

4. The “new unionism” and the transformation of workers’ consciousness in America, 1909–22

André Tridon, correspondent of *La Bataille Syndicaliste* in the United States, had little concern for theoretical debates among syndicalists, industrialists, Socialists and “pure and simple” unionists. The “New Unionism,” said he, “is the practice which will enable the workers to assume as a return for their labor the full control of the various industries.”¹ This emphasis on practice and control suggests that syndicalist tendencies among American workers may have reached far beyond the limited influence of the Industrial Workers of the World, and that the customary image of the IWW as representing conduct and aspirations far removed from the “mainstream” of American labor development may be misleading. To test these implications of Tridon’s view this essay will first examine the patterns of working-class behavior in the years 1909 to 1922, then explore the causes of that behavior. Along the way it will try to shed some light on the question widely voiced in “Wobbly” circles in 1911: “Why don’t the IWW grow?”

The IWW was born just as a massive upsurge in trade union strength had been brought to an abrupt halt. Between 1898 and 1903 the American economy had enjoyed an extraordinary boom resulting from the reconstruction of urban commercial centers with reinforced concrete and structural steel, the emergence of a host of new industries based on products and processes created in research laboratories of the previous decade, ranging from chemicals to electrical machinery, and an extensive quest for the resources of the tropical world, the value of which was largely revealed by those laboratories. In this setting financial houses sponsored mergers among competing manufacturing firms, which gave birth to most of the twentieth century’s leading corporations. The same upsurge generated so strong a demand for labor that skilled workmen had been able to force General Electric, U.S. Steel, International Harvester, the Morgan interests in anthracite and the Big Four meat packers of Chicago, not to mention the smaller employers of the building trades, machine tool industry, boot and shoe manufacture and northern textiles, to deal at least momentarily with numerous craft unions.

The economic downturn of 1903–4 changed this situation dramatically. The great steel corporation, having seriously limited union influence in the 1901 strike, began to pick off union outposts in the South, and Great Lakes shipping and bridge erection, in preparation for dealing the coup de grace to all unions within its writ in 1909. Harvester and the meat packers disposed of union annoyance in 1904, and eastern metal working shops began universally to ignore the rules of the machinists' union and to substitute handymen and specialists for journeymen.² Outside the metropolitan centers of the land, all unionism but that of miners was "stopped in its tracks"³ by Citizens' Alliances and other mobilizations of the local middle classes sponsored by employers' associations to rid their communities of strikes and union restrictions on production.

But the craft unions, checked at flood tide by an aroused Babbitry, had already been tamed in their own conduct by the bitter social conflicts of the 1890s. The quest for binding trade agreements to secure their industrial positions had induced their leaders to suppress sympathy strikes, which had been the mainspring of their growth in earlier decades. Most unions, furthermore, had come to rely on the union label as their primary organizing instrument. By bestowing labels on companies with which they signed agreements, union leaders offered employers a talisman to promote their sales in working-class markets (as with overalls, beer or machinists' instruments) or to distinguish wares of high quality from mass produced articles (as with cigars or shoes). "The union label," observed Brewery Workers' editor W. E. Trautmann, "is practically the manufacturers' label."⁴

It was such unionism which roused the ire of the men and women who assembled in July 1905 to found the IWW. Agreeing that "trade lines have been swallowed up in a common servitude of all workers to the machines which they tend,"⁵ the delegates decided to organize workers from the bottom up, enlisting first the unskilled and using their enthusiasm and power to pull the more highly skilled workers into action. This meant that the IWW had to replace the craft unions' meticulous caution with dramatic tactics. It would scorn large strike funds, relying instead on mass appeals for aid, on the workers' own spirit of sacrifice and on short strikes. It would reject all reliance on negotiations, labels, written contracts, trade autonomy and benefit funds, and it would summon the workers to leave the decrepit "American Separation of Labor" and enlist in the new revolutionary union.⁶

In the ensuing four or five years little came of these great hopes. The IWW seemed determined to devour itself in internecine bickering. Leaders

of the AFL union which had borne the most intense raids from the IWW, the Machinists, could assure their members by the end of 1906 that the rival organization had reached the end of its career. What “went up like a rocket,” they crowed, “came down like a stick.”⁷ In fact, the most massive struggle of the period, set off in 1907 when thirty-six unions of the New Orleans Dock and Cotton Council closed the port of the Crescent City to help the Brewery Workers challenge a jurisdictional award of the AFL, had borne many attributes of an IWW battle – a general strike based on the power of the “unskilled,” Black–White unity explicitly and decisively asserted, Marxist leadership and bitter worker hostility to the AFL – but the Wobblies had played no greater part in it than the organization of some support meetings.⁸

Strike decade

Despite its peculiar attributes of being set in the deep South and engaging strikers more against the AFL than against capital, the New Orleans strike did portend things to come. In the last quarter of 1907 the economy was struck by a crisis of such severity that the average level of unemployment for the ensuing year was 16.4 percent of the nation’s nonfarm employees.⁹ Then between July 1909 and the summer of 1910 the economy revived vigorously, before sinking back into the doldrums for all of 1911. With the upturn came the beginning of a decade of strikes of unprecedented scale and continuity.

In New York a militant nucleus of workers enrolled in the Ladies Garment Workers broke sharply with the union label tradition by calling general strikes, first of the city’s entire shirtwaist industry then of cloak and suit manufacture. Strikers at the Pressed Steel Car Company near Pittsburgh called in IWW organizers to assist them. The great armaments works of Bethlehem Steel was brought to a halt when blast furnace laborers quit work in sympathy with machinists, who had struck to protest Sunday work.¹⁰

In Philadelphia, efforts by the city government to break the street-car men’s union provoked in quick succession a strike of motormen, violent crowd action against scabs, which saw 298 cars wrecked and more than 500 people arrested, a sympathy stoppage which spread from the knitting mills of the Kensington district across the city, and ultimately a general strike involving 146 thousand workers at its peak and directed by the AFL’s Central Labor Union for twenty days.¹¹ The Socialist editors of the *New York Call* saw in this upsurge a challenge to the established

practices of the union movement and the electoral orientation of their party alike:

Such strikes as that of McKees Rocks, the shirtwaist makers' strike of this city, and now the Philadelphia strike are witnesses of the incapacity of the conservative and "constructive" labor leaders, as well as of the fighting spirit which animates the working masses . . . The working masses are just as ready to fight the capitalists by means of the strike as by means of the ballot.¹²

