

# The Two Hundred and Fifty Year Transition: How the American Empire Became Capitalist

JAMES PARISOT\*

**Abstract** This paper aims to rethink United States history from the colonial era through the Civil War and Reconstruction by examining how capitalism and empire joined together as the logic of expansion increasingly became driven by the logic of capital over approximately two hundred and fifty years. Specifically, it argues that (what became) the United States originated as a 'society with capitalism' and became a 'capitalist society'. This transition was a highly complex and uneven process as a variety of social forms developed and interacted, and in which there was not one road to capitalism, but a variety, depending on the historical circumstance. To accomplish this, first, the article reviews the Marx-Weber debate to develop a theoretical and methodological approach to the historical sociology of capitalism. The remainder of the paper focuses on narrating an empirical interpretation of the transition to capitalism including the diversity of labor forms capital historically utilized.

\*\*\*\*\*

On one hand, it seems self-evident to say that great overlap exists between history and sociology. Just as historians synthesize a variety of literatures into their narratives and construct stories of social patterns and action, so sociologists also continually confront history in their subject matter. On the other hand, these disciplinary divisions continue to shape research methods and methodologies, in so leading historians and historical sociologists continue to confront the same historical periods in different ways. While historians dust off tomes in archives and read centuries old handwritings only discernable by an expert in old dialects, historical sociologists pull from the works of historians to synthesize them into larger structural stories. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. While historians can recollect and describe the details of their subject matter to the most minute details, they often fall back on description without explanation, and don't take the step towards locating their subject matter in broader, structural processes of social change. On the other hand, historical sociologists have a tendency to construct complex models of how societies are supposed to operate and impose theory on history, in doing so writing narratives to fit into their theories, rather than adequately addressing the complexities of history itself.

\* James Parisot received his PhD in sociology from Binghamton University and is currently an adjunct faculty member in sociology at Temple University. His research focuses on interpretations of American imperialism in its historical and contemporary forms. He can be reached at [jpariso1@binghamton.edu](mailto:jpariso1@binghamton.edu)

This is not to argue bluntly about the relations between history and sociology as disciplines and practices. And, of course, decades of historians and sociologists have found a wide variety of solutions to these problems. Rather, the goal of this paper is to suggest that the forty year debate over the origins of American capitalism has been plagued by this division. On one hand, dozens of works exist written by historians which look at the rise of capitalism and the 'market revolution' in specific localities.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, dominant explanations within historical sociology continue to place history into boxes, in doing so developing narratives that, while neat in appearance, risk doing injustice to the complexities of history.<sup>2</sup>

In this context, the purpose of this paper is to reinterpret the large scale history of American capitalism through what I regard as the strengths and pitfalls of each approach. More specifically, the purpose of this essay is to rethink the origins and early history of American capitalism in the context of the history of American Empire. While so many contributions have been made to the American transition debate, it is striking how, within this, the question of empire has almost never been raised.<sup>3</sup> And while historians agree that the United States was born as an 'empire of liberty', little work has been done actually locating how these twin historical structures converged, and how their social logics merged. This is much in part due to the gap between disciplines; too often American historians are unwilling to take the risk of examining macro-scale historical structure, while some sociologists are unwilling to get their hands dirty enough in the messy and anarchic ground of historical description.

By bringing these worlds together, I argue, a new perspective can be developed that explains how a 'society with capitalism' became a 'capitalist society'.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to, on one hand, scholars that view the North American colonies as capitalist from the start due to their incorporation in the 'capitalist world-system' and social historians who draw a sharp distinction between merchant capital and productive capital, and focus on agrarian social transformations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I argue that while the colonies, from early on, had elements of capitalism, (what became) the United States was not a fully capitalist society.<sup>5</sup> By this I refer to the ways that, over time, the bits and pieces of capitalist activity that existed from the earliest days of colonization were, especially in the north, subsumed under the dominance of non-capitalist social forms, and what pockets of capitalistic behavior did exist were mitigated and regulated by the 'moral economy'.<sup>6</sup> Over time these elements 'transitioned' to become the dominant guiding logic of social relations and social action. In this sense, the question of American history is not of the 'origins' of capitalism, so much as the transition from a less capitalistic

to a more fully capitalist society.<sup>7</sup> From Roanoke to Jamestown through the Civil War and Reconstruction, the rise to dominance of American capitalism needs to be thought of in terms of centuries, not decades. If anything characterizes this history, it is complex uneven development. The origins of capitalism are not found in the black and white class relations in north and south, but in the complex borderlands and grey areas of history, in which back and forth movements for and against capitalism took place, in which the modern construct of race was born, wherein patriarchy was remade through the development of 'public' and 'private' space, and whereby the middle ground between settlers and natives was destroyed to pave the way for an 'empty' space for capital to remake itself in its own image. This did not just mean the rise to dominance of wage labor as the general labor form in American society, but capitalism emerged through the use of a diversity of racialized and gendered labor forms.<sup>8</sup>

In recent years, the question of slavery and capitalism has also been reignited. Yet, somewhat curiously, authors who have written important major works on the topic have retreated from clearly defining what capitalism is.<sup>9</sup> Instead, it has been suggested, of engaging in endless abstract debate, the history can just be documented, and we can say, *this* is what capitalism was/is. But this approach does not end up solving the problem; rather, it replaces one problem (a conceptual analysis of how capitalism operates) with another (a historical description of the history of capitalism). In other words, while it is problematic to impose abstracted definitions on history, it is also problematic not to clearly define the boundaries of a category as used in a historical narration or, for that matter, to write history without clarifying a position in debates about how to construct concepts to interpret history in the first place. In this regard, one area in which both Karl Marx and Max Weber agreed is that defining capitalism is not a question that can be solved through flat historical description alone.<sup>10</sup> Rather, by moving between logical networks of abstraction and historical description and narrative, revising history and theory back upon each other, it is possible to identify both what capitalism generally is and how it historically rose to become the central organizing structure of daily life in the modern world. Thus, I suggest, by returning to Marx and Weber, it might be possible to find a starting point for making sense of capitalism, empire, and slavery which the recent rebirth of the debate over plantation slavery have overlooked.

### **Theoretical Perspectives on Capitalism: Marx and Weber**

For Marx, the heart of capitalism was the capital-labor relation. It was the historical specificity of this relation, through which workers are dispossessed of the means of production through 'primitive

accumulation' and forced to work for capitalists, owners of the means of production, for a wage, in turn, generating surplus value that became transformed into capital, which was the historical essence of the capitalist mode of production. Accumulation is an ever circular, ever growing process tending also towards occasional large-scale crisis and it is also the fundamental basis of modern 'globalization'.<sup>11</sup> Marx's (often neglected) writings on American history and, in his time, contemporary political economy, were also shaped by this perspective. Many of the issues regarding the Civil War, for example, historians are still debating to this day, Marx examined, including the tendency of the south towards constant expansion and the increasing closeness of the north and the northeast. He also saw the war as rooted in the social division between the free labor north and slave south and he also viewed its immediate causes and outcomes as politically and militarily constituted.<sup>12</sup>

For Weber modern capitalism was much more than the generalization of the capital/labor relation. It entailed transformations in religion and culture, bureaucracy and state (Marx also emphasized the transformation of a particular type of capitalist state, albeit his planned book on the topic was never written), and, most importantly, the rise to dominate of all aspects of social life organized around rational economic calculation.<sup>13</sup> And among other things, Weber's famous work on the Protestant ethic was a challenge to (or engagement with) Marx in that it emphasized the role of religion as one factor—not, as is often mistaken, necessarily the primary factor—in the rise of capitalism. Of course, Weber was writing well before social historians uncovered the non-capitalist history of American expansion, and his thesis may have turned out to be empirically problematic, as this paper demonstrates. Finally, for Weber, while the transformation of labor forms was key to the rise of capitalism, it was also possible for capitalism to exist in a slave society, as in the case of the American plantation south.<sup>14</sup>

Overall, each provided a basic starting point for explaining what capitalism is and how it operates that holds to this day. Each also based their analysis upon a different methodology. For Marx, it was necessary to abstract from the details of history to examine, theoretically, the 'inner logic' of capitalism and, from there, dialectically move between theory and history to explain its concrete historical workings. For Weber, concepts rarely, if ever, exactly corresponded to reality. Due to this separation between 'the real' and 'the ideal', it was necessary to build ideal types: clearly defined categories that would function as starting points to interpret concrete history. For example, to make sense of modern society, simply describing history would not tell us enough. To understand social action and social structure, ideal types made it possible to compare models with

reality and, while the reality would always differ, they, at least, made it possible to study and compare history in order to situate what is, or is not, unique about a particular era. In this, each aimed for historicization beyond transhistorical description, and towards and understanding of how different epochs were driven by different types of social action, making it possible to locate what is unique about modern capitalism and how it originated and developed.<sup>15</sup>

Much in part due to methodological differences, large divergences also exist between the two thinkers. Therborn, for example, has argued that while Weber referred to Marx's historical materialism as an ideal type, for Marx, the goal was not to build a 'model' of capitalism, as Marx's outline of the system in *Capital* might be read as, but outline capitalism's relations of production "as part of a theoretical discourse that seeks to discover a pattern of regularities in the real world".<sup>16</sup> In this sense, Marx, using abstraction, attempted to explain how the system actually worked, albeit in a conceptual form, in contrast to Weber whose method of historicism was more skeptical of system level analysis and more focused on using ideal types to explain historical contingency.

