworthy is the fact that a labor movement with a reputation for radicalism took no sides in the Spanish civil war. Practically, if not rhetorically, the leadership

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retreated quickly from the tactical and political riskiness of the sit-down strike. Differences between Lewis and Hillman emerged over whether to sue for peace with the AFL. Meanwhile, that bitter rivalry continued. While immediately a matter of organizational turf, it was aggravated by deeper historical divisions. The tendency of old-stock, Catholic, craft-based groups to vote against the New Deal–CIO alliance became pronounced in the 1938 congressional elections. By mid-1938 the AFL launched an industrial counteroffensive, sponsoring splits from the CIO in textile and in auto (where Homer Martin rejoined the AFL) as well as a breakaway from the National Maritime Union and even a "Progressive Miners" group to aggravate Lewis. Simultaneously, an alliance of the AFL and the NAM (in particular, the lawyers for the adamantly anti-union little steel companies) worked assiduously to undermine the NLRB and the Wagner Act itself.[35]

Lewis's mounting exasperation with Roosevelt, first surfacing in his angry denunciation of the president's disingenuous neutrality in the Little Steel strike, dramatized the CIO's predicament. How quickly the balance of forces had shifted. The SWOC, which had boomed after the Roosevelt landslide, was deeply demoralized and withering away by late 1937. Similarly, when the LNPL was first formed, the ground swell of reform sentiment emboldened Hillman and Lewis to keep alive, if only rhetorically, the possibility of an independent labor party. To be sure, the first priority was Roosevelt's reelection, without which fascism might triumph in America. Hillman made it clear that labor only stood a chance politically if it talked "not Marxism, but economic power" to the masses of the people. Still, he boldly announced himself "satisfied . . . we are laying the foundations for a labor party."[36]

Just months later Gardner Jackson, New Deal functionary and adviser to Lewis, was worrying about how to offset the bad publicity about violence and irresponsibility that was clearly hurting the CIO, not only among middle-class people but within the ranks of the CIO itself. By 1939, Murray was telling the CIO executive board, "We are living in a wave and an age and an era of reaction." By the middle of 1940, Lee Pressman was reporting to that same board that "within the past few weeks we have had to shift our emphasis from attempting to obtain new legislation to bending all efforts to defend the legislative protection which we now enjoy."[37]

It was the effort to crack the Solid South, politically and industrially, that most tellingly revealed the inherent limitations of the New Deal–CIO alliance. The Textile Workers Organizing Committee was created when the second New Deal and the CIO were riding high, in

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the spring of 1937. In the South, moreover, they depended utterly upon each other. Hillman's strategy as TWOC chairman (about which Lewis was dubious) was in part predicated on the political assistance of the administration through the NLRB as well as LaFollette's civil liberties subcommittee and those congressional Democrats promoting fair labor standards legislation aimed principally at the Southern textile industry. Meanwhile, the Roosevelt administration took steps to purge the Southern wing of the party of its conservative opponents, who, together with a revived Republican party, were managing to stalemate New Deal initiatives in Congress. The LNPL devoted itself to the defeat of these Southern reactionaries in the '38 primaries. The purge, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and TWOC's mass organizing campaign would together, it was hoped, recast the Democratic party, making of it an unequivocal instrument of economic and social reform.

This was political strategy at its grandest, since its success was predicated on the deliberate transformation of the South's political and social structure. Unionizing the South's key industry, textiles, together with the passage of minimum wages and hours legislation (the FLSA was drafted by Cohen, Corcoran, and Frankfurter in consultation with Hillman) would transform the closed Southern labor market and help break the political stranglehold of the planter and merchant-manufacturer oligarchy. Corcoran in particular thought the bill would shatter the monopoly of Southern Democratic politics by older corporate interests—the railroads and public utilities especially.[38]