The direct, mass-involvement challenge to managerial authority and contempt for accepted AFL practice workers exhibited in 1909–10 were to remain the outstanding characteristics of American labor struggles, not episodically but continuously for the next dozen years. That most large strikes of the epoch ended in total defeat for the workers testifies both to the audacity of the strikers' pretensions and to their willingness to act in defiance of warnings from experienced union leaders that chances of victory were slim. In fact, large-scale strikes erupted whenever the level of unemployment fell off sufficiently to give the strikers a ghost of a chance of success. The critical level of unemployment seems to have been as high as nine percent of the nonfarm labor force. At any jobless rate below that level, the ratio of strikers to industrial workers shot up.¹³

From mid-1910 until the first quarter of 1912, however, the economy sagged consistently and unemployment rose above the 13 percent mark, despite a short-lived false recovery early in 1911. Major strikes were few, though one of them, that of the shopmen on the Illinois Central Railroad, was to be a major landmark in the history of American syndicalism. No great strikes were staged against wage reductions, largely because major corporations followed the lead of U.S. Steel in scrupulously avoiding wage cuts. They sought rather to reduce unit costs of production by the widespread promotion of new efficiency schemes and to capitalize on heavy unemployment by "the weeding out of the less efficient workman."¹⁴ Socialist party votes surged upward and party members captured leading positions in the Machinists and the Mine Workers, but direct action in basic industry was at a minimum.¹⁵

Even before the first clear signs of revival in 1912, the woolen mills of Lawrence were closed by the IWW's famous strike against one group of companies which had assumed that the state of the labor market would allow them to reduce wages (in conjunction with a small reduction of hours mandated by law). The textile workers' revolt spread across New England and New Jersey during the ensuing eighteen months, focusing its fire increasingly on the new stretch-out and premium pay schemes.

By April 1913, *Iron Age* complained that the country was gripped by an "epidemic of strikes."¹⁶ Most of the walkouts were brief, spontaneous, and local and were sparked by unskilled workers, like those at Studebaker and Firestone Rubber. Republic Steel avoided trouble by raising its common labor rate for the first time since May 1910 from seventeen cents to nineteen and a half cents an hour. In New York the most wretchedly paid garment workers, the ten thousand women who sewed kimonos, wrappers, and other "white goods," staged a fierce and successful strike for union recognition.¹⁷

By the end of 1913 both the prosperity and the workers' militancy had subsided. *Iron Age* commented that "a year of blight" had opened with the "most buoyant activity ever known," and closed in an atmosphere of business uncertainty.¹⁸ Unemployment stood at brutally high levels for a year and a half, and strikes were largely confined to long-unionized sectors, such as coal mines and the building trades.

Then came the Allies' war orders, and with them all economic inhibitions to direct action were removed. The "munitions strikes," as they were called by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, swept out of New England across the whole northeastern part of the country in the hot summer of 1915. Metal trades replaced building trades as the most strike-prone occupations. Small and middling-sized towns, the scene of the Open Shop Drive's earlier triumph, replaced big cities as the location of most work stoppages. Moreover, of the 179 strikes of machinists recorded for 1915, only 43 had union support.¹⁹ In the ten-day closing of the whole complex of firms controlled by Westinghouse in the East Pittsburgh area, the Machinists and other AFL unions were repudiated by the forty-thousand strikers, despite the fact that the tumultuous strike had been initiated by tool and die makers. The most prominent spokesmen of the strikers had Socialist party, Socialist Labor party, and IWW affiliations.²⁰

Despite the uneven impact of the war orders on the economy and the persistence of serious unemployment through 1916, the strike fever spread to many other industries. For the seven years following 1915, the ratio of strikers to all industrial and service employees remained constantly on a par with the more famous strike years of 1934 and 1937. The declaration of war had only a minor impact on this militancy. In each year of American participation more than a million workers struck, more, that is, than had ever struck in any year before 1915. The soaring cost of food, and especially government orders diluting wheat flour with corn meal, added fuel to the fire. Food riots flared in March 1917, when New York women

attacked grocery stores and marched on the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel demanding bread. In Philadelphia troops killed one woman and wounded nine others, breaking their occupation of the city's market place.²¹

The 6,205 recorded strikes between April 6, 1917 and November 11, 1918 tended to be short and took on an outlaw quality more than ever in the face of the AFL's official pledge not to strike. With unemployment down to 1.4 percent, workers improved their incomes as much by moving from job to job as they did by striking. It was common for workers to accept six to eight jobs in a single day of searching, then to report to the most promising one. An annual factory turnover rate "of 1,600 to 2,000 percent was by no means phenomenal," observed Professor L. C. Marshall.²² On the other hand, the most ambitious claims of workers, the 8-hour day and control over their conditions of work, could not be obtained by individual action. They provoked the most intense, and the most chronic, collective conflicts.

The second decade of the twentieth century was the decisive period in the battle for the 8-hour day, which American workers had been waging since the 1860s. At the start of the decade only 8 percent of the country's workers had regular schedules of 48 hours a week or less. Almost 70 percent of them worked more than 54 hours weekly. By 1919, however, 48.6 percent had the 48-hour week, and less than 26 percent still put in more than 54 hours.²³ The machinists of Trenton, whose strike for a 9-hour day in 1914 had been drowned in the unemployed of Philadelphia, shut their city's machine shops for three months at the end of 1915 to demand an 8-hour day. When their employers yielded to the union, they found "practically all" of the strikers had found jobs elsewhere.²⁴ According to the National War Labor Board, 1,026,703 workers had achieved the 8-hour day between 1915 and 1917 alone, before the board instituted its "basic 8-hour day." Most dramatic of all was the accomplishment of the silk, cotton and woolen mill hands of the North. In 1910 the state of Massachusetts had legislated a 58-hour week for textile workers, the first reduction since the law of 1874 had established the 60-hour week. Nine years later the 48-hour week was the norm in all three industries.²⁵

Such gains cannot be understood simply as the logical fruit of technological progress and rising productivity. In fact, there is evidence to suggest both that output per man-hour declined during the war years and that some restoration of longer hours accompanied rising productivity in the twenties.²⁶ A survey by the National Industrial Conference Board of five major industries in 1919 and 1920 found employers overwhelmingly

