

Business Conservatism on the Shop Floor: Anti-union Campaigns in the 1950s

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On April 15, 1958, the workers at Mar-Jac Poultry Company, a chicken-processing factory located in Gainesville, Georgia, voted not to join a union in an election supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Their choice came after days of turmoil at the plant, during which the rumor had circulated that the company would close if the union won. Foremen collared the workers thought to be the leaders of the drive, telling them that if the union came in they would lose their jobs.¹ Sometimes managers made promises instead of issuing threats, offering additional work or a steady schedule.² For days leading up to the election, supervisors handed out letters and pamphlets propagandizing against the union, warning employees that they would be compelled to pay high union dues, reminding them that they were lucky to be part of the Mar-Jac family, and arguing that the union's only interest in Mar-Jac workers was a predatory desire to collect dues: "They want your money and are trying hard to get it. No worker has to pay money to have a job. It cost you nothing to work at Mar-Jac. And you can keep it that way by voting NO to the union."³ The week before the election, supervisors gave speeches to an assembly of the workers, telling them that the union would take so much money away from them that they

1. Billie Hamilton statement, 1959, RG 25, box 1012, case 10-RC-4080, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland; Billie Patrick statement, April 13, 1958, RG 25, box 1012, NARA. Patrick, who was African American, later reversed this testimony in a conversation with the NLRB field examiner. A union organizer wrote to the NLRB that many of the African American workers at Mar-Jac had been frightened about making sworn statements and were unwilling to sign them. Patrick, in particular, could neither read nor write. These documents and signed testimonials are from the unfair labor practice case that the union filed after losing the election. Some of the testimonials were done in the days leading up to the election, probably because the union anticipated filing unfair labor practice charges and wanted to gather evidence in advance of the election. Because Patrick had reversed his statements, the NLRB upheld the results of the election. A subsequent election was held in November 1959, which the union won.

2. Wiley Popham statement, RG 25, box 1012, NARA.

3. Letters, posters, and pamphlets in the Mar-Jac case file, RG 25, box 1012, NARA.

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would be unable to pay their bills.⁴ A group of workers wore headbands emblazoned “Vote No.” Although some reported that they had made the bands themselves, others claimed that they had been told to wear the bands or they would lose their jobs.⁵ All in all, the campaign against the union left the workers uncertain and confused: “The Boss has us all so mixed up that we do not know how to vote on Election Day.”⁶ They voted 28–76 against the union.⁷

A year and a half later, workers at Mott’s Super Market in Connecticut also voted 77–33 against unionization, following a similar anti-union campaign. Managers met with union supporters to promise them benefits if they opposed the union and to warn them of the greedy motives of union bosses.⁸ The owner of the supermarket sent a letter to workers at their homes, telling them that the union would make promises on which it had no power to deliver. The overt message of the letter was positive, as Joseph Mott reminded his employees of the “warm personal relationship” at the store: “I think we would all miss that feeling most of all, if it were destroyed by having outsiders in the picture, as so often has happened elsewhere.” However, the letter was accompanied by an unsigned enclosure that took a strident tone, telling workers that joining a union meant losing control over their jobs, they might lose earnings through strikes and work stoppages, and the union would not win anything meaningful for the employees. It ended with a direct order to vote against the union: “We hope and believe that on December 17 you will exercise your secret ballot and VOTE NO!”⁹

Historians have long recognized the distinctive nature of labor relations in the United States in the 1950s. One-third of the American workforce belonged to a union during this decade — a high point for the country’s history — and 70 percent of workers in mass-production industries were union members. Workers engaged in an average of 352 major strikes a year, a record for the century. In centers of union power such as New York City, unions transcended the firm-centered bargaining that

4. Statements by Billie Patrick, Odell Clark, Minnie Cunningham, Eunise Carter, and Jimmie Oglesby, Mar-Jac case file, RG 25, box 1012, NARA.

5. Billie Hamilton statement, Mar-Jac case file, RG 25, box 1012, NARA.

6. Statements by Billie Patrick, Odell Clark, Minnie Cunningham, Eunise Carter, and Jimmie Oglesby, Mar-Jac case file, RG 25, box 1012, NARA.

7. The Mar-Jac case had an interesting postscript. A subsequent election was conducted in November 1959, which Local 454 of the Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen won. Early in 1960, the original owners sold their equipment and leased their property to new owners, who promptly refused to bargain and requested a decertification election. The union brought the case back before the NLRB, which in 1962 ruled that the employer had not given the union enough time to bargain a new contract and denied the petition. Carl Weinberg, “Big Dixie Chicken Goes Global: Exports and the Rise of the North Georgia Poultry Industry,” *Business and Economic History Online* 1 (2003): 1–32, www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2003/Weinberg.pdf.

8. Testimony in Mott’s Super Market unfair labor practices case before the National Labor Relations Board, 1959, RG 25, box 1058, case 1-RC-5814, NARA.

9. Joseph Mott letter to employees, December 14, 1959, RG 25, box 1058, NARA; Mott enclosure, RG 25, box 1058, NARA.

characterized much of American labor and won major changes in the city government, such as public health care, public cultural institutions, and free public universities. The strength of organized labor transformed the economic outlook for working-class people in the United States, leading to steady improvements in wages; benefits that had once been quite unusual, such as health insurance and pensions; and changes such as contractual rights on the job and grievance procedures. Unions such as the United Auto Workers were able to push for more far-reaching measures, such as a guaranteed annual wage to protect workers against seasonal unemployment. The merger of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1955 created a single organization representing all American workers. Labor did experience political defeats in the late 1940s, most notably the Taft-Hartley Act and the failure of Operation Dixie in the South. Also, the movement was deeply divided by anticommunism during the age of McCarthy. Despite these strains, the power of the labor movement in the workplace and in political life during the 1950s was unusual in American history.¹⁰