The results proved far less grand than the strategy. The traditional patriarchal structures of Southern authority—the communal, small-town alliance of press, pulpit, property, and racial populism—survived. Although TWOC got off to a promising start, by the middle of 1938 it was collapsing all over the South as the recession made textile workers desperate and afraid. Roosevelt's purge was at best a partial success. The Fair Labor Standards Act did finally, although barely, manage to overcome a tenacious congressional opposition, an opposition that included the AFL, which refused to support the administration's bill even though Roosevelt designated it priority legislation. But the bill created a real wedge between the CIO-LNPL and the farmers lobby, which feared its impact on agricultural wages. The emasculated result was an act that exempted millions of workers from its coverage—only one-fifth of the work force fell under its provisions—while establishing the most minimal standards for those it did

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include; only 325,000 workers stood to benefit immediately from the act's initial twenty-five-cent minimum wage.[39]

VI

The FLSA was the last "act" of the New Deal. Soon the war in Europe would put a period to an era of reform, but not all at once. There were wartime battles in Congress and within the labyrinthine bureaucracy of home-front mobilization over who was to control the vastly expanded domestic economy. Meanwhile, all throughout the war the shop floor remained a contested arena where resentments about the inequalities of sacrifice demanded of industrial workers exploded in outlaw strikes in defiance of the CIO leadership. In retrospect, however, the drift of events seems unmistakable. The war demanded the suppression of unresolved social conflict and opened up all the state agencies of economic mobilization to the dominating influence of large-scale corporate interests. Lewis resisted and finally broke with Roosevelt officially in 1940. Hillman was convinced, however, that there were no other options for labor outside the precincts of the Democratic party. He was willing to trust the fate of the CIO to Roosevelt even though, or perhaps because, both the CIO and the New Deal had lost a good deal of their forward momentum. He sought a permanent place for the industrial union movement as an institutional component of the New Deal state, a state no longer able to innovate in the area of social and economic reform. To achieve that recognized position, moreover, entailed a similar accommodation in the industrial arena.

The industrial relations compact worked out by the industrial union leadership and the scientific management–keynesian milieu provided for job security, formal democratic grievance and representation procedures, and high wages and benefits, all in return for shop-floor stability self-consciously achieved at the expense of the less formal practices of shop-floor democracy. Growing segments of the business community accepted that basic arrangement. By 1939 most of the legal and extralegal challenges to the essentials of the Wagner Act were over. Hillman testified at congressional hearings on amending the Wagner Act that core companies, including USS, GE, American Woolen, and RCA, had long ago recognized the wisdom of the act and its procedures for collective bargaining. Carle Conway, chairman of the board of Continental Can, delivered a reprise on the way corporate thinking had changed:

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> Certainly anyone who has been in business during [the past 30 years] would have to be naive to think that management by and large desired collective bargaining or certain of the other reforms which labor has finally won . . . But isn't it also likely that better understanding of the basic fundamentals involved in the struggle over the last thirty years between labor and management can work toward harmonizing the two viewpoints into a common objective and so make collective bargaining and many of the other reforms operate in the interests of both labor and management?[40]

Nor was it merely the giants of American industry that began to accept industrial unionism as a feature of modern management. In the late thirties many steel mills on the verge of bankruptcy began to cooperate with SWOC, particularly with Clinton Golden, a former organizer for the ACW's 'new unionism' in the twenties and a close associate of Philip Murray and Morris Cooke. In return for stabilized and secure employment, Golden showed how SWOC could improve productivity by sharing in the determination and enforcement of production standards, more or less exactly in the manner that the Amalgamated had first done after the war.[41]

Thus the common ground for a close collaboration between modern management and centralized industrial unionism emerged clearly by the end of the decade. The history of UAW–GM relations after the heroic battle at Flint is illustrative. Immediately after Flint there was considerable truth in the romantic image of the UAW as a union of shop-floor solidarity, militancy, and democratic participation. Because stewards were prepared to act boldly, to lead strikes if necessary, grievances were settled rapidly and workers' powers expanded without regard to contractual formalities. Neither the central leadership of the UAW nor, more important, the national leadership of the CIO—Lewis and his appointed deputies, Hillman and Philip Murray, who effectively ran UAW affairs in the late thirties—nor GM management found this tolerable. The union sought institutional stability and normalizing of the collective bargaining relationship. The corporation expected maintenance of order and discipline and recognition of its prerogatives. And so a second conflict that pitted the International Union and GM management against rank-and-file shop-floor organizers supplanted the more celebrated battle between union and corporation. The emerging bureaucracy of the UAW took steps to dismantle the shop steward system, reduced the authority of local unions while augmenting the power of the International, appended a no-strike and management rights clause to the contract,