Table 2. *Strike trends in the United States, 1900–25*

Year	Strikes and lockouts (1)	Workers involved (000) (2)	Strikers as % of all workers (3)	Index of control strikes (4)	Unemployed as % of nonfarm employees (5)
1900	1,899	568	4.9	182	12.6
1901	3,012	564	4.7	320	10.1
1902	3,240	692	5.6	328	8.6
1903	3,648	788	6.2	375	9.0
1904	2,419	574	4.3	296	12.0
1905	2,186	302	2.2	249	9.5
1906	629 ^a	74 ^b	5.1 ^b	—	3.0
1907	680 ^a	94 ^b	6.3 ^b	—	6.0
1908	315 ^a	28 ^b	1.9 ^b	—	16.4
1909	452 ^a	65 ^b	4.1 ^b	—	11.6
1910	604 ^a	218 ^a	11.4 ^a	—	11.6
1911	511 ^a	112 ^a	5.8 ^a	—	13.0
1912	575 ^a	138 ^a	7.0 ^a	—	9.0
1913	567 ^c	337 ^c	24.4 ^c	—	8.2
1914	1,204	—	—	81	14.7
1915	1,593	640	3.7	109	15.6
1916	3,789	1,600	9.2	225	9.1
1917	4,450	1,227	6.9	312	8.2
1918	3,353	1,240	6.8	220	2.4
1919	3,630	4,160	22.5	269	2.4
1920	3,411	1,463	7.8	214	8.6
1921	2,385	1,099	5.7	144	19.5
1922	1,112	1,613	8.3	93	11.4
1923	1,553	757	3.8	150	4.1
1924	1,249	655	3.3	121	8.3
1925	1,301	428	2.1	133	5.4

Notes: ^a Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey figures. ^b Massachusetts and New York only. ^c New York and New Jersey only.

Sources: The number of strikes and lockouts (1) and the number of workers involved (2) are from Florence Peterson, *Strikes in the United States, 1880–1936* (U.S. Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 651), 21; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C. 1960), 99; Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, *Reports, 1901–16*; New York Department of Labor, *Bulletin No. 66* (November, 1914); New Jersey Bureau of Industrial Statistics, *Reports, 1901–16*; U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Manufacturers, 1914 Abstract* and *Census of Manufactures, 1919 Abstract*. No strike data was gathered by the federal government from 1906 through 1914.

The number of “all workers” on which column (3) is based is the number of “manual and service workers” minus the number of “private household workers,” from *Historical Statistics*, 74. Annual figures were estimated from the decade figures of the census.

The index of control (4) is the ratio of the total number of strikes each year for recognition, union rules, sympathy and miscellaneous, to the number of such strikes in 1886, taken as 100. The data used is from Peterson, 33, 39.

Figures on unemployment (5) are from Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth* (New York, 1964), 512.

of the opinion that the more mechanized an industry was, the more *difficult* it was for employers to compensate for reduction of hours by increases in hourly output, and consequently the greater the resistance of employers to such reductions.²⁷ Certainly the intense opposition of metal trades firms to demands for the 8-hour day in the strikes of 1916 (when some 600 strikes were called on May 1 alone) indicated their full agreement with the editorial resolve of *Iron Age*, "that the unparalleled situation which has made victory in Europe turn not only upon sheer tonnage in steel projectiles, but upon the metal-cutting capacity of American machine tools, must not be allowed to settle for years to come so important an issue as the 8-hour machine shop day."²⁸

Control strikes

Every bit as provocative of conflict as the battle for the 8-hour day, but far less richly rewarded in long-term effects, was the effort by workers to establish collective control over their conditions of work. A measure of control struggles other than those for eight hours may be constructed by lumping together such strike issues as enforcement of work rules, union recognition, discharge of unpopular foremen or retention of popular ones, regulation of layoffs or dismissals, and actions of sympathy with other groups of workers. An index of the frequency of these control strikes since 1881 reveals that they became especially prominent in three periods: 1901–4, 1916–20, and 1934–41.²⁹

The control strikes of 1901–4 basically involved the titanic and mostly unsuccessful effort of the craft unions to secure a firm hold within the congealing structure of monopoly capitalism. Many similar efforts appeared in the 1916–20 period, when unions like the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and the International Association of Machinists took advantage of the buoyant labor market to renew their efforts to operate in the old way. Much more distinctive and significant were the extensive efforts of workers both inside and outside the old unions to exert new forms of collective control. Even the recognition struggles of older unions, however, could trigger new forms of struggle. Five city-wide general strikes plagued the government between September 1917 and April 1918: in Springfield, Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Waco, Texas; and two in Billings, Montana. The Billings strikes were called to aid embattled building tradesmen; Kansas City's was to help laundry workers, and the others were in support of streetcar motormen and conductors.³⁰

In the four years following the armistice, control strikes persisted at high levels, while the phrase "workers' control," seldom heard before that time, became a popular catchword throughout the labor movement. Union membership in the United States was two and a half times the level of 1910, an increase not far below the threefold rise for the world's twenty leading industrial nations as a whole.³¹ The Machinists union alone had grown from 54,000 members under predominantly conservative leadership in 1910 to 331,450 members under a Socialist administration by 1919.³² Both the United Mine Workers, now over 400 thousand strong, and the increasingly unified coalition of sixteen unions among the 1.85 million railway workers had committed themselves officially to immediate nationalization of their particular industries, with future direction to be shared by the employees and consumer groups. When the railroad brotherhoods and shopcraft unions tested the sentiment of their members on the so-called Plumb Plan in 1920, 90 percent of the workers voting favored a strike to make congress enact the nationalization scheme.³³

Among the 4,160,348 workers who participated in strikes in 1919 every conceivable type of demand was raised: wage increases to catch the soaring cost of living, reductions of hours to forty-four a week in the needle trades and forty in metropolitan building trades, recognition of unions and shop committees, joint negotiation with councils of related unions in particular plants, ship-yards or communities, defiance of governmental decrees and, on July 4-9, freedom for Tom Mooney. In Seattle the committee directing the city's general strike declared:

Labor will not only SHUT DOWN the industries, but Labor will REOPEN, under the management of the appropriate trades, such activities as are needed to preserve public health and public peace. If the strike continues, Labor may feel led to avoid public suffering by reopening more and more activities.

UNDER ITS OWN MANAGEMENT.