Even at this moment of peak union density, as the workers at both Mott's and Mar-Jac found, labor unions were confronting a new threat: the increasing sophistication and coordination of anti-union strategies among employers facing organizing drives. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of unfair labor practice cases filed against employers for breaking the law during union elections climbed from 4,472 to 7,723 per year, and the number of charges filed against companies for illegally discharging workers during union campaigns rose from 3,213 to 6,024.¹¹ Virtually all of the increases came in the second half of the decade, after a series of NLRB decisions that gave employers much greater latitude in openly campaigning against unions during election campaigns, suggesting that employers were adopting a more aggressive stance overall. Employer associations — most important, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) — disseminated anti-union strategies through seminars and meetings, and specialized anti-union consulting firms taught employers how to fight unions. As anti-union campaigning became more widespread, the proportion of union victories in NLRB-conducted representation elections began to fall — from 72 percent in 1954 to 63 percent in 1958.¹² Although many of these techniques were

10. Nelson Lichtenstein, *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 136; David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth-Century Struggle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 188; Joshua Freeman, *Working-Class New York: Life and Labor since World War II* (New York: New Press, 2000); Daniel Clark, *Like Night and Day: Unionization in a Southern Mill Town* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Jack Metzgar, *Striking Steel: Solidarity Remembered* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000). For problems within the labor movement, see Steve Rosswurm, ed., *The CIO's Left-Led Unions* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), and Robert Zieger, *The CIO, 1935–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

11. Michael Goldfield, *The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 196.

12. James Gross, *Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. Labor Policy, 1947–1994* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 137.

pioneered in the South, specifically in textile companies, the strategies were by no means limited to this historically anti-union region and industry — on the contrary, manufacturing companies throughout the country (including in the union strongholds of the Midwest and Northeast) made use of such anti-union campaign tactics, even during the 1950s.

Many scholars have argued that anti-union campaigns in the post-Wagner Act era became prevalent only in the 1970s, when economic recession, international competition, and the growing strength of the conservative movement hardened the line against unions and stimulated the growth of a professional anti-union consulting industry.¹³ Yet although anti-union campaigns — and antilabor politics more generally — became more widespread in the 1970s, the strategies and tactics that employers and anti-union consultants developed were by no means unique to that decade. Most of them had been created decades earlier, during the 1950s, when shop-floor anti-union campaigns developed alongside a broader anti-union political mobilization of business, which both fed off of the campaigns and helped stimulate them. Recognizing the importance of anti-union campaigns in the shape of labor relations in the twentieth century does not mean that all worker opposition to unions can be traced back to employer hostility. In recent years, scholars seeking to explain the opposition of American workers to unions have cited the widespread faith in liberal individualism among even working-class people, economic changes in the postwar period that created new prosperity and reduced the willingness of workers to organize, and the role of union corruption and labor's ties to organized crime in alienating potential members. However, employee anti-unionism exists within the broader context of employer opposition to organizing, which helps shape the culture and climate in which any organizing drive takes place. In a sense, the opinions and beliefs of individual anti-union workers became politically magnified by the hostility of employers to organizing drives. This anti-unionism was able to gain traction during the 1950s in large part because of the changing legal climate for labor brought about by the NLRB during the Eisenhower years, when it became more open to various anti-union strategies that had been prohibited in the 1930s and 1940s. The back-and-forth dynamic between the legal decisions issued by the NLRB and the growing confidence of anti-union employers provided the seedbed for the rise of a set of strategies

13. For the legal history, see Gross, *Broken Promise*, and Janice A. Klein and E. David Wanger, "The Legal Setting for the Emergence of the Union Avoidance Strategy," in *Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor*, ed. Thomas A. Kochran (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). For work that focuses on the emergence of anti-union campaigns in the 1970s, see Martin Jay Levitt with Terry Conrow, *Confessions of a Union Buster* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993); Stephen H. Norwood, *Strikebreaking and Intimidation: Mercenaries and Masculinity in Twentieth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Robert Michael Smith, *From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003); and John Logan, "Consultants, Lawyers, and the Union-Free Movement in the United States since the 1970s," *Industrial Relations Journal* 33 (2002): 197–214.

employers could use to counter the threat of unionization — in a sense, a social technology of anti-unionism.¹⁴

In recent years, historians have charted the strains within the “labor-management accord” throughout the postwar period, showing the many strategies — ranging from relocation of plants to the adoption of elaborate labor-relations techniques — that companies used to avoid negotiating with labor unions, even during the mid-twentieth century when labor was at its strongest. This article adds to the growing literature that treats the attempts of management to weaken unions where they already existed and to evade them through “welfare capitalist strategies,” as well as the broader efforts of businessmen to shape politics and culture, by looking at the anti-union campaigns run by management at nonunion companies confronted by union drives. The companies that made use of these strategies most aggressively were not in the white-collar industries where the leaders of the CIO hoped labor could expand in the 1950s. However, an analysis of these anti-union campaigns — many of which were in the very manufacturing companies where the union movement thought it could assume strength — illuminates the contentious atmosphere unions confronted during the decade. It also sheds light on some of the reasons unions had trouble expanding their membership during the late 1950s. Finally, it deepens our understanding of the political impact of the conservative mobilization of the decade. The wave of conservative political activism in the business community, which was building over the course of the 1950s, was also reflected in shop-floor relations, as employers — emboldened by laissez-faire, anti-union political rhetoric — increased efforts to prevent unions from organizing. In a sense, anti-union campaigns resembled laboratories for the conservative movement. The rhetorical strategies used in anti-union campaigns at once borrowed from and contributed to the shaping of a broader anti-union politics that extended beyond the factory floor into the right-to-work campaigns and struggles over electoral politics of the late 1950s and early 1960s.¹⁵

14. Lawrence Richards, *Union-Free America: Workers and Antiunion Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008); Timothy J. Minchin, *What Do We Need a Union For? The TWUA in the South, 1945–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); David Witwer, *Shadow of the Racketeer: Scandal in Organized Labor* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009). For the formulation of a “social technology” of anti-unionism, I am indebted to the comments of Jefferson Decker at the Columbia Politics and Society Seminar, September 24, 2009.