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and perfected the modern grievance procedure and committee system.[42]

None of this constituted the betrayal of some sacred trust. If the more radical promises of the New Deal—to seriously redistribute income, to systematically socialize the care of the needy and unfit, to democratize the councils of industry and government, to uproot the iniquities of racial and social caste—fell short, they did so for reasons more deeply implanted within the dynamics of the national political economy and within the social chemistry of the CIO itself. Even in the early years of the New Deal, when mass and general strikes and rank-and-file self-organization made independent labor politics and radical versions of industrial democracy seem less than utopian, countercurrents within and outside of the labor movement pressed toward a more conservative resolution. The presumptive momentum of complex, bureaucratic organization, the imperatives of corporate-led economic stability and growth, and the increasing power of the mass market and mass production to dissolve the ties of social solidarity, were enough, even by themselves, to overwhelm whatever contrary impulses were given life by the trauma of economic collapse and social chaos.

Finally, to the extent that this capitalist trauma gave rise to a culture of resistance, that culture was itself often profoundly conservative even while ushering in a new age. Over and over again the CIO insisted that what it sought above all else, whether in negotiating contracts with employers or in pressing its demands for social welfare legislation, was security. As early as 1934 in a BBC address, Hillman characterized the "quest for security" as the "central issue in this life of modern man." Ten years later, as the CIO's Political Action Committee mobilized to defend the New Deal, it proclaimed: "As a result of this war and the victory that will be achieved at the conclusion of it we must move forward to a broader program of social and economic security for the men and women of this nation." The CIO turned out to be engaged in a great project to protect the individual and the nuclear family from the vicissitudes of modern industrial society. For that, the moral and millenarian enthusiasms once invoked by the 'labor question' were no longer appropriate.[43]

Notes

1. Quoted in Philippa Strum, *Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 103.
2. Quoted in John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow*

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Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 264.

3. Frederick Howe, *Confessions of a Reformer* (New York, 1925), cited in Stanley Shapiro, "The Great War and Reform: Liberals and Labor, 1917–19," *Labor History*.

4. *New Republic*, June 29, 1918.

5. *New Republic*, February 1, 1919.

6. Strum, *Louis D. Brandeis*, esp. chap. 10; *Public*, May 4, 1918, 556–57, cited in Shapiro, "The Great War." Personal forms of authority and control persisted among skilled production and nonproduction workers, as inherent in the exercise of these skills was an element of discretion and autonomy.

7. Steven Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents, Political Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union," in Michael Frisch and Daniel Walkowitz, eds., *Working-Class America* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

8. Christopher L. Tomlins, *The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 81.

9. Morris Cooke to Sidney Hillman, April 15, 1920, Sidney Hillman Papers, Labor Management Documentation Center, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. Peter Friedlander, in his unpublished manuscript "The Origins of the Welfare State: The Keynesian Elite and the Second New Deal," presents pathbreaking research on this network of business and political associations. It informs a good deal of the analysis of this essay.

10. "Some Observations on Workers Organizations," Presidential Address to the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Taylor Society in New York City, box 62, folder A, Morris Cooke Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park. Cooke had no patience with welfare capitalism or company unions, which he largely considered "fakes, pure and simple" (Cooke to Robert Bruere, July 10, 1928, box 2, file 14, Cooke Papers). Anyone failing to see the utility and necessity of independent collective bargaining was not a worthy associate: "I make collective bargaining as essential to the proper conduct of industrial organization as modern tools" (Cooke to Boyd Fisher, April 13, 1922, box 8, file 65, Cooke Papers).

11. Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal"; Jonathan D. Bloom, "Brookwood Labor College, 1921–33: Training Ground for Union Organizers" (M.A. thesis, New York University, 1978). Lewis's taste for scientific management cooperation schemes originated in the UMW's arrangements with the Rocky Mountain Fuel Company in Colorado under Josephine Roche, an associate of Frankfurter's.

12. David Montgomery, "The 'New Unionism' and the Transformation of Workers' Consciousness in America," *Journal of Social History* (Summer 1974); Carmen Sirianni, "Workers' Control in Europe: A Comparative Sociological Analysis," in James E. Cronin and Carmen Sirianni, eds., *Work, Community, and Power* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1983); Henry

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Eilbert, "The Development of Personnel Management in the United States," *Business History Review* (Autumn 1959). Both John L. Thomas, *Alternative America: Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry Demarest Lloyd, and the Adversary Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), and Nick Salvatore, *Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1982), reveal the threads connecting the language and political culture of labor radicalism in the Gilded Age to its subsequent socialist and syndicalist mutations in the twentieth century.

13. Ewa Morawska, *For Bread with Butter: Life-Worlds of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890–1940* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), is particularly good on this persistence amidst great change of old-world cultures.

14. Morawska, *For Bread with Butter*; Edwin Fenton, *Immigrants and Unions, A Case Study: Italians and American Labor, 1870–1920* (reprint, New York, 1957). For some eastern European immigrants, however, the war aroused a latent nationalism and a powerful identification with struggles for democracy and national liberation in their homelands.

15. Morris Cooke and Philip Murray, *Organized Labor and Production: Next Steps in Industrial Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940); David Gartman, *Auto Slavery: The Labor Process in the American Automobile Industry, 1897–1950* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 173, notes that within the auto industry both craftsmen and laborers lost ground to the new class of semiskilled assemblers, machine tool and press operators, and "machine-minders."

16. Nelson Lichtenstein, *Labor's War At Home: The CIO in World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ronald Schatz, *The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at GE and Westinghouse, 1923–60* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Peter Friedlander, *The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936–39: A Study of Class and Culture* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975); and Gartman, *Auto Slavery*, are all illuminating on this set of issues. The UAW's carefully orchestrated tool and die makers' strike of 1939, deliberately limited to only these skilled militants, was arguably responsible for arresting the union's life-threatening decline after the heroic days of Flint.

17. Mel Piehl, *Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker and the Origins of Catholic Radicalism in America* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1982), notes that the liberal Association of Catholic Trade Unionists led by Father Charles Owen Rice, adviser to Philip Murray, exerted significant influence among steel, auto, electrical, and transport workers (p. 61); Schatz, *The Electrical Workers*, 89; Friedlander, *The Emergence*; Ronald Edsforth, *Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint, Michigan* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Gartman, *Auto Slavery*, 173. The National Recovery Administration further exacerbated this threat as employers tried using wage codes particularly to turn minimum wages into maximums (see Charles R. Roos, *NRA: Economic Planning* [New York: Da Capo Press, 1971]).

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18. Robert A. Slayton, *Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Barbara Newell, *Chicago and the Labor Movement* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961); Edsforth, *Class Conflict.* It is noteworthy that Chicago remained an essentially AFL town with few sit-downs through the thirties and that the CIO was not publicly sanctioned by the city's Roman Catholic officialdom until 1939, and that the UE remained insignificant while the UAW was restricted to the city's parts plants (see Newell, *Chicago and the Labor Movement,* 115, 130, 150–51, 167–68, 180–81).

19. David Brody, "Labor and the Great Depression—Interpretive Prospects," *Labor History* (Spring 1972); Josef J. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City, 1890–1950* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Morawska, *For Bread with Butter.* There was a hard practicality to these deferential relations, as through their observance the immigrant often managed to first secure and then hold onto a job; his skilled betters frequently functioned as work-gang leaders with real, if informal, authority over such matters.

20. Schatz, *The Electrical Workers,* Morawska, *For Bread with Butter,* 276. Skilled positions in the steel industry, including rollers, blacksmiths, carpenters, etc., were monopolized by Americans and western Europeans whose racism helped block access to these jobs by eastern European immigrants as well as their offspring.