And that is why we say we are starting on a road that leads – NO ONE KNOWS WHERE!³⁴

The new mood among workers shattered the Socialist party and subjected the AFL to extreme stress. As J. B. S. Hardman noted: "the war emphasized the power of money, of industry, the significance of leadership, of direct action. And the Socialist party had nothing to offer but advice to use the franchise intelligently."³⁵ Samuel Gompers, in turn, organized an "All-American" committee of labor leaders to stage rallies against "bolshivism, I. W. W. ism and red flagism in general."³⁶ Editorially he warned his flock: "History records few ideas more tragic and fantastic than the idea of government by direct action . . . The strike itself is a

weapon too sacred and too valuable to be used for any other than its legitimate purpose."³⁷

In 1920, consequently, 7.4 percent of the strikes and 58 percent of the strikers were without union sanction. The insurgent strike of 60 thousand Illinois coal miners and another of 25 thousand railroad switchmen were the best known of these conflicts.³⁸ They also marked a return to the center of the American labor scene of the alliance of railroad workers and coal miners which had been the germ of most nineteenth-century mass strikes.³⁹ But the upward spiral of unemployment, starting in the summer of 1920 and rising to 20 percent through 1921, put a damper on this insurgent behavior.

The main thrust of official union efforts during the 1921–2 depression was to preserve contracts and work rules, even at the expense of wage reductions.⁴⁰ Workers, in turn, tended to close ranks around their organizations and hence to strengthen the hand of incumbent leaders. In 1922 less than one-tenth of one percent of the 1.613 million strikers were out without union authorization. Yet the year began with almost forty thousand packing house workers on strike and progressed to a summertime state of war in American basic industries. The strikes were not numerous, but they were huge, protracted, desperate battles. Fully 400 thousand railroad shopmen, 600 thousand coal miners and 60 thousand textile workers struck in vain attempts to preserve union organization against the employers' American Plan offensive.⁴¹

In summary, then, direct action had been, not the exclusive property of the IWW, but the main theme of a dozen years of fierce class conflict in America. During those years a secondary theme of workers' control had recurred incessantly and become increasingly explicit. It is small wonder, therefore, that avowedly syndicalist groupings of workers were numerous, some of them inside the AFL. The Cloth Hat and Cap Makers and the Sheet Metal Workers of New York put no faith in trade agreements or union labels and bestowed absolute power on shop committees, coordinated by executive boards of avowed revolutionaries.⁴² The Jewelry Workers, sparked by an alliance of Jewish Socialists and Italian syndicalists, boasted their shop autonomy and the direct action which had won them a 44-hour week as early as 1916.⁴³ Another Italian–Jewish axis gave similar orientation to the local of the Structural Iron Workers which dealt with New York's ornamental iron shops.⁴⁴

All these unions were made up of skilled craftsmen and dealt with very small employers. A Parisian syndicalist would have understood them well.⁴⁵ But all of them stood outside the world of modern large-scale

industry, where the direct action currents of these twelve years were concentrated. The more significant appearance of New Unionism *within* basic industry was attributed by Vice-President P. J. Conlon of the Machinists to the spread of new managerial practices which, he claimed, stimulated a response of “sabotage, syndicalism, [and] passive resistance” on the workers’ part. “We did not hear of any of these things,” he argued, “until we heard of scientific management and new methods of production.”⁴⁶

Conlon’s view merits careful examination because American manufacturing had, in fact, been drastically transformed since the 1890s not only in its financial structure and market relationships by the consolidation of competing firms and the formation of ubiquitous trade associations, but also in the internal organization of the production process itself. The cutting edge of the internal reform was described by Frederick Winslow Taylor as “the deliberate gathering in on the part of those on management’s side of all of the great mass of traditional knowledge, which in the past has been in the heads of the workmen, and in the physical skill and knack of the workman, which he has acquired through years of experience.”⁴⁷

Worker response to “rationalized industry”

Although the particulars of the process varied substantially from one industry to another, employers in every major industry sought to develop an engineering staff, academically educated for its new role, which could plan and direct the flow of production on the basis of systematic research in both the properties of materials used in production and the logical sequence of productive operations, then assign each worker a very specific task in that sequence, based on time and motion studies, and finally, induce the worker to perform that task as assigned by a carefully structured system of incentive payments. By this innovation, the power of the craftsmen which had rested on their superior knowledge of their work relative to their employers was undermined, and the traditional dualism of craftsmen operating the machinery while laborers fetched and carried was remodeled into a continuum of specialized machine tenders performing functions which required only minor variations in training and agility, and all of which were directly under the detailed supervision of a swarm of managerial officials.⁴⁸

Three important consequences for workers flowed from the combination of corporate consolidation and the adoption of new efficiency schemes. The first was the divorce between the technical and social systems of control in the factory, which Roethlisberger and Dickson were

to discover in the famous Hawthorne experiments.⁴⁹ Some degree of worker restriction of output remained, but on a guerrilla basis – as defiance of management's will and instructions, as sabotage. The small informal work group persisted, not as an agency of explicit control, as it had been under craft unionism, but as a submerged, impenetrable obstacle to management's sovereignty. The steel mill laborers of Whiting William's gang had "not the slightest interest in what [their work] means or how it affects the operations of the mill around them . . . It is all just a matter of doing as little work as the boss will allow." Their favorite saying was, "what the hell!"⁵⁰

Secondly, the more thoroughly business rationalized itself, the more extreme became the chaos of working-class life. Even the frail safeguards of employment stability that union rules and standard rates had represented were swept away, while the urgent need of heavily capitalized corporations to operate only at full capacity made job tenure increasingly spasmodic for many workers. Hence weavers could be ordered to run twelve looms in place of eight because, "there's plenty waitin' at the gates for our jobs."⁵¹ Henry Ford could enforce any tempo of work he wished because, when he announced the famous five-dollar day in January 1914, ten thousand men rioted at the plant gates, fighting each other for the jobs.⁵² At a national conference on unemployment that year, the secretary of the Chicago Unemployment Commission reported that conditions were no worse than usual. That was the tragedy, he continued, unemployment was now chronic and endemic to the economy.⁵³ The typical unemployed male, a conference the next year concluded, was neither the casual laborer nor the craftsman, but the specialist, whom scientific management had spawned. In New York only 21 percent of the unemployed had been in the United States fewer than five years. Fifty-five percent of them had been here more than ten years.⁵⁴ The jobless were not marginal men, but an indispensable part of "rationalized" industry.