15. For some of the most important work on the problematic idea of the “labor-management accord,” see Lichtenstein, *State of the Union*, especially chapter 3; Jefferson Cowie, *Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–1960* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); and Sanford Jacoby, *Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). On the growing anti-union political offensive in the late 1950s, see Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise*; Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Origins of the Conservative Ascendancy: Barry Goldwater’s Early Senate Career and the De-legitimization of Organized Labor,” *Journal of American History* 95 (2009): 678–709; and Tami Friedman, “Exploiting the North-South Differential: Corporate Power, Southern Politics, and the Decline of Organized Labor after World War II,” *Journal of American History* 95 (2008): 323–48.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the battles for recognition from the 1930s behind them, many unionists assumed that organizing American workers into unions would be relatively easy. They had an expansive sense of what was possible and hoped to organize workers in the South and in white-collar industries outside of labor's traditional base of strength. They thought that the real challenge was no longer persuading workers to become union members — after all, the system of federally supervised elections was much easier and seemed to require much less sacrifice than the earlier struggles for recognition — but instead building a union culture and a labor consciousness that would be capable of winning strikes and creating political power. As Walter Reuther put it, “First we organize [workers], that’s the easy part. Then we must unionize them, that’s the hard part.”¹⁶ This optimism about the ease of organizing workers may have been somewhat misplaced. The annals of the NLRB reveal many employers who were happy to violate the law to fight unions throughout the 1940s. However, over the course of the 1950s, a new willingness to act on hostility to unions, legitimated in part by NLRB decisions during the Eisenhower years, made it more difficult to organize at all. There were a variety of factors leading to this new level of open antagonism, including the rise of a conservative political movement, which made fighting labor one of its central tenets, and the recession of the late 1950s, which created hardships for small manufacturing companies. However, the changing legal situation for unions also helped to create new obstacles to organizing. A series of NLRB rulings during the Eisenhower years made various tactics that had previously been viewed as violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) more available to employers in fighting union drives. The changes in NLRB policy also emboldened employer groups such as NAM to educate employers on how to fight unions without violating the letter of the law.

In the years directly following the passage of the Wagner Act, the NLRB had interpreted the law to mean that employers had to remain strictly neutral during organizing campaigns — not openly intervening in the drive at all, because any anti-union sentiments expressed by an employer upon whom the employee relied for a job inherently implied the possibility of economic punishment if the worker supported the union. In 1941, however, the Supreme Court ruled in *NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.* that employer speech was not in and of itself coercive and that it was protected by the Constitution — only if it were part of a broader pattern of coercive behavior could it be found to violate the NLRA. Even a few years after this decision, the NLRB found that captive-audience meetings violated the act — demanding that workers listen to anti-union speeches prevented them from having the freedom to make their own decisions in an organizing drive. Even while the Taft-Hartley Act gave employers the legal freedom to express their views about unionization as long as they did not openly and explicitly threaten workers or promise benefits — which

16. Nelson Lichtenstein, *Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 300.

would permit captive-audience meetings—the NLRB continued to find that unions needed to be granted equal access to workers, effectively demanding that if employers wanted to give an anti-union point of view, then unions should be permitted to respond. If the company spoke about the union drive in the workplace on company time, the union had to be permitted equal access to do the same.¹⁷

This relatively favorable environment for organizing campaigns began to change during the Eisenhower years. Eisenhower famously described himself as a “modern Republican” who recognized the importance of labor unions as an integral and legitimate part of the economy. However, in late 1953, his first secretary of commerce, Sinclair Weeks—an active member of NAM and a former president of the American Enterprise Association (later the American Enterprise Institute)—helped to draft legislation amending the Taft-Hartley Act to curtail the power of the NLRB, giving labor relations “back to the states.”¹⁸ Ninety-two management representatives came to testify in congressional hearings that during the Truman years the NLRB had distorted the Taft-Hartley Act and unfairly favored labor. They complained that they faced unreasonable restrictions on their contacts with workers in the weeks leading up to a union election. It was their duty, they insisted, to advise their workers honestly regarding their opinions on unionization, but the policies of the NLRB made that impossible. J. McWilliams Stone of the Dukane Corporation of St. Charles, Illinois, argued, “Executives should have freedom of expression in union affairs. The average employer is far more honest than the average big union organizer or business agent.”¹⁹ At times, employers also used the hearings as an opportunity to make known their broader fears about union power. Charles Kuzell, a lawyer at the Arizona copper company Phelps Dodge, testified about his fears of the union shop: “The entire working force of the Nation will eventually become a subservient group dependent on labor bosses for its livelihood. Thus the way is paved to labor dictatorship. World history will show that wherever labor has attained this ascendancy, national socialism has been instituted.”²⁰

The management representatives who testified about labor law reform in 1953 did not succeed in changing the law. But—as James Gross has demonstrated—many

17. Gross, *Broken Promise*, 104–5. In the *Bonwit Teller* case, six days before the representation election, the employer (a department store) closed the store, gathered all the workers on the main selling floor, and gave an anti-union speech. At the same time, the employer forbade union organizers from entering the premises and refused to allow the union to address workers. The NLRB found that the employer discriminated against the union by not allowing organizers to talk to employees. In part, the NLRB’s decision was based on special circumstances—the company had committed other unfair labor practices, and department stores were allowed special privileges to bar union organizers—but the doctrine was extended in subsequent cases to other kinds of businesses and in elections without unfair labor practices.

18. Eisenhower diaries, January 19, 1954, 267, quoted in Robert Griffith, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” *American Historical Review* 87 (1982): 87–122.

19. House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings before the United States Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, Matters Relating to the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947*, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, 999, 1020, 2379–80.