While both Marx and Weber saw modern capitalism as an epochal form of social order, they also differed in their analysis of its class basis. For Marx, history was built around structure; social classes were moving structures constrained by the historical conditions they inherited. For Weber, the basis of sociology was social action. This led him to define social class as the position of social actors in the market; their market opportunity.<sup>17</sup> This did not mean that Weber simply saw capitalism as defined by the generalization of market relations, though, and he is more distanced from a marginalist view of economic action than Therborn argues when he says "Weber's interpretive sociology, devoted to the understanding of social action, was thus not conceived as an imaginative art. It is a generalization of marginalist economics".<sup>18</sup> While a major part of marginalism was naturalizing capitalism by removing the class analysis of classical political economy, Weber's goal was very much to demonstrate the concrete historical specificity of capitalism in contrast to other forms of society, including its historically unique class relations.<sup>19</sup>

There are major differences in Marx and Weber's approaches to the question of the rise, definition, and dynamics of capitalism, their methodology, and their categories of social class. For Marx, capitalism is organized around the 'law of value'. This means that, while prices themselves are market determined, they are fundamentally based in the production of surplus value through the capital/labor relation. In other words, the production of surplus value—the unpaid labor time of workers—in ever increasing masses is a, if not the, central regulating principle of the capitalist mode of production.

For Weber, the capitalism is organized around 'rational (capitalist) calculation'. In other words, it is the specific forms of social life, labor, and organization which give rise to a society in which practically all calculations of daily life are also calculations of money and capital that gives capitalism its unique social form and dynamics. Weber's whole methodology, which never quite ventures into Marx's 'hidden abode of production', leads to an analysis lacking a labor theory of value and an analysis of capitalist dynamics that stem from this. In other words, the ideal type movement, while potentially useful even in Marxist analysis, is unable to reach into and pull out the deeper social and system level dynamics of capitalism; thus his approach is unable to develop a way of explaining capitalism's macro-dynamics, including its tendencies towards imperialism and crisis.

In this context, my definition of capitalism is: *a social order structured around and overdetermined by the law of value and the continual push towards infinite expansion rooted in and driven by the social relations through which capital extracts surplus value from a variety of labor forms.* This perspective differs from the 'market revolution' approach in that it sees the social dynamics of particular market relations constituted by the social relations which underlie them. Thus 'the market' is not something that has a life of its own, but is built through human labor and takes different historical forms depending upon the way the class relations underlying and structuring market relations are organized. As the narrative of this paper demonstrates, capitalism was always about much more than wage labor. While Marx's overall analysis of the capitalist mode of production centered on wage labor, his methodology permits an analysis of capital's exploitation of a variety of labor forms into an analysis of capitalism's systemic dynamics. In this way, for example, while not all slavery throughout world history was necessarily capitalist, plantation slavery was capitalist due to the structuration of the social relations of production and the ways in which surplus value was generated through forced labor. And even in the historical locations of the rise of so-called free labor, this freedom was always curtailed by a variety of gradations of freedom and unfreedom. This also means, historically, the key factor to look for is the ways that social life was transformed in and through market relations, the ways the formation of new social relations gave birth to new market relations, and the ways class, race, and gender transformed as a part of this in the making of a capitalist social order. In other words, it is not simply the market revolution we should be looking for, but the capitalist revolution.<sup>20</sup>

The historical transformation from a *society with capitalism* to a *capitalist society*, then, meant, in the American case, the two hundred and fifty or so year process through which bits and pieces of capitalist relations slowly came to predominate and incorporate

non-capitalist forms of social life. And this history of the rise of capitalist dominance was simultaneously a history of empire building. By *empire* I refer to the *total structure of power over space and territory that emerged from the earliest days of white-settler colonization through the extension of continental expansion and the globalization of US power.*<sup>21</sup> To say that the empire 'became capitalist' means, then, to argue with the rise to dominance of capitalism, the form imperialism took transformed so imperialism became structured around and driven by the reproduction of capital on ever increasing geographical scales. This does not preclude a 'relatively autonomy' of political action, but is only to suggest that political action becomes organized around and dependent upon the logic of capital's reproduction. Within historical materialism the debate has tended to be divided between, on one hand, those who identify different spaces of capitalist and territorial or political power and, on the other hand, those who see capitalist imperialism's uniqueness in the fact that capital expands through a system of states, in contrast to earlier modes of territorial expansion and domination.<sup>22</sup> My goal here is not to bring any resolution to this debate, so much as point out the extent to which capitalist expansion and territorial expansion merged together in the final stages of building the American continental empire, and highlight the ways in which imperialism is something more than a state-capital relation, but as well built into and at times driven by social relations 'from below' as much as 'from above'. While the US intervened abroad as early as 1801 in the First Barbary War, and as US expansion outside of the continent and upon it were two sides of the same coin, for purposes of this essay I focus on continental empire, particularly in the form of white-settler colonialism. While (what became) the American Empire originated as an offshoot of European colonialism and imperialism, the American Revolution solidified a white-settler imperial state that cleared the land of the native peoples. But the American Empire was something not reducible to the American state. As hundreds of thousands of white settlers moved west, in some cases cooperating with native populations or even becoming 'white Indians', more often than not, the racialized empire was built around a logic of racial, ethnic cleansing. At times, those settlers on the western edge of empire even conflicted with the American state, as state building and empire building came into conflict, in particular, as the military burned down the homes of settlers who ventured beyond the jurisdiction of the state's control.

While the American Empire had capitalist elements from the start, particularly in the south, much of white-settler colonialism was driven less by capital or state-led imperialism than settlers organized into a patriarchal household mode of social reproduction, moving

west, clearing the land, building the empire, and reproducing their mode of production on ever increasing scales. In this sense, much of the type of imperialism that built the early American Empire was social—rooted in the reproduction of daily life—rather than the result of the capital-state relation, as classical theories of imperialism framed it. When this logic of imperialism changed as, in the east, social relations became ‘formally’ and ‘really’ subsumed into the law of value and, in the west, expansion became driven by capitalist firms such as railroad companies and mining capital, rather than settlers organized into the patriarchal household mode of reproduction, imperialism itself became a profit driven project. Here, capital pushed to expand its geographical boundaries and incorporate space into the expanding capitalist empire, setting the basis for the further expansion of American power across the globe.

The difficulty in this is tracing the history of historical structure through the lives and agency of both individuals and collective social units. Within history, this problem is often addressed by expanding narrative. Take, for example, Daniel Walker Howe’s monumental *What Hath God Wrought*, an 850 page explanation of social, political, and economic changes in the United States from the end of the War of 1812 through the Revolutions of 1848.<sup>23</sup> While this work attempts to link the ‘market revolution’ with the ‘communication revolution’, by not contextualizing this pivotal era in American history in terms of the rise of capitalism as a historical structure, the most comprehensively written story of American history during these decades remains incomplete. In other words, narrative and description without analysis of social structure remains partial history, in which even those events and characters discussed cannot be properly interpreted, as they are placed outside of an analysis of the structural relations which shaped their actions and, in which, they shaped the structures of their times.

To solve these problems, the narrative constructed in this paper takes a variety of snapshots from the history of the rise of the American capitalist empire, in doing so outlining aspects of the overall general process—the unification of capitalism and empire—in motion. In this sense, the particular events chosen to describe out of the practical infiniteness of history were picked to highlight the general complexities of the ways the American Empire became capitalist. In this, I aim to locate the ways human agency built the social structures of capitalism and empire that, in many ways, continue to be the defining features of American power in its contemporary forms today. After all, the purpose of history is not simply to accurately locate ‘facts’ (given that facts themselves are always socially produced in a given context) but to provide a way to understand our own epoch.



## **The Beginnings of White-Settler Colonialism**

While, from the start, capitalist motivations drove the colonization of what became the United States, a variety of capitalist and non-capitalist relations prevailed in an uneven continuum. In Virginia, for example, the colony was started by the profit motivated Virginia Company, and the social property relations that developed tended to be capitalistic, albeit not completely. The system of land distribution and organization of social property relations themselves went through several phases. Early on, agricultural production was run communally. But in 1609 small amounts of land were distributed to individuals, and in 1614 the first group of company men finished their contracts and were allotted three acres per individual, or twelve per family. Independent farmers were expected to feed themselves, and additionally provide two and a half barrels of corn a year in addition to working for the company one month per year.<sup>24</sup> More generally, this started the tradition of private individual agricultural social property relations that would continue to expand.

In 1619 the company introduced full private property into the agrarian landowning structure by allowing 'fee simple' land. In other words, in contrast to 'fee tail' land in which individual's abilities to alienate their land was dependent on personalized relations with state authorities, under fee simple land individuals were given independent mastery of their land. It is the difference between 'holding by grace' and 'owning by right'.<sup>25</sup> This was part of the political restructuring of 1619 in which martial law was replaced by limited representative democracy. An elected general assembly was set up, run by the colony elite. And the Virginia Company encouraged this restructuring with the hope that "a colony where the Englishmen inhabiting it had not only all the political rights and privileges their forefathers had earned for them at home, but in addition a more liberal economy opportunity to improve their social and economic status would attract the number and quality of settlers needed to build a profitable plantation".<sup>26</sup> Thus this political restructuring was, in part, a new method to stabilize the colony, encourage immigration, and bring returns to stockholders in London.