Third, the oligopolistic power of the new corporation provided it with a new capacity to administer prices on the basis of long-range planning for company development. Simultaneously, the rapid growth of the urban population reversed the nineteenth-century trend of constantly falling food prices. These two factors contributed to an upward drift in the cost of living, which averaged 2.4 percent annually from 1896 through 1912. With the coming of the war the rate of increase soared upward.⁵⁵ As a result, even though major corporations increasingly adhered to a policy of maintaining stable wages through crisis periods, thus avoiding mass revolts against wage cuts, real earnings were, in fact, constantly falling.

Every period of relatively full employment, therefore, was marked by strikes of lower paid workers over wages.

The combined impact of these three developments generated two distinct currents of working-class struggle, which often tended to fuse during and after the war years: one arising from the craftsmen and the other from operatives and laborers. The more skilled workers took advantage of every period of low unemployment to attack certain elements of the new managerial methods directly. During the war they mounted a widespread revolt against premium pay systems, dilution of skills and the stop watch, especially in metal-working plants where, Taylor had boasted, little overt protest had greeted the introduction of those devices.⁵⁶ Anxious to maintain uninterrupted war production, the National War Labor Board had even agreed to the abolition of incentive pay systems in some large companies, at the very time top AFL leaders were consummating their celebrated reconciliation with the Taylor Society.⁵⁷ Numerous strikes for job classifications with standard rates directly challenged the individualized wage rates which employers had come to believe were inevitable reflections of the variety of machine tending tasks and necessary inducements to individual exertion. The board consistently refused to support such sweeping changes in company practices as the demand for classifications entailed.

Furthermore, the enormous expansion of tool room work which attended the shift from the use of all-around machinists to specialized operators in metal works made the manufacture of jigs and fixtures itself a production line function, carried on in large plants by hundreds of men, who were called tool makers but who had very heterogeneous work assignments and earnings (ranging from thirty-eight to ninety cents per hour). Consequently in the munitions strikes the "tool makers" were the stormy petrels. Their demand for a standard tool room rate was the most difficult issue for government agencies to mediate. Ostensibly a wage demand, it challenged the basic fabric of the new managerial methods.

Bridgeport, Connecticut, where some 120 local firms subcontracted for the Remington Arms Company, which directly employed fifteen thousand men and women in a twenty-one building plant erected in the first eight months of 1915, was a seething cauldron of such conflicts from the summer of 1915 onward. Strikes for the 8-hour day, wage increases and overtime pay, abolition of premiums, equal pay regardless of sex on all jobs where women were substituted for craftsmen, an end to discrimination and intimidation against union members, secure draft deferments and recognition of shop committees were endemic to this boom town.

The preeminence of tool makers in these actions brought the city's District 55 of the IAM under the leadership of an erstwhile Wobbly, Samuel Lavit, and his radical colleagues. The refusal of the National War Labor Board to uphold their demand for seven standardized job classifications (where there were more than 250 known wage rates) provoked a total strike at Remington and most contractors in September 1918 that was broken only when President Wilson personally ordered all who failed to return to work barred from any war employment for a year. A city-wide council of shop delegates, created by the government to ease the crisis atmosphere, quickly fell under the leadership of Lavit, and was repudiated by the employers. By January 1919 when the local machinists staged rallies against layoffs, their leaders cast off the nonpolitical guise they had carefully assumed through America's participation in the fighting. Louise Bryant, just returned from Russia with John Reed, was the featured speaker, and union petitions demanded "co-operative ownership and democratic management of industry."⁵⁸

The Bridgeport struggles, with their clear emphasis on control questions, were led by skilled workers, in fact by a craft union (the IAM). The second current of workers' activity, however, that which arose from laborers and operatives, was prompted primarily by wage questions, that is to say, by the rising cost of living. The resistance of these workers to speedup and management's authority tended to take the form of continuous, covert, self-organization by small informal groups at work.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the very occurrence of strikes among them shattered the myth of immigrant docility and revealed that the new industrial discipline had promoted a sense of raw injustice and common cause among, as well as within, the various ethnic communities of foreign born. The experience of immigrant machine tenders, furthermore, made both the craft divisions of the AFL and its traditional commitment to self-help appear ludicrous.⁶⁰

Consequently, revolts of immigrant operatives offered a fertile field for the work of revolutionary activists, provided those activists could circumvent the Socialist Party's official fixation on electoral activity.⁶¹ The mass picketing and endless succession of huge rallies which characterized such strikes lent themselves to an energizing sense of collective power and invited revolutionary rhetoric. When, for example, two thousand Lithuanians, Poles, and Hungarians walked out of the pipe threading, finishing and furnace departments of National Tube in Pittsburgh in 1912, the leadership of their daily meetings and parades quickly fell to Fred Merrick, a local Socialist journalist, and several of his party comrades. More than a thousand strikers marched across a bridge over the Monon-

gahela to stand outside the company office, while Merrick and their committee negotiated the settlement.⁶²

As this pattern of action recurred time and again, some well-tested and charismatic radicals became veritable folk heroes: William Z. Foster, William D. Haywood, Arturo Giovanitti and especially Carlo Tresca, one man who actually incarnated the conservative's fantasy of the agitator who could start an uprising with a speech. During the strikes of immigrants local authorities went to extraordinary lengths to exclude such men from the mill towns and to dominate the mass meetings themselves. In Ipswich, Massachusetts, the local citizens of standing mobilized vigilante forces to control rallies of Greek and Polish cotton-mill strikers in 1913, jailed all the Socialist and Wobbly activists who came to town and lured native workmen back to their jobs with patriotic appeals. In the strike of Bayonne oil refinery workers, Sheriff Kinkead literally seized command, first by flamboyantly jailing eighty Bergoff detectives and the company superintendent on riot charges to gain credibility with the strikers while his deputies discretely lured Frank Tannenbaum and other Wobblies onto company property, beat them brutally and expelled them from town, then persuaded a mass meeting to accept a settlement he had worked out with Standard Oil.⁶³ In Passaic in 1919 police officers sat on the platform and censored speeches, while a representative of the Department of Labor denounced the strike leaders sent by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and cajoled strikers into the AFL. When Anthony Capraro, a leader of the 1919 Lawrence strike, succeeded in smuggling Tresca into the city past the police dragnet, the police retaliated by taking Capraro into the countryside and beating him within an inch of his life.⁶⁴