20. *Ibid.*, 53.

of the points that they raised in the hearings nonetheless were enacted in administrative rulings by the NLRB later in the 1950s. By 1954, Republicans dominated the NLRB for the first time in its history. Several of the new Eisenhower appointees were vigorous political conservatives who were strongly opposed to labor power. Albert Beeson, for example, who had been the director of industrial relations for California's Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation before Richard Nixon recommended him for the NLRB, bragged about one time that he had led an anti-union campaign in Pennsylvania: "You could say, if you like, in that instance I was a union buster."²¹ Philip Ray Rodgers, another Republican, described himself as "the employers' representative on the Board."²² Even without a formal change in the law, these conservatives on the NLRB significantly revised national labor policy. In December 1953, in *Livingston Shirt Corporation*, the NLRB ruled that employers had the right to "attempt by speech and otherwise" to persuade their workers how to vote in a union election and that therefore captive-audience meetings were legal—the union no longer had the right to respond to a speech that the employer gave on the company premises.²³ In *Blue Flash Express* (1954), the board reversed its position that interrogation of workers about union activities was in and of itself an act of intimidation and therefore an unfair labor practice, finding instead that in certain cases it was acceptable if motivated by good-faith curiosity on the part of the employer. In *American Laundry Machinery Company* (1953), the NLRB found that an employer publicizing its work on a formula for compensation that would increase vacation and holiday pay was not a promise of benefit, even though it was made in the buildup to a union election. In *Esquire, Inc.* (1954), the NLRB ruled that an employer stating that it would not bargain with a winning union without protracted litigation was simply informing workers of its legal plans—a reversal of its earlier position that this was an unacceptable threat that mandated setting aside election results.²⁴

These changes in labor-law policy during the Eisenhower years encouraged employers to develop a wide range of anti-union tactics that carefully exploited the openings in the law. In addition to making it easier for employers to fight unions, the changing regulations suggested that the NLRB might be more sympathetic to employers if they did face appeals. The result was a new level of open hostility to unions during organizing drives. Employers bringing cases before the NLRB occasionally cited *Blue Flash Express* (for example) to defend their decision to interrogate employees.²⁵ Organizations such as NAM started to develop and publicize strategies

21. Statement of Albert Cummins Beeson, *Nomination of Albert Cummins Beeson to Be a Member of the National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare*, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1953, 22.

22. Gross, *Broken Promise*, 98.

23. *Ibid.*, 106.

24. *Ibid.*, 106–11. Also see Klein and Wanger, "The Legal Setting for the Emergence of the Union Avoidance Strategy," in Kockran, *Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor*, 82.

25. See *Brennan's French Restaurant*, September 16, 1960. In this case, the employer argued that its interrogation did not restrain or interfere with the rights of its employees, citing the *Blue Flash Express* case.

that employers could use to resist unionization. The importance of NAM in solidifying a conservative wing of the business community in the 1940s and 1950s has long been noted by historians. In the 1940s, the group played an influential role in drafting the legislation that became the Taft-Hartley Act (although a number of its members who had urged the organization to continue its outright opposition to the Wagner Act viewed this as capitulation). Even after Taft-Hartley, NAM continued to seek ways to counter labor's power, especially through the public relations campaigns chronicled by Elizabeth Fones-Wolf.²⁶

In the late 1950s, NAM began something new: The organization started to serve as a clearinghouse for anti-union strategies and tactics.²⁷ It published anti-union materials (letters, leaflets, and speeches) that employers could mimeograph and use in anti-union campaigns in their own companies. In the *Communications Manual for Union Representation Elections*, NAM offered copies of letters and speeches that employers could deliver to their workers in the event of an anti-union campaign. These varied in tone from chatty and conversational to dour and outright threatening. Some invoked the specter of strikes: "Don't believe the union organizers when they say a strike couldn't happen here in our plant. It could happen here! It could happen if a union comes in to represent your employees, especially if that union is the (name of union). They have called many strikes—some of them long and brutal and bloody."²⁸ Others sought to discredit the motivations of the union organizers, arguing that the only reason that unions came to organize was to gain dues money.²⁹ Sample speeches implied that the company would not be as "liberal" with wages and benefits once a union came in, when it was forced to give things to the workers instead of

The NLRB found that the employer was still guilty of unfair labor practices and wrote that "the *Blue Flash* rule was not intended to license or immunize the use of interrogation, simply because the interrogation, if considered in isolation separate from such a campaign, would not be found independently coercive." However, the rule seems to have been interpreted by employers in precisely this way. See *Decisions and Orders of the NLRB*, vol. 129 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office).

26. On NAM's public relations campaigns, see Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise*. On NAM in the 1940s, see Howell John Harris, *The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); for Taft-Hartley, see Harry A. Mills and Emily Clark Brown, *From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). Andrew Workman, "Manufacturing Power: The Organizational Revival of the National Association of Manufacturers, 1941–1954," *Business History Review* 72 (1998): 279–317, discusses the evolution of NAM's attitude toward labor law reform in the 1940s.

27. NAM's president in the mid-1950s, a Michigan furniture manufacturer named Charles Sligh, had his own experiences with anti-union campaigns. When his own employees tried to organize, he told them that the labor union was trying to organize them only out of "personal revenge" against Sligh and that their union would be "started in hate," like the movements of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and, "in this country, the Ku Klux Klan." Charles Sligh to Sligh Furniture Factory employees, undated, box 23, Sligh Family Papers, Bentley Library, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

28. "Sample Letter #2," *Communications Manual for Union Representation Elections*, March 11, 1957, accession 1411, series 7, box 128, NAM Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware.