But rights to individual capitalistic land ownership did not go uncontested. Under Charles I (after the Virginia Company lost control of the colony to the crown in 1624), Royal Governor Sir John Harvey arrived in 1630. He was given instructions by Charles I to transform Virginia's ownership rights to something closer to a system of subinfeudation as oppose to capitalist private ownership. He declared all pre-existing patents invalid, and created new ones so that "rent was to be paid to the proprietors and quit-rent to the Crown, which changed the title in land occupancy from "ownership by right" to

“possession by grace”<sup>27</sup>. But these changes proved very short lived, and several years later the Puritan colonialists expelled Harvey from the colony.

By the 1620s, the path that Virginia would follow—more generally setting up the basis for the uneven development of the southern colonies—was, in its earliest form, in place: primary commodity production (tobacco) and forced labor. In this, and as slavery would gradually come to dominate in the next half century, empire, capital, and unfree capitalist labor came together. Additionally, this occurred as a small part of the broader uneven development of the making of international capitalist relations. Capital accumulation in Virginia developed as part of a spatially expanding world market and as one node on the broader trans-Atlantic world.

Further north, the social property relations of the first decades of New England settlement defy easy categorization as purely capitalist or non-capitalist. Initially English capital brought settlers to New England with the goal of generating of a profit. In 1620 James I gave permission for the Council of New England to settle (what became) the Plymouth colony.<sup>28</sup> Additionally, the Dorchester Company was formed and established plantations on Cape Ann in 1632.<sup>29</sup> And in 1629 and 1630 the Massachusetts Bay Company, financed primarily by London Puritan merchants, sent voyages to New England. Merchant capital and the pursuit of profit, along with political and religious freedom, motivated these voyages. New England colonization was proprietary colonialism: the English state did not itself have the funds to colonize the Americas, so sponsored private enterprises to do so at their own expense.

Although merchant capital played a role in the making of England's New England Empire, the social property relations that predominated in New England were far from purely capitalist. Initially, for example, settlers organized land in common rather than individually.<sup>30</sup> But the communal experiment was abandoned in 1624 as food shortages developed. Following this, independent freeholds would predominate. Yet landholding, rather than regulated by market forces, remained socially controlled. New England colonies were organized around town authorities who made decisions over land control and distribution. Social regulation and the maintenance of a Puritan hierarchy took precedence over the law of capitalist value in regulating land control. Different towns also had somewhat different regulations. For example, Watertown declared in 1638 land could only be sold to a freeman of the congregation, New Haven required strangers to have permission of the court to obtain land, and in 1659 in Hadley it was decided that no one could purchase land without three years of occupation and with approval of the town.<sup>31</sup> These are just three examples of many; overall the ownership and control of

land was regulated by the moral economy according to what was acceptable to the local Puritan hierarchy rather than abstractly valued capitalist land markets. And during the seventeenth century, independence still meant to be free from the dependency on wage labor; to be free meant to be free from being a dependent laborer, a widespread definition up until the Civil War.<sup>32</sup> As Taylor puts it, “diligent and realistic, most New England families sought an “independent competency.” “Independence” meant owning enough property—a farm or a shop—to employ a family, without having to work for someone else as a hired hand or servant. A “competency” meant a sufficiency, but not an abundance, of worldly goods”.<sup>33</sup>

Artisans and farmers were also participants in market relations. Most towns needed a few artisans—blacksmiths, shoemakers, and so on—and artisans tended to be concentrated in larger cities. Additionally, many artisans also owned farms, and engaged in both farm and artisanal labor. Farmers themselves were also embedded in market relations, producing both for subsistence and to sell crops on the market to obtain goods they could not produce domestically.<sup>34</sup> But market relations don’t necessarily mean capitalist relations; historically markets existed long before capital took control of and reorganized social production on a mass scale. And New England was a colony linked into both local markets and the world market. New England merchants sold commodities such as fish and timber to the West Indies in return for molasses, rum, and sugar, and by 1700 Boston became a major center of trade and had the second largest shipbuilding industry in the British Empire after London itself.<sup>35</sup>

### **The Expanding Empire**

Massachusetts also developed unevenly along both capitalist and non-capitalist lines. Early capitalist relations, for example, developed in the iron industry using a variety of labor types. In 1641, for example, John Winthrop Jr. returned to England with the support of the Massachusetts General Court to locate investors for iron production. He was eventually successful and in 1643 the Company of Undertakers of the Ironworks in New England was formed. After attempts to start ironworks in Braintree in 1644 and 1645, in 1646 the construction of ironworks on the Saugus River began which became the primary site of production, although the Braintree ironworks also remained open.<sup>36</sup> To produce iron for profit, the company needed laborers. Skilled workers were recruited from Britain and Ireland. Less skilled workers were hired from the local Massachusetts labor force. Some workers worked for wages while others were contracted as indentured servants. But a stable labor

supply remained difficult to sustain as workers continued to be imported. The English Civil War provided some impetus for the importation of new workers as, for example, hundreds of Scottish soldiers were captured and sent to New England, the Chesapeake colony, or the West Indies in the early 1650s. In 1650 sixty two of these prisoners were taken control of by the Company of Undertakers and thirty six of those made it to Saugus.<sup>37</sup> Many of the workers imported also did not conform to Puritan standards of life, yet the colony made exceptions in negotiation with the Company of Undertakers.

Capitalist relations also developed in coastal towns, linked into the broader movements of the world market. The development of the New England fishing industry represents the complexities of the relations between merchant and productive capital. And it was linked to the world market. London merchants supplied—usually on credit—equipment and salt to New England merchants who returned with dried fish, and the merchants themselves shaped the productive relations of the fishing industry in Massachusetts by negotiating terms of exchange with local fishers.<sup>38</sup> But gradually, over the decades, the industry became less dependent on English capital and more internally self-reproducing. While merchants provided the necessary credit to make the system work, fisherman procured the actual product. While a substantial portion of fishers owned shares in the vessels they sailed, perhaps sixty percent did not. Their option was either to contract with a company, or else rent out a boat with other dispossessed fishermen.<sup>39</sup> As the industry continued to develop, its capitalist character deepened. While, for example, previously a group of fishers might rent a boat than share the catch, by the mid-1670s increasingly crews worked for merchant capitalists who owned boats and rented them out in return for three-eighths of the profits.<sup>40</sup> While workers might not directly be paid a monetary wage, they were paid indirect wages in the form of a share of the proceeds from the catch; in effect, they functioned as a dispossessed proletariat class dependent on selling their labor-power for a wage, albeit not in the classical Marxist conceptualization.

These capitalist relations developed connected to, and in tandem with, non-capitalist relations in the countryside. Clark's well known study, for example, shows the ways that farming families in the Connecticut Valley were gradually brought into capitalist relations. While Connecticut Valley farmers were incorporated into market relations, whatever nascent capitalist tendencies that might have existed in the 1780s and 1790s were generally subordinated to patriarchal non-capitalist relations of social reproduction and commercial exchange. Farmers were not self-sufficient. They regularly exchanged goods and services with their neighbors and the few merchants around

the area. But in exchange they used the language of 'give and take' rather than 'buy and sell'.<sup>41</sup> Exchange relations were built into kinship and community relations, and the law of value was yet to determine patterns of production and exchange. Neighbors regularly swapped labor, depending on resources and community obligation. The goal of social reproduction was not profit, but inheritance. Farmers worked to develop competent lifestyles—that is, comfortable lifestyles given the social needs of the time—and provide resources, particularly land, for their male heirs.

As colonists moved west, unlike the other British colonies in North America which practiced fee simple land ownership, in New York land was granted to the elite in the form of manors. Tenants moved to the land in return for regularly producing agricultural products for the lord of the manor. This likely slowed the growth of the New York population which by 1756 had around 97,000 people as oppose to 220,000 in Pennsylvania.<sup>42</sup> The manorial structure has led to suggestions that New York manors were something closer to feudalism than capitalism. Lynd, for one, argues the Livingston Manor had a 'quasi-feudal' character.<sup>43</sup> But the Livingston Manor, was less a quasi-feudal mode of production than a capitalist institution that utilized tenants rather than wage workers, given the paucity of labor at the time. With the market for food growing throughout the colony, Livingston, similarly to other landowners, responded not by selling land, but by investing in gristmills, sawmills, a bakery and a brewhouse, for example, as a way to encourage tenants to work under the manor.<sup>44</sup> Livingston was not completely unwilling to part with land, though. In 1710 he agreed to sell 6,000 acres to the government to settle Palatine refugees, but did so with the stipulation that he would be given an exclusive contract to sell them commodities.<sup>45</sup> In general, for Livingston, land ownership was a way to engage in for-profit tenant farming. And his heirs kept this legacy alive.