21. Silvano Tomasi, *Piety and Power: The Role of Italian Parishes in the New York Metropolitan Area, 1880–1930* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1975); Nicholas J. Russo, "Three Generations of Italians in New York City: Their Religious Acculturation," in Silvano M. Tomasi and Madeline H. Engel, eds., *The Italian Experience in the United States* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1970); Slayton, *Back of the Yards,* 62; quotation from Morawaska, *For Bread with Butter,* 274; Lizabeth Cohen, "Learning to Live in the Welfare State" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1986); Humbert S. Nelli, *From Immigrants to Ethnics: The Italian-American* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Barton, *Peasants and Strangers*; Edsforth, *Class Conflict.*

22. Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–36* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

23. Cited in "He Fights for Labor," Labor Non-Partisan League pamphlet, p. 4, Hillman Papers.

24. James A. Gross, *The Making of the NLRB: A Study in Economics, Politics, and Law* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), vol. 1. The Twentieth Century Fund, an assembly point for mass-consumer-oriented businessmen, social scientists, and economists, not only supported the essentials of the Wagner Act (with some qualifications), but supplied the NLRB with its most radical, original member, Edwin Smith, and its research director, David Saposs, one-time educational director for the Amalgamated. With respect to the Social Security Act, Marion Folsom of Kodak lobbied vigorously on its behalf (see Kim McQuaid, "Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920–40," *Business History Review* [Autumn 1978]);

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Marion Folsom to John B. Andrews, May 11, 1934, American Association of Labor Legislation papers, Tamiment Library, New York University; Social Security Project, Marion B. Folsom, Oral History Collection of Columbia University (hereafter cited as OHCCU), 1970; Tomlins, *The State and the Unions*, 119.

25. Frances Perkins, Oral History Memoir, OHCCU, p. 214; Roos, *NRA: Economic Planning*.

26. Friedlander, "Origins of the Welfare State"; Strum, *Louis D. Brandeis*; Max Lowenthal to Tom Corcoran, April 4, 1934, and July 12, 1935, and Lowenthal to "Tom and Ben," July 12, 1937, box 204, Thomas Corcoran Papers, Library of Congress; Donald A. Ritchie, *James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Felix Frankfurter to Bruce Bliven, December 4, 1930, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress.

27. *Fortune*, October 1933; "Wagner Committee—1933," memo, box 285, William Jett Lauck Papers, University of Virginia; "Suggested Program for 1934–35, memo to Mr. Lewis," box 40, Lauck Papers.

28. Frances Perkins Memoir, OHCCU; Jacob Potofsky Memoir, OHCCU; James A. Farley Memoir, OHCCU; Kenneth Waltzer, "The American Labor Party" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1977); New York State Labor Non-Partisan League, "Declaration of Principles," July 16, 1936, Labor Non-Partisan League file, Hillman Papers.

29. Perkins used her influence with varying success to persuade industrialists like Swope, Chrysler, and Sloan of General Motors to come to terms with the new labor movement (see Perkins correspondence, Record Group 174, Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, boxes 79 and 91; Jerrold Auerbach, *Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal* [Bobbs-Merrill, 1966]). Lee Pressman's influence extended directly into the White House via his relationship with Tom Corcoran and through Corcoran to James Roosevelt (see "Memorandum on conference with Secretary Perkins," October 11, 1937, box 63, "Secretary of Labor" folder, Father Francis Haas Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.).

30. Gross, *The Making of the NLRB*, 247–48.

31. Edsforth, *Class Conflict*; Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, 1949); Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 140, 200–202; David O'Brien, "American Catholics and Organized Labor in the 1930s," *Catholic Historical Review* (October 1966).

32. Transcript of Homer Martin radio broadcast, WJR in Detroit and WGAR in Cleveland, n.d., box 20, Adolph Germer Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison.

33. Jacob Potofsky to Father Haas, July 8, 1937, and Haas to Monseigneur Tourenhart, August 10, 1937, box 63, Haas Papers.