29. *Ibid.*, "Sample Letter #4."

using its own free will.³⁰ Such communications were highly specific, citing particular unions and strikes, even though they were written for campaigns that had not even happened, at companies with conditions totally unknown to NAM. For example, one sample speech to be delivered to employees (by “a management representative in a position of authority—well known to employees and enjoying their respect”), cited the seniority provisions in a union plant “down the road” and offered a detailed story for the management representative to tell about the failures of collective bargaining at this apocryphal plant: “Don’t let the union kid you into thinking that you can get the kind of seniority you want when there’s a union in the plant. Union politics call the turn, not the wishes of the people.”³¹

NAM published many other kinds of advice for companies facing difficulties in a union drive. The “Suggested Outline of Possible Problems Confronting the Employer When Faced with an Organizing Drive” recommended small-group meetings, talking to workers one on one, sending letters to their homes, and using the company bulletin in “the Campaign.”³² “Some Do’s and Don’ts for Supervisors under the Labor-Management Reporting Act” informed managers that they could tell employees that, legally, they could be replaced permanently if they went on an economic strike and to inform them that they could face “lay off, discipline and discharge for cause so long as such action follows customary practice and is done without regard to union membership or non-union membership.”³³ The pamphlets offered tips for how to reopen a plant after breaking a strike.³⁴ The group publicized a case study of Reliance Electric, where the employer had defeated a union organizing drive among white-collar office personnel.³⁵ NAM ran a workshop on “Recapturing and Maintaining Efficiency in Organized Plants” at a 1960 seminar.³⁶ It delivered memos about what companies “could do” about union solicitation and distribution of literature in the worksite.³⁷ Such NAM documents were intended to give employers a clear sense of how to work around NLRB guidelines and take advantage of the law in order to campaign against unionization.

30. Ibid., “Sample Talk to Employees #2.”

31. Ibid., “Sample Talk to Employees #1.”

32. Memo, July 1958, accession 1411, series 7, box 129, NAM Papers.

33. “Some Dos and Don’ts for Supervisors,” accession 1411, series 7, box 129, NAM Papers.

34. “Check List—Back to Work Movements” (undated but “received” on February 10, 1959), accession 1411, series 7, box 129, NAM Papers.

35. “Defeat of Union at Reliance Electric Serves as Model to Other Firms Contending with Office Organizers” (undated, but the Reliance election was held on July 15, 1959; the memo seems to have been written about a month after the election was held), accession 1411, series 7, box 129, NAM Papers.

36. “Outline for Workshop on Recapturing and Maintaining Efficiency in Organized Plants,” session at the Second Annual Industrial Relations Workshop, sponsored by the NAM Industrial Relations Committee, October 6–7, 1960. The workshop’s leaders were Forrest Kirkpatrick, assistant to the president of Wheeling Steel Corporation, and Nicholas Criss Jr., assistant general counsel, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. Accession 1411, series 7, box 130, NAM Papers.

37. “What Companies Can Do about Union Solicitation and Distribution of Campaign Literature,” October 12, 1960, accession 1411, series 7, box 130, NAM Papers.

What did the strategies that NAM proposed look like in practice? What kinds of companies, in what parts of the country, made use of them? In a typical organizing drive, the employer would speak out against the union as soon as the NLRB announced that there would be an election. In the frantic, chaotic weeks leading up to the election, the employer attacked the union in every way possible while extending carrots to the workers to give them some reason, some incentive, to be loyal. The propaganda efforts of the companies often reached a fever pitch, invoking a wide range of points of loyalty — to the town, to the company, to God, and to community — to instill a sense of fear about the good things in life that the union would surely tear apart. The regional and industrial patterns of anti-union activity are suggested by comparing NLRB decisions in 1950 to those in 1960. The NLRB's published rulings in cases involving unfair labor practices committed by management numbered 116 in 1950 and 151 in 1960. In both years, the South had a disproportionate percentage of such cases (42 percent in 1950, 39 percent in 1960). In 1960, the Midwest had gained substantially, rising from 18 percent of the cases to 31 percent. The industrial shift was also striking: in 1950, one-third of the cases were in manufacturing companies, whereas in 1960, cases in manufacturing had increased to 47 percent. In both years, these involved mostly small and midsized firms. Although these numbers do not tell us everything about the shifting patterns of industrial and regional anti-unionism during the 1950s, they suggest that anti-union campaigns were becoming more common in the Midwest, although the South still remained an important center of anti-union activities, and that manufacturing companies — which might have been seen as the heart of union strength — were becoming more willing to engage in such activities.³⁸

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, textile and clothing companies constituted a large proportion of the companies that engaged in such anti-union campaigns,

38. This analysis relies on published NLRB decisions from 1950 and 1960 in cases that involved an allegation of an unfair labor practice committed by management during a negotiating drive. The union drives took place in the late 1940s (for those decisions published in 1950) and the late 1950s (for those in 1960). I looked both at cases where the NLRB upheld the decision of the regional board and those in which it was overturned. It is important to be aware of the limitations of this source. These decisions therefore may only represent a portion of all the decisions issued by the NLRB in either year. I have excluded unfair labor practices committed during strikes or after a union had won recognition in the context of negotiations. I have also excluded jurisdictional challenges, which can create delays that union activists often feel have a destructive impact on an organizing drive. In addition, for the NLRB to issue a ruling, a regional board would have needed to hear the case earlier, often a year or two earlier, and one party or the other would have had to decide to appeal the ruling of the regional board. These decisions, therefore, may reflect only a small proportion of all the cases brought before divisions of the NLRB around the country. Finally, there may have been many cases in which unfair labor practices were committed but no case brought before the NLRB. Looking at the decisions from the two years (of cases from a year or two before) gives a very partial image; a fuller study analyzing the data from multiple years would be welcome. Finally, when analyzing where a firm was located, I looked at the location of the plant where the anti-union campaign was fought, rather than where the firm was headquartered. The cases I discuss in depth here draw on research done using the case files of the NLRB stored at the NARA, College Park, Maryland.