Such repression, however, does not provide a sufficient explanation of the IWW's failure to grow apace with the rising militancy of industrial workers. Paradoxically, the greater the scope and intensity of struggles in the Northeast grew, the more exclusively the IWW's attention became riveted on timber and agricultural workers of the South and West. Conversely, individual Wobblies of industrial areas collaborated ever more closely with mill town locals of the Socialist Party, which were charting their own courses in direct action without guidance (or even in the face of hostility) from their party's national executive.⁶⁵

Two reasons for the small role of the IWW as such in the New Unionism suggest themselves. First, it became increasingly apparent that the immigrant machine tenders wanted something more from their organization than oratory and strike leadership. As their aspirations to regulate working conditions and shorten hours grew stronger, their desire

for durable, open, recognized unions grew with them. The enthusiastic responses of immigrant packing house workers and steel workers to William Z. Foster's organizing committees revealed this desire clearly.⁶⁶ The steady growth of the language federations of the Socialist Party, from 15,340 members in 1912 to 23,000 in 1915 and 56,680 by 1919 and the great effectiveness of the Ladies Garment Workers among Jews in New York and of the United Shoe Workers among Italians in Lynn and Poles in Chicago— both unions being led by militant Socialists— bore testimony to the appeal of revolutionary leadership coupled with business-like organization among foreign-born workers.⁶⁷ After 1916, however, the lodestone of the leftward movement among immigrants clearly became the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. So effective was the fusion of Jewish and Italian workers on which that union and its satellite, the Amalgamated Textile Workers, rested that by 1919 even Giovanitti and Tresca had put the IWW behind them and were devoting all their energies to the Amalgamated.⁶⁸

Second, the contempt of the Wobblies for craft unions all too easily became contempt for the more skilled workers. "I do not care the snap of my finger whether or not the skilled workman joins this industrial movement," Haywood had said in 1905. "When we get the unorganized and unskilled laborer into this organization, the skilled worker will of necessity come here for his own protection."⁶⁹ This contempt in turn explains the absence of any reference to "workers' control" at the founding convention of the IWW, aside from the recurring theme that under socialism workers would assume direct management of their industries.⁷⁰ As the munitions strikes revealed, fights for the deliberate collective regulation of production were most likely to arise from the ranks of workers who had exercised such regulation in the memorable past, that is, from craftsmen. Despite the fact that the progress of scientific management had ruled out the possibility of their restoring control in its traditional form (the journeyman machinist, pledged to union rules, making the product his way), the machinists of Bridgeport had formulated by the summer of 1918 their own clear alternative to the way management directed the factories: a plan based on the 8-hour day, standard job classifications, and shop committees energized by a militant machinists' union. This counterplan, distilled from countless strike meetings, provided the substance behind the rhetoric of their 1919 appeal for "collective participation of the workers in the control of the industry."⁷¹ Without such widely shared aspirations and collectively formulated plans, Louis Fraina

had argued six years earlier, syndicalism easily degenerates into a "slavery to means," a fixation on militant tactics, or even a cult of violence.⁷²

The potential significance of craftsmen's struggles had been grasped, however, by the North American Syndicalist League, and the shopmen of the Illinois Central Railroad and Harriman lines provided their favorite case in point. These workers had been noted both for the prevalence of Socialist politics among them and for their craft exclusiveness. Their lodges cast overwhelming votes at the 1903 IAM convention for resolutions favoring the cooperative commonwealth and against resolutions to admit handymen to the union.⁷³ Here were political Socialists of the type any good syndicalist would mock. Yet in 1911, the very year the bloc of Socialist Party candidates swept the elections for top offices in the IAM, these shopmen launched a strike which was to last for four years and pit them as insurgents against the union's new leaders.

The spur was the spread of time study and incentive pay to railroad car shops, which had long been strongholds of traditional unionism. When organized craftsmen in the Illinois Central's two largest shops (Chicago and Paducah, Kentucky) observed new timecards and stop-watches appearing around them, they began on their own initiative to protest to local superintendents through joint committees of the several trades. Meeting top-level resistance from the railroad, the shopmen convened an unofficial meeting in Memphis, where they formed a "system federation" to speak jointly for locals of the machinists, steamfitters, carmen, sheet-metal workers, boilermakers, blacksmiths, painters, laborers and (cruellest blow of all to the company) clerks.

A parallel movement spread out of Kansas City along the Union Pacific and other lines controlled by the Harriman interests, which the Illinois Central linked to Chicago and New Orleans. Together the new systems federations demanded the abolition of premium pay schemes, time study, personnel records, and dilution of skills. When the railroads involved refused to deal with the unions except through the separate national offices of the different crafts, as they had done in the past, the federations called a strike of more than sixteen thousand workers, to which the seven national unions gave reluctant support.⁷⁴

The railroads deluged the strikers with injunctions and drew strike-breakers from the heavy ranks of unemployed, and from the "clerks, druggists, soldiers, street car drivers, motormen . . . [and] young men that wanted to learn a trade," in towns along their lines.⁷⁵ Gunplay blazed around the tracks and shops for four years, 553 strikers were jailed and

1,069 lost their homes before the unions officially called off the strike, over the angry protests of its leaders.⁷⁶ Subsequently Illinois Central executives complained that clerks who had returned to work showed a marked aptitude “in removing and concealing records, in removing cards from cars, and in exchanging cards on cars so that the utmost confusion resulted from their action.”⁷⁷

The strike had revealed a readiness among some craft unionists of long standing to fuse all grades of workers in open confrontation with scientific management. William Z. Foster of the newly established Syndicalist League used the strike to illustrate the foolishness of the IWW's dual unionism and the significance of a “militant minority” among unionized workmen. Max Dezzettel, James Cannon and Earl Browder were three of the league's supporters in Kansas City, a storm center of the conflict and the cradle of the Communist Party in the West.⁷⁸ The strikers themselves pushed their unions into a convention at Kansas City in 1912, where they created a Federation of Federations to coordinate the efforts of all railway shopmen and to agitate for a general strike over the whole western railroad district.⁷⁹

In short, both the control struggles of skilled workers and the wage strikes of laborers and machine tenders had opened new vistas to millions of workers by 1920. In fact, the basic challenges to which employers responded with the American Plan were those of preventing the convergence of the two currents of working-class activity and defusing control demands with an appearance of worker participation in management. But the transformation of consciousness which generated these challenges by enrolling five million into unions and infusing into their ranks a widespread aspiration to direct the operation of railroads, mines, shipyards and factories collectively, was itself the product of a decade of continuous struggle, the new forms of which resulted from management's reorganization of industry. Only when that transformation was well under way, and only when the strong unionization of workers in basic industries it made possible had been achieved, did the challenge Joseph Schlossberg hurled to the 1920 convention of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers become meaningful: “It is now our responsibility to establish order in the industry in the place of the chaos created by the employers when they had things their own way.”⁸⁰