Tenant farmers tended to operate through a patriarchal household mode of production that was, to a higher degree than elsewhere, subordinated to capitalist profit relations. A housewife was supposed to be a 'good wife'; tending to the cooking and cleaning and taking care of the household chores.<sup>46</sup> While in some cases women took on men's roles, for example, going to the local store to trade, they did so in their husband's name rather than their own. Longer term trade was always handled by the men. Most of the family's needs were supplied by the farm itself, although some necessities were purchased from local stores, often owned by the manor itself. Some farmers also had other skills such as carpentry and produced goods to sell to the market in addition to their subsistence farming activities.<sup>47</sup> New York manors operating for profit by using tenant farmers blurs the categories between a non-capitalist and capitalist mode of

production. Tenancy forced farmers to produce commodities to sell on markets to obtain some goods. Additionally, the results of their labor (for example, one tenth of their wheat in the case of the Livingston manor) went to the head of the manor, who then sold it for a profit. Overall, this seems to be a case of household production subordinated to the law of value in a capitalistic way. It is something much more complex and closer to capitalism than 'quasi' feudalism.

In Pennsylvania, while William Penn's deed gave him 'possession' rather than ownership of the land, it was quickly subdivided into commodified shapes that could be sold for a profit.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps the greatest example of this is Philadelphia. Penn saw that a successful colony would need a central commercial city, just as England had London. He commissioned Thomas Holme, surveyor general of the providence, to lay out plan for the city. Penn's idea was to develop a commercial center with small lots of land given out, surrounded by larger lots as suburbs. Purchasers would buy lots by lottery, and the space itself would be designed in a grid pattern, facilitating rational flows of capital and people.<sup>49</sup>

While Philadelphia was planned as a kind of capitalist city from the start, its development used a variety of labor forms. In some cases, slaves were imported, first primarily from the West Indies. By the middle of the century merchants were trading directly between the city and the African coast.<sup>50</sup> More common than slaves were indentured servants. In the middle of the eighteenth century, approximately half of all laborers in Philadelphia were some form of unfree labor (servants or slaves) and two-thirds of servants were purchased by artisans.<sup>51</sup> But during the Revolutionary War, the pace of servants transported across the ocean slowed. It picked up again later, and was followed by a 1788 British ban on the emigration of skilled workers from Britain and Ireland, and the Passenger Act of 1803 that reduced the number of immigrants a merchant could carry.<sup>52</sup> These policies, along with the confusion of the Napoleonic Wars, limited the number of new servants, encouraging producers to rely more heavily on wage laborers. At the same time, economic problems hurt the artisan class, forcing them to sell their own labor power for wages. A depression hit in 1765 following the Seven Years' War, and between 1765 and 1769 prices decreased, putting artisans out of work. From the end of the 1760s through the 1790s, wages for cordwainers, tailors, journeymen printers, and others tended to decline. In this context, master mechanics found it more profitable to invest in the growing wage labor force rather than hire servants.<sup>53</sup>

In the west, the social relations that formed took on a variety of not-so-capitalist characteristics. The Moravians provide an example in contrast to the capitalistically forming Philadelphia landscape. Under Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf, they purchased 500

acres in Pennsylvania in 1741 and started the town of Bethlehem. Moravians organized their age, gender, and labor relations around 'choirs'; little girls and little boys choirs, older boys and girls choirs, single brothers and sisters choirs, married couples choirs, and so on. They ate and slept in choirs, worked in choirs, and often worshiped in choirs. They also raised children communally, rather than living in nuclear families.<sup>54</sup> Within the choir system, women tended to have positions of power alien to other parts of the colony, they could participate in governing bodies, give sermons, etc. although the top leadership was all male. In summary, the Moravians organized a communal society antithetical to capitalism.

But gradually, over time, Moravians became integrated into the expanding hegemony of capital. Most significantly, the colony had acquired debts that they were not able to pay off. This was coupled with an ideological shift in which Moravian leaders became increasingly unsatisfied with elements of communalism, such as the communal raising of children. In the 1760s, the colony began to make changes to cope with these pressures, and by the early 1770s families were reorganized to live together and some industries began to operate privately. While some parts of the colony were kept communal at first, such as stores, inns, farms, blacksmithing, and pottery production, some farms were leased to tenant farms as privatization was introduced. In 1771 the colony also started its first constitution that, among other things, set prices and wages and prevented land leased by the colony to holders to purchase or sell it without the colony's permission.<sup>55</sup> By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the original Moravian dream began to collapse. The Revolutionary War disrupted the colony as many men left to fight in the war and pressures from within and without the colony forced a series of changes in the structure of governance as, for example, in 1818 a General Synod was held for the first time in seventeen years that would, among other things, reduce the degree of commercial regulation. As time passed, the community could not resist the changing world around them. Coal was discovered around the area and was developed into an industry by the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company and Bethlehem increasingly found itself linked into new networks of transportation and circuits of capital. So in 1844 the Board of Supervision finally decided to dismantle the lease ownership system, open the city up to non-Moravians, and adopt a secular government, enacted the next year.<sup>56</sup>

### **Empire in the South**

As expansion continued west and south, white settler colonialism in Missouri and surrounding states was also part of the broader

uneven development of the western American Empire.<sup>57</sup> While many farmers practiced something close to a patriarchal household mode of production, some more capitalistic activity did develop from the start. By the 1710s the French, for example, chartered the Company of the West to monopolize trade, use of forts, and mine in the territory. And by 1720 black slaves were being used to mine the main metal located in the region: lead. Meanwhile, Moses Austin obtained a concession from Spanish authorities to mine lead in Mine á Breton in 1797.<sup>58</sup> Austin's project started a longer tradition of American mining in Missouri organized for profit. But the majority of American immigrants came not for profit, but to obtain what they called 'competency'; that is, live a basic, but secure life in which patriarchs provided for their families.<sup>59</sup> They were driven west by the abundance of relatively cheap, fertile land, and often came through family networks. As eastern lands became increasingly expensive patriarchs brought their families west to earn competency and obtain land, which, on death, could be parceled out to children to earn competency themselves.<sup>60</sup> In Perry County, for example, as late as 1850, farmers were living with relative self-sufficiency.<sup>61</sup> Like most Missouri yeoman, the staple of their diet was corn and hog, although they produced a variety of other crops including wheat, oats, peas, beans, barley, potatoes, and raised sheep, hunted, and engaged in other activities to reproduce the household.

The most capitalistic behavior formed around the area most geographically connected to the world market, 'little Dixie' on the Missouri river, particularly the counties of Clay, Lafayette, Saline, Cooper, Howard, Boone, and Callaway. Here, slaves rebuilt the ecology of the region by clearing land, growing corn, tobacco, and hemp, and eventually building railroads.<sup>62</sup> For example, one of the first settled areas was termed 'Boon's lick' due to its abundant salt resources. By 1814, around 526 white males lived in this area, and that year settlers petitioned congress to remove Indian titles to the land, which was accomplished the following year. The population quickly increased, and by 1820 around 12,000 people lived in the region.<sup>63</sup> In some cases, business men focused on smaller business, such as taverns, and others focused on profits from trade. But in other cases merchant-capitalists invested in industry. For example, in the 1820s William Lamme, a highly successful merchant, opened a tobacco factory in Franklin.<sup>64</sup> Others opened gristmills and sawmills, and soon the region developed an uneven combination of relations that are not easy to characterize as fully capitalist, as much of production was still organized by patriarchal families, but in which families articulated with especially urban capitalist relations, linked through the Missouri and Mississippi rivers to New Orleans and the world market.



This region contrasted most starkly with the Ozarks, the least capitalist region in Missouri. As was often the case on the frontier of empire, the first to move west were not slave owning planters, nor patriarchal, petty-commodity producing families, but practically self-sufficient 'white Indians'. But the majority of settlers practiced some variation of the patriarchal household mode of production; relatively self-sufficient domestic production coupled with basic market participation for goods they could not obtain through family production. As Schroeder discusses, the territory developed around space and social forms in an uneven way.

At the core were the large cities of the East where goods were consumed, business transactions made, strategy laid out, and wealth transferred. Surrounding the core was intensively used land of high value that provided products for direct sale in the cities, including more perishable products. Successively outward were zones of land use of correspondingly less intensively used land, because the value of land, in general, diminished with the distance from the core. Beyond was unoccupied and little-used land, viewed as part of this centralized economic system.<sup>65</sup>

In this sense, it is difficult to categorize the early settlement of Missouri as purely capitalist or non-capitalist; rather, it was a system of integrated relationships with gradations of capitalist behavior, from more capitalist urban centers to less capitalist rural petty-commodity producers.