although their significance decreased as the decade went on (they accounted for 18 percent of the cases involving management's unfair labor practices in which the NLRB published a decision in 1950 but only 7 percent in 1960).³⁹ One prototypical campaign that illuminates the rhetoric and style of business conservatism on the shop floor took place at Rainfair, a garment-manufacturing company located in Wynne, Arkansas, far from corporate headquarters in the heavily union town of Racine, Wisconsin. In December 1958, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers held a union election at the company. The anti-union campaign mobilized the broader political and business community in the town in an effort to fight the union. The day before the election, Rainfair held its annual Christmas party at noon. Although there had been parties in previous years, in 1958 the company chose to hold the festivities at a new café instead of in the plant. The company paid for the entire lunch instead of accepting contributions from employees, as it had in previous years. Local businessmen came to speak about Rainfair and its many contributions to the life of the town. The mayor of Wynne even doled out five-year-service pins. Supervisors handed out bonuses after the party, with a special letter: "Dear Friend: Thank you for your loyal effort and willing cooperation toward helping to make our Wynne plant a success. The wonderful spirit of friendliness and unity that exists at Wynne is an example that all of us are proud of, and as a token of our appreciation we are enclosing your Christmas check." At the end of that same day, a message from one of the plant managers blared over the loudspeakers in the plant, telling workers that they should vote no and send the "outsiders" packing back to Chicago. On the way out, supervisors handed workers a letter about the union and told them to come in early the next day.⁴⁰

The Rainfair anti-union letter is a classic of the genre for its confusing and yet effective combination of sentimentality and brutality. On the one hand, it invoked the company as a source of community, solidarity, and intimacy — all the values that the union might be supposed to stand for. At the same time, it suggested that should the workers violate the organic harmony of the company by endorsing the union, Rainfair would shut its doors in punishment and throw them all out of work without a second thought. The key principle that united the simultaneous nastiness and sweetness of the company was the arbitrariness of its authority: whatever the company did, the workers had no choice but to accept. The letter opened with the suggestions that the union was trying to unsettle life within the company and that it had no sense of the "spirit of Christmas." It had no real power — "only the company" could extend economic benefits and charity such as "free Turkeys for Thanksgiving" — and if the workers voted for the union, they would risk losing their jobs altogether, especially

39. Minchin, *What Do We Need a Union For?*, 32–37 and 207, describes anti-union campaigns in the late 1940s in the textile industry, although Minchin sees rising standards of living among southern textile workers as the chief obstacle to organizing.

40. Affidavits in *Rainfair, Inc. vs. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America*. Rainfair was based in Racine, Wisconsin, but the plant organizing was in Wynne, Arkansas. NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1043, case 32-RC-1209, NARA.

given the tough economic climate of the recession of the late 1950s: “We have a tough job of pulling our factory out of the red. . . Obviously we cannot go on losing ground and stay in business here.” The letter concluded with an invocation of the Christmas spirit and a call to prayer: “We beg of you to please think over this very serious matter tonight and pray to God, and we know that as you ask for Divine guidance on this question the answer will be NO in your vote tomorrow.”⁴¹ The next morning, the women in the plant were greeted with a large flyer: “In a few minutes you will have a chance to vote on the union issue that threatens to destroy the happy friendly atmosphere of your job.” The workers voted 63–39 against joining the union.⁴²

Other times, anti-union speeches focused less on a vision of an organic community linking workers and boss and instead emphasized an image of the union as a disruptive, alien force, threatening the deepest values of the community. In the South, employers exploited the racism of their employees, telling workers that the union would end segregation, promote black workers over white workers, hire blacks as supervisors, and generally overturn local racial hierarchies. The anti-union campaign would argue that the commitment of labor to fighting racial inequality was one of the main reasons to vote against organizing. One letter distributed at a southern hosiery mill told workers, “The unions are working day and night, and pouring out the money which they collect in dues, in an effort to eliminate segregation and bring about integration in the schools and elsewhere between the white people and the colored people as rapidly and completely as possible.”⁴³ In another campaign, the town’s sole newspaper printed photographs of the president of the International Union of Electrical Workers dancing with a black woman — which the company then copied and distributed to all the employees.⁴⁴

Other Southern work sites took the opposite approach and told black workers that they would no longer have jobs if the union came in. The National Caterers of Virginia operated a cafeteria, known as Hot Shoppes, at a Phillip Morris factory in Richmond, which employed thirty-four workers who sought to organize in the late 1950s. The assistant to the president of Hot Shoppes spoke with all the workers in one-on-one meetings about the union. “I told them I felt close to them and I was going to talk to each one individually and when I called each one in they would know I was going to speak to all of them,” he said in an affidavit. “The substance was to sell them Hot Shoppes under our management in preference to outside interference.” When it emerged that one grievance was that they had recently lost free lunches, he brought back the free-lunch program. “After my conversations I got them together in

41. Letter, December 22, 1958, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1043, case 32-RC-1209, NARA.

42. Rainfair flyer, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1043, case 32-RC-1209, NARA.

43. Letter used at Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Madison, North Carolina, in 1957. Cited in testimony of Benjamin Wyle, general counsel, Textile Workers Union of America, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 185.