34. Robert P. Ingalls, *Herbert Lehman and New York State's Little New Deal* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 117–19. Even as staunch a CIO supporter as Father Rice opposed a federal housing project in Pittsburgh,

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sensing a threat to the integrity of the local Catholic community (see Bruce Stave, "Pittsburgh and the New Deal," in Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, eds., *State and Local Levels,* vol. 2 of *The New Deal* [Ohio State University Press, 1975]). The far more conservative Catholic hierarchy in New York State opposed all federal and state child labor regulations for similar reasons.

35. Gross, *The Making of the NLRB.*

36. Newell, *Chicago and the Labor Movement*; Hugh T. Lovin, "The Fall of the Farmer-Labor Parties," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* (January 1971); Sidney Hillman, speech to the General Executive Board of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, April 19, 1936, Hillman Papers; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* April 26, 1937.

37. Gardner Jackson to Jett Lauck and "Memo for Mr. John L. Lewis on Public Relations Suggestions," August 12, 1937, box 37, "Gardner Jackson" folder, Lauck Papers; Executive Board Minutes of the CIO, June 13, 1939, and June 3, 4, 5, 1940, AFL-CIO Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

38. Mordecai Ezekiel to Sidney Hillman, October 22, 1935, and February 10, 1938, Hillman Papers; Eziekel to Jett Lauck, May 3, 1938, box 35, Lauck Papers; "Rendevous with Democracy: The Memoirs of 'Tommy the Cork,' " with Philip Kooper, box 586a, Corcoran Papers. Arguably, this strategy pursued the objectives of the Rural Electrification Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Resettlement Administration, and other related agencies as well as the more radical leanings of the purged group around Tugwell within the Agriculture Department, which included Eziekel, Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, Jerome Frank, Beanie Baldwin, and Gardner Jackson, who viewed agricultural reform as a way of recasting the political economy of the South and thereby realigning the Democratic party.

39. James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); CIO Executive Board Minutes, 1938–1941, AFL-CIO Headquarters; James A. Gross, *The Reshaping of the NLRB: National Policy in Transition, 1937–47* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981). While it is true that a combination of work relief projects and the FLSA did eventually undermine the regional isolation of the Southern labor market and, most important, the New Deal's agricultural programs encouraging the mechanization of cotton cultivation produced an out-migration of farm labor, the full impact of these developments would not be registered for decades (see Gavin Wright, *Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War* [New York: Basic Books, 1986]).

40. *New York Times,* July 27, 1939; "Correspondence, 1935–37," box 63, Haas Papers; Carle Conway's address to the Annual Meeting of the Taylor Society, 1939. Many personnel managers, reflecting the functional dispersion of the firm, were quite sympathetic to the Wagner Act: "After so long a struggle . . . the principle of representation in employer-employee relations is definitely established. It has become increasingly clear that modern, complex, large-scale corporations no longer admit of satisfactory individualized control and management" ("Employer-Employee Relations," September 1, 1935,

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quoted in Robert E. Lane, *The Regulation of Businessmen: Social Conditions of Government Economic Control* [Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966], 129).

41. Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Ruttenberg, *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy* (1942; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1975); Cooke and Murray, *Organized Labor and Production*; Morris Cooke to Beulah Amidon, July 14, 1938, Paul U. Kellogg Papers, New York School of Social Work.

42. Box 24 of the Adolph Germer Papers is most useful in documenting this control; R. J. Thomas Memoir, OHCCU; Lee Pressman Memoir, OHCCU; Lichtenstein, *Labor's War at Home*; Gartman, *Auto Slavery*.

43. "The Quest for Security," transcript of Sidney Hillman address on the BBC, November 18, 1934, Hillman Papers; Joseph Gaer, *The First Round: The Story of the CIO-PAC* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944); *A Turning Point in History*, National Citizens Political Action Committee pamphlet, August 5, 1944, Hillman Papers; "PAC Political Program 1944," Hillman Papers; Hillman speech at CIO Full Employment Conference, January 1944, Hillman Papers.

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