Further south in Texas about one-third of all farmers owned slaves on the verge of the Civil War, and within this only a small portion could consider themselves planters.<sup>66</sup> Texas plantation owners migrated primarily from the lower south, and went into the state in search of cheap land and profits generated from surplus value produced by black slaves. Most slaves likely immigrated with their owners, but some came in through the slave market. Cities such as Houston and Galveston, similar to cities in Louisiana, developed permanent slave marts and auctions, and a Mayor of Galveston named J.P. Sydnor was even a commission merchant and auctioneer himself.<sup>67</sup>

Slave life on a Texas plantation was no different from plantations throughout the south. Slave owners acted to reproduce the value of their slave capital and profit from the labor of slaves through the management of the plantations. Slaves were seen as lazy, childlike, and in need of supervision.<sup>68</sup> In other words, slaves did not naturally act in their own self-interest to maximize their market conditions, as neoclassical economic theory suggests all humans do, but had to be forced to understand so-called 'self-interest' through careful management and, if needed, the whip. Capitalist time discipline and work habits had to be imposed with violence.<sup>69</sup> As elsewhere, slaves tried to build lives and families in the conditions they were forced into. And class struggle also shaped the social relations on plantations

as, if pushed too hard, slaves would fight back or flee. Most slaves were expected to work five and a half days per week, from sunrise to sunset. On some plantations slaves were given their own plots of land to garden, and even, with (or in some cases without) master's permission, allowed, in some cases, to sell their produce on the market.<sup>70</sup>

But two-thirds of families did not own slaves. And even a portion of those who did owned very few. As Fehrenbach puts it, "during the whole antebellum era Texas was still a log cabin frontier".<sup>71</sup> Early settlers lived in dog-run wood cabins (generally with two rooms connected by a covered corridor) and produced little beyond subsistence. Mary Rabb, one of Austin's original three-hundred, provides a clear example of early white-settler life. She left with her husband and baby from Arkansas on October 1823, bringing along over a dozen cattle and six horses, although some of the animals did not survive the trip. With local help, John Rabb built a log house in a week, their first house in Texas. They began to work to clear the land, but after conflicts with the Native population, decided to look elsewhere. Later they settled near Bernard River, and built another house, growing corn, raising livestock, and living little beyond subsistence. As early as April 1826 Mary Rabb records her husband selling corn in Brazos, but, as was the case with the patriarchal household mode of life, the Rabb's practiced safety-first agriculture.<sup>72</sup>

Mary Helm, whose husband founded Matagorda, Texas in 1829, tells a similar story. What exchange did occur in this mode of living was not about profit, but taking care of basic needs. Helm records, for example, trading five cows and calves for hewed logs they could use to build their home. She also notes that, with little money in circulation, cows served as a form of currency, with one cow and calf equaling about \$10.<sup>73</sup> Mathilda Wagner's story, part of the German immigration, is also similar. Her family settled in Texas, wherein local men contributed their labor by constructing a two room home. The division of labor was structured around kinship and gender with the community, more broadly, contributing to larger scale tasks such as raising a house. Her father cleared the land and farmed, while the women made clothes, prepared food, and did other household tasks. Practically everything was produced in the household. Wagner notes, for example, that there were shoemakers in Fredericksburg, but often times yeoman and their families went barefoot or crafted their own shoes: most could not afford to purchase such a luxury.<sup>74</sup>

While a small amount of sugar was produced in antebellum Texas, the primary crop Texan plantation owners grew for the market was cotton. Additionally, between 1850 and 1860 it appears an increasing portion of farmers were producing cotton, suggesting that market

integration was deepening, even for small farmers, in the decade before the Civil War. For example, while in 1850 around three-quarters of the farm population grew no cotton, a decade later sixty percent did not. That being said, ninety percent of cotton was grown by the one-third of the population that owned slaves, suggesting that, as throughout the south, plantation slavery was the vanguard of capitalism, and many yeoman farmers were yet to be controlled by rational capitalist calculation.<sup>75</sup> Overall, by 1860 Texas might be considered more of a society with capitalism rather than a capitalist society.

### **The Consolidation of Capitalist Empire**

But over time an American labor market, built increasingly on wage labor, formed. Between 1800 and 1860, the percentage of wage workers as a part of the total labor force (southern slavery included) rose from around 12 to 40 percent.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, the population laboring in agriculture declined from perhaps 75–83 to 52–55 percent, depending on the estimate.<sup>77</sup> Thus the antebellum era was also the epoch of the ‘initial proletarianization’ of the United States.<sup>78</sup> This trend continued after the war, as one estimate suggests that by 1870 as many as 67 percent of American workers were dependent laborers.<sup>79</sup>

As Norman Ware discussed in the 1920s, and ‘new’ labor historians would later emphasize, the making of the American working class was a story in which a rising capitalist system stripped workers of control of the means of production, and pressed upon them an alien capitalist force, in which new forms of abstract value production structured into, and ruled over, the practices of everyday life.<sup>80</sup> Artisans spoke in terms of prices rather than wages; in other words, it was not their labor power that was valued but the products they produced.<sup>81</sup> And as Laurie discusses, “journeymen subscribed to traditional conceptions of social improvement. As late as midcentury, they spoke alternatively of achieving independence or securing competencies, not of the constant accumulation of wealth”.<sup>82</sup> Many early labor organizations, termed ‘associations’ and ‘societies’ were reflective of the pressures of this social—capitalist—revolution as artisans organized to hold on to the rights they had to control their own labor against the rising pressures of an emerging capitalist order.<sup>83</sup>

As Montgomery discusses, the desire of workers to control the organization of production continued through the industrial era. Workers in the Columbus Iron Works in Ohio, in the mid-1870s, the author argues, organized their labor around a moral code in which, “those who held fast to the carefully measured stint, despite

the curses of their employers and the lure of higher earnings, depicted themselves as sober and trustworthy masters of their trades. Unlimited output led to slashed piece rates, irregular employment, drink, and debauchery, they argued".<sup>84</sup> But over time, workers gradually lost control to capital, as bosses and managers organized the rhythms of labor, rather than workers. Thus to make a relatively reliable working class, capital had to remake the culture of labor.<sup>85</sup> This also entailed a movement from 'customary' to 'industrial' time, in which workers habits and behaviors were strictly regulated by clocks, and labor was organized to maximize profit, rather than reproducing the 'competency' of workers.<sup>86</sup>

Along with the stripping away of workers' control came increased dependence on market relations for every aspect of social life. This occurred in both rural and urban settings as the American population decreasingly produced its own means of social reproduction and increasingly specialized in market production to purchase the necessities of daily life.<sup>87</sup> For example, the making of middle class, patriarchal culture meant that new consumer standards developed to fit the emerging increasingly capitalist class and gender structure. In places such as New England, for example, in the 1830s and 1840s a variety of changes occurred and, "these include improved lighting, more on-the-road vehicles, greater segregation of sleeping from daytime living facilities, and elements of the parlor culture associated with the cult of domesticity—window curtains, wallpaper, carpets, clocks, musical instruments, sofas, heating stoves, and the like".<sup>88</sup>

While in cities, capitalist development tended to consist of the gradual transformation of 'artisans into workers', as Laurie put it, in the countryside it took a different path.<sup>89</sup> Patriarchal households in the northern countryside, between the American Revolution and Civil War, gradually were remade from what Post termed 'independent household-production' into 'petty-commodity production'.<sup>90</sup> During the Revolutionary War itself, state governments and the military purchased supplies from yeoman farmers for high prices, increasingly drawing them into market relations as farmers themselves borrowed from stores. Along with debts, increased taxes also pushed yeoman farmers to specialize more in market production. This increased market deepening was a slow process, though, and by the 1820s and 1830s perhaps 30 percent of farmers' production in places such as the Ohio Valley was production for the market.<sup>91</sup> But decades later:

by 1860, north-western farmers were selling approximately 60% of their total yield, well over the 40% that usually marked the transition from 'subsistence' – to 'commercial' agriculture. In other words, these farmers were marketing not only their 'surplus'-product but a major proportion of their 'necessary' product, necessitating the

purchase of elements of their subsistence, and making them increasingly dependent on the sale of commodities for their economic survival.<sup>92</sup>

The creation of a working class below, of course, also meant the creation of a top layer; a capitalist class. And by the 1850s the modern corporation began to take form as their primary institutional expression. Of course, different capitalist institutional forms had been developed and practiced much earlier than this, from port merchants building up profitable networks stretching across the Atlantic to Almy & Brown that in 1790 began the first significant cotton mill in the country, to the Lowell factory system, and beyond.<sup>93</sup> As state and capital shape each other's forms, so as early as 1809 for Massachusetts and 1811 for New York, general acts to allow for manufacturing corporations were passed.<sup>94</sup> And as Wright discusses, the number of corporations per 100,000 people rose from 1 to 23 from the late eighteenth century through first twenty years of the nineteenth as the US started on its way to be the world's original 'corporate nation'.<sup>95</sup> And the US continued on the path as, between 1845 and 1859, Louisiana, Iowa, New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, and Oregon all passed general incorporation laws in their state constitutions.<sup>96</sup>

The modern corporate form emerged most significantly through the railroad industry in the 1850s. Nationally, the amount of railroad tracks during this part of the 'transportation revolution' increased from 8,879 in 1850 to over 30,000 by 1860.<sup>97</sup> Stretching across the landmass, railroad companies had to calculate countless details as companies used complex organizations of managers, assistant managers, superintendents and salaried workers, and so on. Each played a role in the large scale division of management labor that constituted a central part of the modern corporate form further separating the division between ownership and control.<sup>98</sup> The scale of these firms dwarfed earlier textile mills, the most significant type of corporate form in the earlier era of American capital.