Notes

- 1 André Tridon, *The New Unionism* (New York, 1914), 17.
- 2 David Brody, *Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era* (Cambridge, 1960),

- 50–79; Luke Grant, *The National Erectors' Association and the International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers* (Washington, 1915); Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester* (Madison, 1967), 44–70; David Brody, *The Butcher Workmen, A Study of Unionization* (Cambridge, 1964); Clarence E. Bonnett, *Employers' Association in the United States: A Study of Typical Associations* (New York, 1922); Jacob H. Hollander and George E. Barnett, *Studies in American Trade Unionism* (New York, 1912), 109–52.
- 3 President C. W. Post of the Citizens' Industrial Alliance, quoted in Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, *History of Labor in the United States, 1896–1932* (New York, 1935), 136.
 - 4 *Proceedings of the First Convention of the Industrial Workers of the World, Founded at Chicago, June 27–July 8, 1905* (New York, 1905, hereinafter cited as *IWW Proceedings*), 123. See also Marguerite Green, *The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900–1925* (Washington, 1956); James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918* (Boston, 1968); Philip S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States* (4 vols., New York, 1947–1965), III, 32–110.
 - 5 "Manifesto," in *IWW Proceedings*, 4.
 - 6 Vincent St. John, *The IWW, Its History, Structure and Methods* (Chicago, 1919); Foner, IV, 36–9, 114–71.
 - 7 *Machinists' Monthly Journal*, 18 (December 1906), 1108–11. Hereinafter cited as *MMJ*.
 - 8 Oscar Ameringer, *If You Don't Weaken* (New York, 1940), 194–223; James Leonard to Frank Morrison, June 2, June 6, June 9, July 7, July 14, September 1, September 29, 1907, John Mitchell Papers, Box A3-49, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.; *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, July 13, 1907; Foner, III, 250–3.
 - 9 *Iron Age*, 92 (December 4, 1913), 1294; Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth* (New York, 1964), 512.
 - 10 Louis Levine, *The Women's Garment Workers* (New York, 1924), 144–95; Melvyn Dubofsky, *When Workers Organize: New York City in the Progressive Era* (Amherst, Mass., 1968), 49–66; John N. Ingham, "A Strike in the Progressive Era: McKees Rocks, 1909," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 90 (July 1966), 353–77; U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report on the Strike at the Bethlehem Steel Works*, Senate Document 521 (Washington, D.C., 1910).
 - 11 Perlman and Taft, 343–8; Edward Levinson, *I Break Strikes! The Technique of Pearl L. Bergoff* (New York, 1935), 89–104.
 - 12 Editorial, *New York Call*, March 7, 1910.
 - 13 See Table 2, Ch. 4.
 - 14 Editorial, *Iron Age*, 93 (April 23, 1914), 1018–19. See also *ibid.*, 88 (September 21, 1911), 607; Judge Gary's speech, *ibid.*, 87 (January 19, 1911), 208–10.
 - 15 James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912–1925* (New York, 1967), 93–119; John H. M. Laslett, *Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924* (New York, 1970), 161–4, 214–18.
 - 16 *Iron Age*, 91 (April 17, 1913), 954.
 - 17 Melvyn Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World* (Chicago, 1969), 286–7; *Iron Age*, 92 (September 11, 1913), 572; Levine, 227–31.
 - 18 *Iron Age*, 93 (January 1, 1914), 13.
 - 19 *Monthly Labor Review*, 2 (April 1916), 13–26.

- 20 Dianne Kanitra, "The Westinghouse Strike of 1916," (unpublished M.A. paper, University of Pittsburgh, 1971).
- 21 *International Socialist Review*, 16 (April 1917), 582-7; Joseph T. Makarewicz, "The Impact of World War I on Pennsylvania Politics, with Emphasis on the Election of 1920," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1972).
- 22 Leon C. Marshall, "The War Labor Program and Its Administration," *Journal of Political Economy*, 26 (May 1918), 429.
- 23 *Monthly Labor Review*, 17 (December 1923), 82-5.
- 24 Bureau of Industrial Statistics of New Jersey, *Thirty-Ninth Annual Report* (Camden, 1916), 225; *ibid.*, 1914, 227-40.
- 25 Alexander M. Bing, *War-Time Strikes and Their Adjustment* (New York, 1921), 60-1, 178n, 181; Susan M. Kingsbury, *Labor Laws and Their Enforcement, with Special Reference to Massachusetts* (New York, 1911), 90-125.
- 26 Robert Ozanne, *Wages in Practice and Theory: McCormick and International Harvester, 1860-1960* (Madison, Wis., 1968), 108-11.
- 27 Paul H. Douglas, C. N. Hitchcock, and W. E. Atkins, *The Worker in Modern Economic Society* (Chicago, 1923), 361-2.
- 28 *Iron Age*, 96 (October 14, 1915), 884-5.
- 29 See Table 2, Ch. 4.
- 30 Bing, 30n.
- 31 Frank Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences* (New York, 1921), 147n.
- 32 Mark Perlman, *The Machinists: A New Study in American Trade Unionism*, (Cambridge, 1961), 33, 51.
- 33 Douglas, Hitchcock and Atkins, 562-3; Nationalization Research Committee, United Mine Workers of America, *How To Run Coal* (New York, 1922); Glenn E. Plumb and William G. Roylance, *Industrial Democracy: A Plan for Its Achievement* (New York, 1923); William Z. Foster, *The Railroaders' Next Step* (Chicago, 1921); John G. Randall, Jr., *The Problem of Group Responsibility to Society* (New York, 1922), 227.
- 34 History Committee of the General Strike Committee, *The Seattle General Strike* (reprinted as Root and Branch pamphlet 5, Charlestown, Mass., 1972), 4.
- 35 J. B. S. Hardman, ed., *American Labor Dynamics, in the Light of Post-War Developments* (New York, 1928), 21. cf., Weinstein, *Decline*, 177-233.
- 36 *The Tailor*, April 8, 1919.
- 37 "Direct Action Loses," *American Federationist* (October 1919), 962-4.
- 38 Sylvia Kopald, *Rebellion in Labor Unions* (New York, 1924), 50-177. The percentage figures of insurgent strikers are my own.
- 39 Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco, 1972), 69-96, 243-4.
- 40 Vertrees J. Wyckoff, *The Wage Policies of Labor Organizations in a Period of Industrial Depression* (Baltimore, 1926); Royal E. Montgomery, *Industrial Relations in the Chicago Building Trades* (Chicago, 1927), 233-309.
- 41 *Monthly Labor Review*, 14 (May 1922), 183; *ibid.*, 16 (June 1923), 231-9.
- 42 Interviews with Max Zuckerman, Gen. Secy., Cloth Hat and Cap Makers of America, March 3, 1919 and David Brodsky, Pres. Local 137 Sheet Metal Workers, March 11, 1919, David J. Saposs Papers, Box 22, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.
- 43 Interview with Samuel E. Beardsley, Organizer Local Union No. 1, Jewelry Workers Union, February 19, 1919; D. J. Saposs, "Jewish Unions," typescript (Saposs Papers, Box 21).
- 44 Interviews with Harry Jones, Secy.-Tres., International Association of Bridge