44. Testimony of Al Hartnett, secretary-treasurer, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 560.

a group & told them to close their eyes in silent prayer and seek Divine Guidance to direct them to do the thing that was to their best interest.”⁴⁵ Workers remembered the conversations differently. One recalled, “He said the union wouldn’t do any good and could only strike and that in case the Hot Shoppes pulled out the union wasn’t going to give us the work.”⁴⁶ Another claimed that a week before the election, “Mr. Holland called me into the office and introduced himself and said Hot Shoppes was like a family and wanted us all to stick together and he was glad this union business came up so we could get this thing straight and all stay together.” He showed the worker a newspaper about union leaders in Chicago who had been convicted of murder. The worker responded: “I told him we were in Virginia.” Then, Holland said that Hot Shoppes would leave if the union won the election. “What would you do for work then?” When Philip Morris had owned the cafeteria before, only four of the workers there were black; if they took it back over, most of the black workers would probably lose their jobs.⁴⁷ The union lost the election, 18–16.⁴⁸

Other speeches and letters used in anti-union campaigns emphasized that the union would bring strikes and possible violence. The NAM prepared several booklets, pamphlets, and even movies about union violence — one with the melodramatic title “And Women Will Weep” — to be distributed by employers in organizing campaigns. In an election held in Gastonia, North Carolina, the site of the famous uprising of small-town garment workers in 1929, the history of the town became fodder for the anti-union campaign: “In years past Gastonia was the scene of rioting, violence, bloodshed and death growing out of strikes and union troubles, scenes which some of you will remember and which none of us ever want to see again.”⁴⁹

Although managers and executives in the upper echelons of workplace hierarchy typically planned and ran anti-union campaigns, they downplayed the distinction between themselves and the workers. In the rhetoric of the anti-union campaign, the company bound workers and managers together in a fragile unity that was threatened by powerful and militant union outsiders. Anti-union campaigns played on the dreams, ambitions, and positive commitments of the workers as much as on their fears, manipulating their natural hopes for security and advancement. If management alone could not compel this faith, managers had to find workers who could preach the anti-union gospel from the ranks of the employees. Managers frequently sought to create “Vote No” committees or anti-union committees of employees to spy on pro-union workers, rate workers, identify who was pro-union, and create and distribute propaganda through the workplace. At Schick Incorporated, workers made buttons

45. Daniel Holland affidavit, June 12, 1959, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1047, case 5-RC-2705, NARA.

46. Report on Objections, 3, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1047, case 5-RC-2705, NARA.

47. Report on Objections, 5, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1047, case 5-RC-2705, NARA.

48. NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1047, case 5-RC-2705, NARA.

49. Letter to “All Employees of Threads, Inc.,” November 4, 1958, cited in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 233–37.

dipped in red paint with “NO” inked onto the front while on work time.⁵⁰ At Tyson Poultry Incorporated, anti-union workers put “VOTE NO” tags onto other workers, and then supervisors marked down who was wearing the tags and who had taken them off.⁵¹ At Peerless Tube Company, an employee used work time to pick out an anti-union committee, which then was headed by a supervisory employee. The committee then printed leaflets on the company’s printing machines, using paper and supplies provided by the company, which its members distributed through the firm.⁵² At Morton’s Frozen Foods, workers formed a committee named “We, the Morton Workers.”⁵³

Although most of the time these companies devised their own campaigns, the late 1950s also saw the first professional anti-union consulting firms of the post-Wagner Act era. The best known of these was Labor Relations Associates (LRA), run by Nathan Shefferman, who was ultimately brought to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Shefferman had worked at Sears, Roebuck, where he helped the company devise its human-relations policies. While he was at Sears, he founded LRA (with the support and direction of Sears management) to advise Sears suppliers on anti-union techniques. After he retired from Sears in the late 1940s, he devoted himself full-time to LRA. Although he made a practice of negotiating contracts with conservative AFL unions as an alternative to more militant and independent unions, Shefferman also advised companies on how to fight unions outright by setting up employee groups to fight the union, recruiting internal spies, publishing anti-union literature, using legal appeals to exhaust union campaigns, and paying workers to visit the homes of pro-union colleagues and organize them against the union. He made especially good use of anti-union committees of workers. As he wrote in one memo, a company seeking to fight a union organizing drive should not seek to rely on the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other external authorities—the only chance was “your own employees.”⁵⁴ Participation in such anti-union campaigns could be very psychologically and politically challenging for workers. In one case, at a Marion, Ohio, washing-machine manufacturing company that employed Shefferman in 1955, the company hired a formerly pro-union worker in the economically depressed area specifically to use his union

50. *Schick Incorporated and District No. 98, International Association of Machinists*, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 824, cases 4-RC-3251 and 3252, NARA.

51. *Tyson Poultry Inc., Springdale, Arkansas vs. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America*, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1041, case 32-CA-713, NARA.

52. *Peerless Tube Company vs. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union*, NLRB case files, RG 25, box 1036, case 22-RC-77, NARA.

53. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, *Hearings before the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field*, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1957, 5771.

54. Jacoby, *Modern Manors*, 130–37, 300. For the memorandum, see Jared Day, “While the Sentry Slept: Nathan Shefferman and Corporate Anti-unionism under the Wagner Act, 1935–1960” (unpublished manuscript in possession of the author).

experience to run a campaign against the United Auto Workers. He was paid to do house calls to “dis-organize” and to keep detailed notes on the opinions of his fellow workers and what levers might be brought against them. In the end, the worker was fired when he rebelled against what he was being asked to do and brought a large bunch of balloons reading “JOIN UAW-CIO” to the workplace.⁵⁵

Employers also retaliated against pro-union workers by firing them, even though this violated the law. This not only rid the workplace of troublemakers but also frightened and intimidated other employees. Often, it would happen at the end of a long anti-union campaign in which the union had been defeated — as though to show any workers who might still have union ideas or sympathies that the company, not the union, protected their jobs. At an Atlanta cotton mill, one woman who had been fired said that her friends stopped speaking to her after she lost her job. The other workers at her old company were still interested in unions, she believed, but they were now too afraid to try to take action: “They have seen what happened to me, and they do not want it to happen to them. You only need to fire one or two people to scare many, many others.”⁵⁶ At the Linen Thread Company in Blue Mountain, Alabama, the company ran an extensive campaign against the union. Supervisors pasted up anti-union posters, and the sole newspaper in town ran an article about how the mill would close if the union came in. Despite these threats, six hundred out of nine hundred workers signed cards in support of the union, but two days before the election, the personnel director organized small-group meetings throughout the plant. At the mandatory meetings, supervisors forbade workers from asking questions. The personnel director “put fear in the hearts of all the workers that were there” by bringing in pictures from shut-down mills, telling workers how many mills had been closed by unions and strikes, and by “reminding” workers of how many of them lived in homes they were buying from the company.⁵⁷ In the union election a day or two later, the union lost by several hundred votes. Two months later, the company fired one of the leading activists behind the union organizing drive. He faced great difficulties finding a new job: “Since I have been fired, I have been busy looking for work to support my wife and child. It’s been hard. Business isn’t too good and I am pretty sure that the other problem is that mills won’t hire someone from the Linen Thread unless they know the worker did not try to help the union organize, and I don’t want to move away from my friends and kinfolk. I am still looking for work there.”⁵⁸