The development of the American Empire of capital was further consolidated during the Civil War and Reconstruction. By the late 1860s, on one hand, Reconstruction policies aimed to put black labor back in the hands of plantation owners and, on the other, blacks pushed against this system to obtain autonomy. The result of this racialized class struggle was the sharecropping system.<sup>99</sup> This prevailed on cotton plantations by the early 1870s and remained the primary labor system on southern capitalist plantations for decades. Under sharecropping, farmers, owning no implements, rented equipment, land, and often houses, from plantation owners. In return they were required to give generally one-half of their production

(in some cases one-third or one-quarter) to the capitalist.<sup>100</sup> In addition to sharecropping, other tenants directly rented the land. And as Aiken discusses, this was part of the broader 'resubjection of blacks' as an entire legal structure was put in place to control black labor for the profits of southern capital. This included passing lien laws to fortify the sharecropping and tenancy systems and laws preventing blacks from voting as by 1910 less than 10 percent of southern blacks registered to vote.<sup>101</sup> And this was, of course, driven by violence against black workers, seen most prominently with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan.

William Gillette, in *Retreat from Reconstruction*, saw Reconstruction as, primarily, a political failure. A divided, relatively weak northern Republican government, along with a decentralized political tradition, reinforced with rampant racism, blocked Reconstruction from going further.<sup>102</sup> But framing Reconstruction's retreat simply in terms of politics and race misses the important question of capitalism. In this sense, when asking whether Reconstruction failed, the question is: for whom? For the white American north, reconstruction was, besides for radicals and abolitionists, not a failure. Their goal was to develop and expand American capitalism, and in this sense, reconstruction was as successful as it needed to be. As Richardson puts it, "Northerners wanted the South to develop an economic system that was compatible with the North quickly so that the nation could boom".<sup>103</sup> This meant viewing former slaves as 'good workers' and potential free wage laborers as wage labor became increasingly defined as compatible with American freedom. And for some northern capitalists, concerned with profits rather than equality, the postwar south was seen as a space to invest their capital. In particular, the ecology of the south was seen as potentially exploitable by northern capitalism as, in the 1870s, northern capital went south. Woodward notes, for example, a northern congressman who purchased 111,188 acres in Louisiana, Chicago capitalists who purchased 195,804 acres, a Michigan company for land brokers that purchased close to 700,000 acres, a capitalist in Grand Rapids who bought 126,238 acres, and so on. Overall, forty one Northern groups purchased 1,370,332 acres in Louisiana alone.<sup>104</sup>

But it was not just the Republican Party that transformed. In the elections of 1868 the Democratic Party campaigned with the slogan 'new departure', as they also became a party of capital in its postwar form. Northeastern American capital, for example, had always been somewhat reluctant to embrace the cause of the north as they had a long history of profiting from the slave trade and its products, most significantly, cotton, which went in Northeastern ships to England.<sup>105</sup> At the same time, while some southern capitalists found their fortunes destroyed by the war, many southern planters

reestablished themselves as Reconstruction and Andrew Johnson's pardons restored their property.<sup>106</sup> For capital, the politics of north and south were less important than the politics of profit, and, like the Republican Party, Democrats shifted accordingly. As Camejo puts it, "the Democratic Party was becoming an alternate expression of the same class interests as the Republicans".<sup>107</sup> By the 1872 elections, the Democrats ran with the slogan 'acceptance of the results of the war', against corruption and radicalism within the Republican Party. They also supported Liberal Republican, rather than traditionally Democratic candidates, as many previous Republicans, who split with the party in 1872 as oppose to Ulysses Grant's perceived corruption, found themselves fusing with the Democrats. This included leaders such as Charles Sumner, Horace Greeley, George W. Julian, and Lyman Trumbull. In 1876, for example, the Democrats ran Samuel J. Tilden, a New York lawyer, for president, signifying the extent to which the parties were no longer sectional, but variations of a party of national capitalism.<sup>108</sup>

As the empire continued to grow, the further opening of the west after the Civil War created a vast space for capital accumulation. As William Robbins argues by the 1870s expansion was no longer about pioneers and small farms but capital and industry. As he argues, "to a significant degree, then, the emerging western industrial program was an extension of capitalist relations in eastern North America and in Europe where surpluses had accumulated".<sup>109</sup> In the late antebellum period, as the northeast became increasingly capitalist, the American state also began to develop more of an interest in developing the west as a space for capital accumulation. In the 1850s, for example, the US Army Corps of Topographical Engineers conducted large railroad surveys, and surveys continued after the war as the government sponsored Clarence King, Ferdinand V. Hayden, George M. Wheeler, and John Wesley to further survey the west. These surveys, and the eventual establishment of the US Geological Survey, paved the way for capital by locating the potentially profitable geography of the west.<sup>110</sup>

By 1870, the first transcontinental railroad had been completed, and three decades later five railroads ran across the continent.<sup>111</sup> Railroads both made the transportation of goods and peoples to incorporate the west into capitalism possible, and were a profitable industry in themselves. And a significant amount of capital came from Britain, as between the Civil War and First World War, 34 percent of Britain's overseas portfolio investment went to the United States. Effectively, it was not just western oriented companies building the railroads, but British capital, transferred to New York City banks, then flowing to the west, that developed the western capitalist empire.<sup>112</sup> And while large, industrialized boom farms arose in the

Midwest, and railroads expanded across the continent, the most important industry in the story of post-Civil War western capitalism was mining. Following the California gold rush, mining took off throughout the west, symbolized by miners rushing to Nevada's Comestock Lode in the early 1860s. From Montana silver to Arizona copper, the mining industry quickly expanded as workers provided the labor that built the empire.<sup>113</sup>

By the 1870s, then, the logics of capital and territory, of capital and empire, fully merged. The rise of the US as the world's largest economic power was based upon this fusion, and, in many respects, it is this twin logic of capitalism and empire which shapes the globalization of American power to this very day.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For some main representative works of this trend see: Charles Grier Sellers. *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); John Lauritz Larson. *The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the Eclipse of the Common Good* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Some key examples of historical sociological interpretations of the origins of capitalism include world-systems analysis and political Marxism. See: Immanuel Wallerstein. *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein. "Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World System," *International Social Sciences Journal* 134 (1992), 549-57; Ellen Meiksins Wood. *The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View* (New York: Verso, 2002). For a full critique of these variants of historical sociology see: James Parisot. "What is, and what is not, a Capitalist Empire?" *International Critical Thought* 6, 1 (2016).

<sup>3</sup> Michael Merrill. "Cash Is Good to Eat: Self-Sufficiency and Exchange in the Rural Economy of the United States," *Radical History Review* 13 (1977); Robert Mutch. "Yeoman and Merchant in Pre-Industrial America: Eighteenth Century Massachusetts as a Case Study," *Societas* 7 (1977), 279-302; James A Henretta. "Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America': Reply," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 37, 4 (1980); Robert Mutch. "Colonial America and the Debate about Transition to Capitalism," *Theory and Society* 9, 6 (1980), 847-63; Stephen Hahn and Jonathan Prude, eds. *The Countryside in the Age of Capitalist Transformation: Essays in the Social History of Rural America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Michael Merrill. "The Anticapitalist Origins of the United States," *Review: Fernand Braudel Center* 13 (1990), 465-97; Sue Headlee. *The Political Economy of the Family Farm: The Agrarian Roots of American Capitalism* (New York: Praeger, 1991); Elizabeth A. Perkins. "The Consumer Frontier: Household Consumption in Early Kentucky," *The Journal of American History* 78, 2 (1991), 486-510; Allan Kulikoff. *The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992); N. G. Osterud. "Gender and the Transition to Capitalism in Rural America." *Agricultural History* 67 (1993), 14-29; John Ashworth. *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic Volume I:*



*Commerce and Compromise 1820-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Paul A. Gilje. "The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 16, 2 (1996), 159-81; Craig T. Friend. "Merchants and Markethouses: Reflections on Moral Economy in Early Kentucky," *Journal of the Early Republic* 17, 4 (1997): 553-74; Richard Lyman Bushman. "Markets and Composite Farms in Early America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 55, 3 (1998), 351-374; Christopher Clark. *The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Amy Dru Stanley. *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Allan Kulikoff. *From British Peasants to Colonial American Farmers* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter Temin. "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History," *American Historical Review* 108 (2003), 404-33; Naomi Lamoreaux. "Rethinking the Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast," *Journal of American History* 90, 2 (2003), 437-61; Donald J Ratcliffe. "The Market Revolution and Party Alignments in Ohio, 1828-1840," In *The Pursuit of Public Power: Political Culture in Ohio, 1787-1861* eds. Jeffrey Paul Brown and Andrew R.L. Cayton. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994); Ginette Aley. "A Republic of Farm People: Women, Families, and Market-Minded Agrarianism in Ohio, 1820s-1830s," *Ohio History* 114 (2007); John Ashworth. *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic Volume II: The Coming of the Civil War 1850-1861* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2007); Jeff Bremer. "Frontier Capitalism: Market Migration to Rural Central Missouri, 1815-1860," In *Southern Society and Its Transformations, 1790-1860*, eds. Michelle Gillespie, Susan Delfino and Lous Kyriakoudes (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 79-101; Gary, Edwards. "Anything That Would Pay: Yeomen Farmers and the Nascent Market Economy on the Antebellum Plantation Frontier." In *Southern Society and Its Transformations: 1790-1860*, eds. Susanna Delfino, Michele Gillespie, and Louis Kyriakoudes (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 102-30; Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620-1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012); Michael Zakim and Gary John Kornblith, eds. *Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth Century America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> This contrast draws and reforms Ira Berlin's idea of a 'society with slaves' becoming a 'slave society'. Ira Berlin. *Many Thousands Gone the First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America*. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> World-Systems theorists, for example, who focus on system level analysis and define capitalism in terms of market relations and 'endless accumulation' have argued that the American colonies were capitalist from the start. See Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein. "Americanness as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World System," *International Social Sciences Journal* 134 (1992), 549-57. And other sociologists and social historians have tended to focus more on the specific 'origins' of capitalism, which tend to rest on arguments suggesting that the story is less of a transformation from a society with capitalism to a capitalist society, as I argue, so much as a non-capitalist society that became capitalist. See for example: Christopher Clark. *The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Allan Kulikoff. *The Agrarian Origins*

of *American Capitalism* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992); Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620–1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of this term see E.P. Thompson. *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture* (New York: The New Press, 1993).