- and Structural Iron Workers, January 23, 1919, and Sol Broad, Business Agent, Jewish Local, IABSIW, March 6, 1919 (Saposs Papers, Box 22).
- 45 See Peter N. Stearns, *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels* (New Brunswick, 1971), 19–33.
- 46 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, *Final Report and Testimony*, 11 vols., 64th Congress, 1st session, Senate Document No. 415 (Washington, D.C. 1916, hereinafter cited as CIR), 1, 874.
- 47 Frederick W. Taylor, "Testimony," 49, in Taylor, *Scientific Management. Comprising Shop Management. The Principles of Scientific Management. Testimony before the Special House Committee* (New York, 1947).
- 48 See *Ibid.*; Robert F. Hoxie, *Scientific Management and Labor* (New York, 1915); Hugh G. J. Aitken, *Taylorism at the Watertown Arsenal: Scientific Management in Action, 1908–1915* (Cambridge, 1960).
- 49 F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker: Technical Vs. Social Organization in an Industrial Plant* (Cambridge, 1934).
- 50 Whiting Williams, *What's on the Worker's Mind, By One Who Put on Overalls to Find Out* (New York, 1921), 20.
- 51 Leon Stein and Philip Taft, ed., *Workers Speak: Self Portraits* (New York, 1971), 30.
- 52 *Iron Age*, 93 (January 8, 1914); Keith Sward, *The Legend of Henry Ford* (New York, 1968), 52–60.
- 53 *American Labor Legislation Review*, 4 (May 1914), 225.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 5 (November 1915), 486–7. See also Don D. Lescohier, *The Labor Market* (New York, 1919).
- 55 Lebergott, 524, 528.
- 56 CIR, 1, 772–3.
- 57 Eg., National War Labor Board, Administrative Files Box 54 (General Electric); Docket No. 22 (Bethlehem Steel), Record Group 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C. On the reconciliation, see Milton J. Nadworny, *Scientific Management and the Unions, 1900–1932* (Cambridge, 1955).
- 58 National War Labor Board, Case File 132, Record Group 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C. On the Remington plant, see *Iron Age*, 96 (October 14, 1915), 296–303.
- 59 See Stanley B. Mathewson, *Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers* (New York, 1931).
- 60 William M. Leiserson, *Adjusting Immigrant and Industry* (New York, 1924), 169–233.
- 61 Paul Buhle, "Debsian Socialism and the 'New Immigrant' Worker," in *Insights and Parallels: Problems and Issues of American Social History*, William O'Neill, ed. (Minneapolis, 1973), 249–77.
- 62 *Survey*, 28 (July 6, 1912), 487–8, (August 3, 1912), 595–6.
- 63 J. S. Biscay, "The Ipswich Strike," *International Socialist Review*, 14 (August 1913), 90–2; Bureau of Industrial Statistics of New Jersey, 1915, 210–31.
- 64 Interview with Matthew Pluhar, Pres. Industrial Textile Workers Union, Passaic, April 3, 1919 (Saposs Papers, Box 21); Nat Hentoff, ed., *Essays of A. J. Muste* (Indianapolis, 1967), 71–3.
- 65 Foner, IV, 462–72; Frederick A. Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia from 1898 to 1920; A Study in Working Class Radicalism," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1971), 106–56, 180–6.
- 66 William Z. Foster, *The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons* (New York, 1920); William M. Tuttle, "Labor Conflict and Racial Violence: The Black Worker in Chicago, 1894–1919," *Labor History*, 10 (Summer 1969), 408–32.

- 67 Buhle, 267–8; Levine, 233–41; Interview with C. P. Dean, Business Agent Joint Council No. 9, United Shoe Workers of America, December 24, 1918 (Saposs Papers, Box 21).
- 68 Interviews with David Wolf, Gen.-Treas., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, February 27, 1919 and Frank Blanco, Gen. Organizer, ACWA, March 29, 1919 (Saposs Papers, Box 21); Hentoff, 59–83.
- 69 Quoted in Foner, IV, 37.
- 70 The only explicit reference to workers' control was in Haywood's speech to the ratification meeting. *IWW Proceedings*, 579.
- 71 Petition for the Creation of National Labor Agencies, National War Labor Board, Case File 132, Record Group 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
- 72 Louis Fraina, "Syndicalism and Industrial Unionism," *International Socialist Review*, 14 (July 1913), 25–8.
- 73 *MMJ*, 15 (July 1903), 590–1.
- 74 CIR, 10, 9697–10048; Carl E. Person, *The Lizard's Trail. A Story of the Illinois Central and Harriman Lines Strike of 1911 to 1915 Inclusive* (Chicago, 1918); William Z. Foster, *Pages from a Worker's Life* (New York, 1939), 146–8; *MMJ*, 1911–16.
- 75 CIR, 10, 9918.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 10, 9877–8.
- 77 *Ibid.*, 10, 9705.
- 78 *The Agitator*, May 15, 1912; *Ibid.*, April 15, 1912; William Z. Foster and Earl C. Ford, *Syndicalism* (Chicago, n.d.); Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York, 1957), 308.
- 79 Person, 42–63.
- 80 Quoted in Evans Clark, "The Industry Is Ours," *Socialist Review*, 9 (July 1920), 59.