The anti-union campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s were not, of course, the first examples in American labor history of employers going to great lengths to try to dissuade workers from organizing, but they were the first of the post–Wagner Act era,

55. See Charles Littell testimony, *Hearings before Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field*, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1957, 5954.

56. Roberta Piercy statement, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, 211.

57. *Ibid.*, 202.

58. *Ibid.*, 205.

when employers had to contend with a strong labor movement and the existence of a code of law intended to permit workers to organize unions without fear of harassment or punishment by their employers. This made them different in important ways from earlier anti-union efforts. Employers in the postwar period relied much less on force and threats of violence than they had earlier. Instead, these anti-union efforts depended upon propaganda, combined with an aggressive use of the economic power of the company and the control it exercised over the livelihoods of its employees. The anti-union campaigns portrayed a vision of the world in which corporations exercised tremendous power over the lives of its workers — power corporations could wield for good but could also turn against workers if they offended management. In the normal course of events, the corporation created a community of workers and managers. Employers treated workers well, and workers labored hard for them. If the union — which according to the anti-union campaigns always represented a sly group of outsiders — challenged the employer, the benevolent power of the corporation would suddenly turn sour. The interests of the workers were naturally aligned with those of the company, but if the workers failed to recognize this, they would inevitably face the company's wrath. The workers could not possibly know what was best for them in the end — the company was obliged to protect them from the union and from the foolish, naïve idea that they could actually exercise some power over their lives. Such campaigns were not always successful. Organizers recognized the importance of deepening their educational efforts to strengthen the commitment of union supporters and sought to find ways to allay the fears and anxieties played upon by the anti-union campaigns, but frequently unions were simply stymied when employers mobilized their economic power to punish and frighten pro-union workers.⁵⁹

The significance of these anti-union campaigns lies in part in the effect they had on the labor movement and the increasing difficulties that unions faced in organizing during the 1950s, but they have broader political significance as well. Although economic pressures surely shaped the willingness of these companies to fight union drives, the close resemblance of these campaigns to the anti-union rhetoric of the conservative movement developing over this decade suggests that they were also motivated by broader political and ideological concerns. Anti-union campaigns echoed the analysis of unions by conservative think tanks and radio stations such as the American Enterprise Association and the Manion Forum, according to which management and workers were united by populist bonds against labor unions, elite intellectuals, government bureaucrats, and other nonproductive parts of society. The denunciations of unions as intrusive outsiders resembled the campaigns led by General Electric's

59. See Minchin, *What Do We Need a Union For?*, 32–37, for a short discussion of the ideas that union organizers in the late 1940s had about how to combat anti-union campaigns. In *Union-Free America*, Lawrence Richards details several organizing drives in the 1970s and 1980s in which workers faced strong anti-union campaigns and gives a good sense of how union organizers tried to respond to the messages of employers — assuring workers that they were protected by the NLRA, reminding them that they and not a group of outsiders would vote on contracts and strikes, and in general giving workers the sense that the union belonged to them and would be an expression of their own labor and power.

Lemuel Ricketts Boulware to portray the International Union of Electrical Workers and the United Electrical Workers (which already represented workers at General Electric) as meddlers determined to interfere with the ability of the company to intuit the “balanced best interests” of all. The depiction of union violence resonated with the arguments advanced by the Kohler Company during the long strike of the United Auto Workers in Sheboygan, Wisconsin. It gained intellectual heft from the writings of economists such as Ludwig von Mises, who portrayed collective bargaining as inherently coercive. The suggestion that labor unions were greedy, corrupt, violent, and only involved in organizing to profit off of workers was similar to the arguments put forward by the National Right-to-Work Committee, founded in 1955, which organized and coordinated support for antilabor activism and right-to-work initiatives on the state level. In 1958, six western and midwestern states saw right-to-work initiative campaigns, and although all but one were unsuccessful, they were a sign of a newly aggressive antilabor mood among businessmen. Barry Goldwater’s reelection campaign in Arizona that same year also centered on the need for businesses to come together to combat the excessive power of labor and drew support from anti-union businessmen around the country, as did his presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1964. He drew on the support of businessmen such as Boulware and Kohler, who became political activists in the conservative movement out of their experience opposing unions in their companies, even as their conservative political beliefs emboldened them to fight the unions at their plants.⁶⁰ The Senate hearings on corruption in the labor movement—which resulted in the passage of the Landrum-Griffith Act of 1959—also reflected (as well as shaped) this revived opposition to labor.

The antilabor rhetoric of the developing postwar conservative movement shared many of the same themes as the anti-union campaigns in its efforts to link the interests of business and the rich to those of workers and ordinary people and in its attempt to paint liberal organizations such as unions as the province of elite outsiders. In this sense, the contest on the shop floor was intimately linked to the larger contest over postwar liberalism and the power of labor and the state. Anti-union campaigns provided one center for the development of conservative political ideas and tactics, and they also helped to create a community of businessmen who were organizing and talking to one another about the best ways to fight union power both in the workplace and in American society at large. ▣

60. For the role of economic arguments, business organizing, and anti-unionism in the conservative movement in the 1950s, see Shermer, “Origins of the Conservative Ascendancy”; Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands*; and Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm*.