<sup>7</sup> Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify the distinction between a capitalist ‘transition’ and the origins of capitalism. I also want to add that this distinction goes against the trend to locate the ‘origins’ of capitalism in the colonial era or early US. For example, Kulikoff has argued, “the United States was not born capitalist but *became* capitalist”. Allan Kulikoff. *The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 2. While this has a truth to it, it also risks understating the extent to which capitalist influences existed in the colonies from before 1750, where Kulikoff sees their origins.

<sup>8</sup> Here, my approach differs with the political Marxist approach which emphasizes wage labor as a defining feature of capitalism. For a spirited defense of political Marxism see Spencer Dimmock. *The Origin of Capitalism in England 1400–1600* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2014). The main representative of this position in the US case is: Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620–1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> Edward Baptist. *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Walter Johnson. *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Calvin Schermerhorn. *The Business of Slavery and the Rise of American Capitalism, 1815–1860* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Sven Beckert. *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015). For example, Johnson argues, “what if we sought not to measure the extent to which “the market” or “capitalism” had penetrated the culture of cotton, but rather to understand more concretely and specifically the workings of this market—the way of employing capital—in this place at this point in time? What, that is to say, if we set aside prefabricated questions and threadbare tautologies, and simply begin with a bale of cotton?” Walter Johnson. *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 254. The problem with this perspective is that it replaces a theoretically grounded sociology of slavery and capitalism with a descriptive historicism. In other words, *history cannot simply replace theory*. Instead, what is necessary is to rethink the theoretical categories in light of the historical evidence: the dialectic between category construction and historical narrative in the process of abstraction. Otherwise what is left is a history without sociology: description without explanation.

<sup>10</sup> I am leaving out a discussion of the third so-called founding father of sociology, Durkheim, as while his work contributed to historical sociology, as picked up by historians such as Marc Bloch, by emphasizing the inseparability of history and sociology and the importance of history as determined within structural wholes, his work dealt less explicitly with the precise question of what capitalism was/is. See Robert N. Bellah. “Durkheim and History.” *American Sociological Review* 24, 4 (1959), 447–461; R. Colbert Rhodes. “Emile Durkheim and the Historical Thought of Marc Bloch.” *Theory and Society* 5, 1 (1978), 45–73.

<sup>11</sup> Karl Marx. *Capital Volume I* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990); Karl Marx. *Capital: Volume III* (New York: Penguin Books 1991); Karl Marx. *Capital*

Volume II (New York: Penguin Books 1992); Karl Marx. *Grundrisse* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).

<sup>12</sup> See Ed. Nelly Romyantseva. *Marx and Engels on the United States* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979).

<sup>13</sup> Max Weber. *Economy and Society Volume I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Max Weber. *Economy and Society Volume II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Max Weber. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: And Other Writings*. New York: Penguin Classics, 2002); Max Weber. *General Economic History* (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> At various points in his writings, Weber noted the ways capitalism and unfree labor were compatible. For example, in *Economy and Society* he discussed the ways in which, while different forms of slavery existed throughout history and not all were necessarily capitalist, plantation slavery was a form of capitalism. "Where slaves are used in an enterprise as a means of profit, particularly where there is an organized slave market and widespread purchase and sale of slaves, they do constitute capital goods". Max Weber. *Economy and Society Volume I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 155. And in defining the various methods of capitalist activity he wrote, "it may be orientation to the profit opportunities in continuous business activity which arise by virtue of domination by force or of a position of power guaranteed by the political authority. There are two main sub-types: colonial profits, either through the operation of plantations with compulsory deliveries or compulsory labor or through monopolistic and compulsory trade, and fiscal profits, through the farming of taxes and of offices, whether at home or in the colonies". Max Weber. *Economy and Society Volume I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 164-165.

<sup>15</sup> As Abrams discusses, the heart of historical sociology is locating the ways human agency is constrained, works through, and transforms social structure. Thus, in their own ways, Marx and Weber both organized their research around broad attempts to discover the structure of capitalism and historical uniqueness and specify of the rise of the west. But historical description alone is not enough to locate historical structure; in this sense, both Marx and Weber were attempting to develop a methodology that incorporated movements of abstraction in order to locate and compare structures of history, and, especially for Marx, the potential for human actions to alter these structures. Philip Abrams. *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).

<sup>16</sup> Goran Therborn. *Science, Class, and Society: on the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism* (London: New Left Books, 1976), 290.

<sup>17</sup> Val Burris. "The Neo-Marxist Synthesis of Marx and Weber on Class." In *The Marx-Weber Debate*, ed. Norbert Wiley (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987), 67-90.

<sup>18</sup> Goran Therborn. *Science, Class, and Society: on the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism* (London: New Left Books, 1976), 293.

<sup>19</sup> Simon Clark. *Marx, Marginalism, and Modern Sociology from Adam Smith to Max Weber* (London: Macmillian Press, 1982), 141.

<sup>20</sup> By capitalist revolution I refer to the long term structural social revolutionary process through which non-capitalist (or in this case, mostly non-capitalist) relations are transformed into capitalist relations. In some ways this is similar to Neil Davidson's recent consequentialist definition of a 'bourgeois' revolution as defined not by the actors in the revolution itself, but the social outcome of it. In this case I prefer the term capitalist over bourgeois, though, for purposes of clarity, as who specifically the bourgeoisie

were has changed meaning throughout the decades. Neil Davidson. *How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeoisie Revolutions?* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> For further conceptual clarification see James Parisot. "What is, and what is not, a Capitalist Empire?" *International Critical Thought* 6, 1 (2016).

<sup>22</sup> Arrighi, Harvey, and Callinicos, for example, have all embraced different variations of the relative autonomy of territorial and capitalist expansion. And Wood, Panitch, and Gindin have tended to emphasize the ways that capital expands through a system of states and a logic of informal empire. David Harvey. *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Ellen Meiksins Wood. *Empire of Capital* (New York: Verso, 2003); Giovanni Arrighi. *The Long Twentieth Century* (New York: Verso, 2006); Alex Callinicos. *Imperialism and the Global Political Economy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin. *The Making of Global Capitalism* (New York: Verso, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Walker Howe. *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>24</sup> Edmund S. Morgan. *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 82.

<sup>25</sup> Morris Talpalar. *Sociology of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968), 54.

<sup>26</sup> Nathaniel Claiborne Hale. *Virginia Venturer, a Historical Biography of William Claiborne, 1600-1677: The Story of the Merchant Venturers who Founded Virginia, and the War in the Chesapeake* (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1951), 48.

<sup>27</sup> Morris Talpalar. *Sociology of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968), 67.

<sup>28</sup> Frances Rose-Troup. *The Massachusetts Bay Company and Its Predecessors* (London: The Grafton Press, 1930), 2.

<sup>29</sup> Frances Rose-Troup. *The Massachusetts Bay Company and Its Predecessors* (London: The Grafton Press, 1930), 11.

<sup>30</sup> William B Weeden. *Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1789*. (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), 49; Joseph A Conforti. *Saints and Strangers: New England in British North America*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 40.

<sup>31</sup> William B Weeden. *Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1789* (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), 56-57.

<sup>32</sup> Eric Foner. *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Jonathan A Glickstein. *Concepts of Free Labor in Antebellum America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

<sup>33</sup> Alan Taylor. *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 172.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Archer. *Fissures in the Rock: New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Hanover: New Hampshire, 2001), 129.

<sup>35</sup> Alan Taylor. *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 176-177.

<sup>36</sup> Marsha L. Hamilton. *Social and Economic Networks in Early Massachusetts: Atlantic Connections* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 30-31.

<sup>37</sup> Marsha L. Hamilton. *Social and Economic Networks in Early Massachusetts: Atlantic Connections* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 42.

<sup>38</sup> Daniel Vickers. *Farmers & Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 101.

<sup>39</sup> Daniel Vickers. *Farmers & Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 117.

<sup>40</sup> Daniel Vickers. *Farmers & Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 161.

<sup>41</sup> Christopher Clark. *The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 35.

<sup>42</sup> Michael G. Kammen. *Colonial New York: A History* (New York: Scribner, 1975), 179-180.

<sup>43</sup> Staughton Lynd. *Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 66-67.

<sup>44</sup> Cynthia A Kierner. *Traders and Gentlefolk: The Livingstons of New York, 1675-1790* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 41-42.

<sup>45</sup> Cynthia A Kierner. *Traders and Gentlefolk: The Livingstons of New York, 1675-1790* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 42.

<sup>46</sup> Martin Bruegel. *Farm, Shop, Landing: The Rise of a Market Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780-1860* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 52.

<sup>47</sup> Martin Bruegel. *Farm, Shop, Landing: The Rise of a Market Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780-1860* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 44.

<sup>48</sup> Steven Craig Harper. *Promised Land: Penn's Holy Experiment, the Walking Purchase, and the Disposession of the Delawares, 1600-1763* (Bethlehem PA: Lehigh University Press, 2006), 33.

<sup>49</sup> Joseph E. Illick. *Colonial Pennsylvania: A History* (New York: Scribner, 1976), 30-36.

<sup>50</sup> Sharon V. Salinger. "To Serve Well and Faithfully": *Labor and Indentured Servants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 76.

<sup>51</sup> Sharon V. Salinger. "To Serve Well and Faithfully": *Labor and Indentured Servants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 137.

<sup>52</sup> Sharon V. Salinger. "To Serve Well and Faithfully": *Labor and Indentured Servants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 145.

<sup>53</sup> Sharon V. Salinger. "To Serve Well and Faithfully": *Labor and Indentured Servants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 151.

<sup>54</sup> Beverly Prior Smaby. *The Transformation of Moravian Bethlehem: From Communal Mission to Family Economy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 9.

<sup>55</sup> Beverly Prior Smaby. *The Transformation of Moravian Bethlehem: From Communal Mission to Family Economy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 34-36.

<sup>56</sup> Beverly Prior Smaby. *The Transformation of Moravian Bethlehem: From Communal Mission to Family Economy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 42-45.

<sup>57</sup> Malcolm J. Rohrbough. *The Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, and Institutions, 1775-1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Walter L. Hixson. *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). I am including here a discussion of Missouri, rather than the more commonly discussed deep slave plantation south, to bring out the complexities of capitalist development at the edge of American Empire.

<sup>58</sup> William E Foley. *The Genesis of Missouri: From Wilderness Outpost to Statehood* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989), 89.

<sup>59</sup> Jeff Bremer. *A Store Almost in Sight: The Economic Transformation of Missouri from the Louisiana Purchase to the Civil War* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2014), 33.

<sup>60</sup> Jeff Bremer. *A Store Almost in Sight: The Economic Transformation of Missouri from the Louisiana Purchase to the Civil War* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2014), 36.

<sup>61</sup> Stafford Poole and Douglas J. Slawson. *Church and Slave in Perry County, Missouri, 1818-1865*. (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1986), 13.

<sup>62</sup> Douglas R. Hurt. *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), x-xi.

<sup>63</sup> Douglas R. Hurt. *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 3-4.

<sup>64</sup> Douglas R. Hurt. *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 7.

<sup>65</sup> Walter A. Schroeder. *Opening the Ozarks : A Historical Geography of Missouri's Ste. Genevieve District, 1760-1830* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 435.

<sup>66</sup> Richard G Lowe and Randolph B. Campbell. *Planters and Plain Folk : Agriculture in Antebellum Texas* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1987), 118-119.

<sup>67</sup> Elizabeth Silverthorne. *Plantation Life in Texas* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 32.

<sup>68</sup> Elizabeth Silverthorne. *Plantation Life in Texas* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 40.

<sup>69</sup> Mark M. Smith. *Mastered by the Clock: Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the American South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

<sup>70</sup> Elizabeth Silverthorne. *Plantation Life in Texas* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 49.

<sup>71</sup> T.R. Fehrenbach. *Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans* (New York: Macmillian, 1968), 297).

<sup>72</sup> Jo Ella Powell Exley. *Texas Tears and Texas Sunshine: Voices of Frontier Women* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1985), 5-14.

<sup>73</sup> Jo Ella Powell Exley. *Texas Tears and Texas Sunshine: Voices of Frontier Women* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1985), 24.

<sup>74</sup> Jo Ella Powell Exley. *Texas Tears and Texas Sunshine: Voices of Frontier Women* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1985), 112-115.

<sup>75</sup> Richard G Lowe and Randolph B. Campbell. *Planters and Plain Folk : Agriculture in Antebellum Texas* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1987), 134-135.

<sup>76</sup> John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics Volume I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 85; Stanley Lebergott. "Labor Force and Employment, 1800—1960," In *Output, Employment, and Productivity in the United States after 1800*, ed. Dorothy Brady. National Bureau of Economic Research (1966), <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1567.pdf>.

<sup>77</sup> Thomas Weiss. "U.S. Labor Force Estimates and Economic Growth, 1800-1860." In *American Economic Growth and Standards of Living before the Civil War*, ed. by Robert E. Gallman and John Joseph Wallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22.

<sup>78</sup> David M. Gordon, Richard C. Edwards, and Michael Reich. *Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 48.

<sup>79</sup> David Montgomery. *Beyond Equality; Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 30.

<sup>80</sup> Herbert G. Gutman. *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); Bruce Laurie. *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989); Norman Ware. *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860: The Reaction of American Industrial Society to the Advance of the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1990); David Brody. *In Labor's Cause: Main Themes on the History of the American Worker* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

<sup>81</sup> Norman Ware. *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860: The Reaction of American Industrial Society to the Advance of the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1990), xx.

<sup>82</sup> Bruce Laurie. *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 57.

<sup>83</sup> Joseph G. Rayback. *A History of American Labor* (New York: Free Press, 1966), 54.

<sup>84</sup> David Montgomery. *Workers' Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

<sup>85</sup> Herbert G. Gutman. *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).

<sup>86</sup> David Brody. *In Labor's Cause: Main Themes on the History of the American Worker* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 28.

<sup>87</sup> Rolla M. Tryon. *Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860* (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1966).

<sup>88</sup> Lorena Walsh. "Consumer Behavior, Diet, and the Standard of Living in Late Colonial and Early Antebellum America, 1770-1840," In *American Economic Growth and Standards of Living before the Civil War*, eds. Robert E Gallman and John Joseph Wallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 228.

<sup>89</sup> Bruce Laurie. *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

<sup>90</sup> Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620-1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012), 73.

<sup>91</sup> Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620-1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012), 81.

<sup>92</sup> Charles Post. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620-1877* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012), 92.

<sup>93</sup> Thomas Dublin. *Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter Temin. "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History," *American Historical Review* 108 (2003), 404-33.

<sup>94</sup> Thomas C. Cochran. *Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 121.

<sup>95</sup> Robert Wright. "Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation." In *Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth Century America*, eds. Michael Zakim and Gary John Kornblith (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 148-149.

<sup>96</sup> Robert Wright. "Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation." In *Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth*

*Century America*, eds. Michael Zakim and Gary John Kornblith (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 165.

<sup>97</sup> George Rogers Taylor. *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860* (New York: Rinehart, 1951), 85.

<sup>98</sup> Alfred D Chandler. *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1977), 94-108.

<sup>99</sup> Eric Foner. *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), 404; Michael W Fitzgerald. *Splendid Failure: Postwar Reconstruction in the American South* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 61.

<sup>100</sup> Charles S Aiken. *The Cotton Plantation South since the Civil War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

<sup>101</sup> Charles S Aiken. *The Cotton Plantation South since the Civil War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 23.

<sup>102</sup> William Gillette. *Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 363-380.

<sup>103</sup> Heather Cox Richardson. *The Death of Reconstruction Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 25.

<sup>104</sup> C. Vann Woodward. *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 116-117.

<sup>105</sup> Eric Foner. *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Pedro Camejo. *Racism, Revolution, Reaction, 1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction* (New York: Monad Press, 1976), 117.

<sup>106</sup> James L. Roark. *Masters without Slaves: Southern Planters in the Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York: Norton, 1977); Howard N Rabinowitz. *The First New South, 1865-1920* (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1992), 19.

<sup>107</sup> Pedro Camejo. *Racism, Revolution, Reaction, 1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction* (New York: Monad Press, 1976), 117.

<sup>108</sup> Pedro Camejo. *Racism, Revolution, Reaction, 1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction* (New York: Monad Press, 1976), 115-126.

<sup>109</sup> William G. Robbins. *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 88-89. Robbins book of essays remains the most significant work that links empire and capitalism in the post-Civil War west.

<sup>110</sup> William G. Robbins. *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 66-68.

<sup>111</sup> William G. Robbins. *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 72.

<sup>112</sup> William G. Robbins. *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 87.

<sup>113</sup> William G. Robbins. *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 85-89. For another important recent discussion of labor, capitalism, and the post-war west, seeeds. Daniel E. Bender and Jana K. Lipman. *Making the Empire Work: Labor & United States Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2015). Unfortunately, this work takes 1865 as a starting point for examining American class formation, in doing so, downplaying the importance of the development of capitalism and labor in the centuries before the war.